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Abstract 
 
The thesis analyses spatial dependence in dyadic data by the means of three applications. 
These have in common that they concern bilateral international relations or flows between 
two countries with a particular focus on the relationship between developing and developed 
countries. While the first chapter provides a general introduction to spatial dependence with 
a focus on dyadic datasets, the second chapter looks at double taxation treaties (DTTs) and 
analyses whether strategic interaction among capital importing countries can explain the 
widespread conclusion of double taxation treaties between an industrialised and a 
developing country. This is important since upon entering such a treaty, the net-capital 
importer can lose a significant amount of tax revenues from foreign direct investment 
(FDI), while the net-capital exporter is better off. The analysis reveals that a country is 
more likely to enter a DTT if competitor countries for FDI also negotiated such a DTT, 
providing evidence for the hypothesis that the group of net-capital importers finds itself in a 
situation which can be described as a prisoners’ dilemma: individually they would be better 
off if they refused to negotiate a treaty, but collectively they have an incentive to sign such 
a tax treaty. The third chapter is on official development assistance and deals with the 
question whether a specific donor tends to dedicate a larger share of its aid budget to a 
certain recipient if other donors give money to the same beneficiary. A considerable degree 
of spatial dependence is found in the form that donors tend to allocate their money to the 
same recipients. Donors particularly follow the example of the most important aid donors. 
This behaviour has negative implications for aid effectiveness, contributes to harmful aid 
volatility and leads to aid darlings and orphans. However, there is no evidence that donors 
strategically interact with each other in order to pursue their military strategic and 
economic goals. Spatial dependence in asylum migration is the third application, discussed 
in the fourth chapter. It is well documented in the literature that personal networks of 
migrants reduce the risk of migration and facilitate transition to the host country. So far it 
has always been assumed that these personal networks only exist for fellow countrymen. 
The empirical analysis, however, shows that the positive effects also operate across borders 
and that also migrants from other geographically close source countries make asylum 
migration from a given source country more likely. Furthermore, it is shown that a more 
restrictive asylum policy in one destination country provides a negative externality for 
other destinations. This is because asylum seekers are deflected by a tighter asylum regime 
and encouraged to lodge their application in more liberal target countries.  
 5
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my family for all their support of any kind, particularly my parents for 
their apparently successful laissez-faire education and their steady encouragement to go my 
own path. I thank Viktoria for her support, loving inducement and for enduring a three-year 
long distance relationship. I further thank Oliver for irreplaceable assistance in finding 
solutions for my numerous STATA problems. A very special thanks to Mrs. Rosenauer 
without whom my life could easily have taken a less favourable direction. 
 
My greatest thanks are to Eric Neumayer for the best supervision imaginable – both from a 
personal and a professional point of view. Without his commitment, great support and 
invaluable advice this dissertation would not have been possible – or at least much less fun. 
I am also grateful to Steve Gibbons for being my secondary supervisor and for many 
valuable comments on my first chapter. Last but not least I acknowledge financial support 
from the Department of Geography and Environment.   
 
 6
Table of Contents 
1.  Introduction ............................................................................................................. 12 
1.1.  Introduction ...................................................................................................... 13 
1.2.  Theory of spatial interdependence .................................................................... 14 
1.3.  Modelling spatial dependence .......................................................................... 16 
1.4.  Empirical problems to identify spatial dependence.......................................... 25 
1.5.  Summary of the findings .................................................................................. 26 
References ................................................................................................................... 36 
2.  Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial Dependence in the Diffusion of 
Double Taxation Treaties ................................................................................................ 38 
2.1.  Introduction ...................................................................................................... 39 
2.2.  Review of Literature ......................................................................................... 44 
2.3.  Descriptive Analysis of DTT Diffusion ........................................................... 48 
2.4.  Theoretical Foundations ................................................................................... 54 
2.5.  Data and Methodology ..................................................................................... 70 
2.6.  Main Results ..................................................................................................... 83 
2.7.  Robustness Tests .............................................................................................. 87 
2.8.  Conditional Spatial Policy Dependence ........................................................... 96 
2.9.  Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 99 
References ................................................................................................................. 102 
Appendix ................................................................................................................... 113 
3.  Are Donors Sheep? – Spatial Dependence in Bi- and Multilateral Aid Giving 
Patterns .......................................................................................................................... 123 
3.1.  Introduction .................................................................................................... 124 
3.2.  Origin and consequences of spatial dependence ............................................ 126 
3.3.  Literature review ............................................................................................ 131 
3.4.  Methodology and Data Description................................................................ 139 
3.5.  Main Results ................................................................................................... 155 
3.6.  Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 177 
References ................................................................................................................. 179 
Appendix ................................................................................................................... 186 
4.  Spatial Dependence in Asylum Migration ............................................................ 188 
4.1.  Introduction .................................................................................................... 189 
4.2.  Definition and descriptive analysis of asylum seekers ................................... 191 
 7
4.3.  Costs and benefits of asylum migration for the migrant and the host country, 
trends in asylum policy and sources of spatial dependence ...................................... 201 
4.4.  Literature review ............................................................................................ 216 
4.5.  Data and methodology .................................................................................... 227 
4.6.  Main results and robustness checks ................................................................ 244 
4.7.  Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 256 
References ................................................................................................................. 258 
Appendix ................................................................................................................... 267 
5.  Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 271 
References ................................................................................................................. 274 
 8
List of Tables 
Table 1:  DTT details and FDI stock asymmetry of selected countries ...................... 43 
Table 2:  Regional distribution of DTTs and percentage of possible combinations 
covered by a DTT ......................................................................................... 51 
Table 3:  Share of DTTs by income group dyad-type ................................................. 52 
Table 4:  The Use of Fiscal Incentives ......................................................................... 63 
Table 5:  Summary statistics and data sources ............................................................. 80 
Table 6:  Estimation results of Cox proportional hazard model .................................. 85 
Table 7:  Estimation results for OECD member and non-member country dyads ...... 88 
Table 8:  Estimation results for specific target contagion in a directed dyad         
dataset (from OECD member to non-member country) ............................... 90 
Table 9:  Non-proportional hazard diagnostics (Grambsch and Therneau test) .......... 92 
Table 10:  Estimation results of Cox proportional hazard model (with time  
interactions) .................................................................................................. 94 
Table 11:  Estimation results for spatial lags interacted with maximum number of 
DTTs ............................................................................................................ 97 
Table 12:  Estimation results for spatial lags interacted with years since        
independence ................................................................................................ 98 
Table 13:  Estimation results for spatial lags interacted with openness to trade ........... 99 
Table 14:  Logit estimation results: Spatial lags interacted with number of             
DTTs (max.) ............................................................................................... 114 
Table 15:  Logit estimation results: Spatial lags interacted with years since 
independence .............................................................................................. 117 
Table 16:  Logit estimation results: Spatial lags interacted with the product of  
openness  to trade ....................................................................................... 120 
Table 17:  Results of previous studies ......................................................................... 136 
Table 18:  Summary statistics ..................................................................................... 151 
Table 19:  Eligibility stage (first stage) fixed-effects Logit results for all donors ...... 158 
Table 20:  Allocation stage (second stage) fixed effects estimation results for all  
donors ......................................................................................................... 162 
Table 21:  Allocation stage (second stage) fixed effects estimation results for     
bilateral donors ........................................................................................... 165 
Table 22:  Allocation stage (second stage) fixed effects estimation results for 
multilateral donors ..................................................................................... 166 
 9
Table 23:  Allocation stage (second stage) fixed effects estimation results for big 
Western donors ........................................................................................... 168 
Table 24:  Allocation stage (second stage) fixed effects estimation results for like-
minded donors ............................................................................................ 169 
Table 25:  Allocation stage (second stage) fixed effects estimation results for other 
bilateral donors ........................................................................................... 171 
Table 26:  Conditional spatial lag effects (interacted with aid share donor, allocation 
stage fixed effects estimation results for all donors) .................................. 174 
Table 27:  Donor classification ................................................................................... 186 
Table 28:  List of recipients ......................................................................................... 187 
Table 29:  Annual averages of applications per 1000 people in different destination 
countries ..................................................................................................... 200 
Table 30:  Summary statistics and data sources of the dependent and the control 
variables ..................................................................................................... 239 
Table 31:  Summary statistics of the spatial lags ........................................................ 240 
Table 32:  OLS estimation results for specific source contagion with source and     
target specific time trend ............................................................................ 248 
Table 33:  OLS estimation results for specific target contagion with source and      
target pecific time trend ............................................................................. 252 
Table 34:  OLS estimation results for specific source and specific target contagion  
with source and target specific time trend .................................................. 255 
Table 35:  List of target countries and first year of detailed data availability ............. 267 
Table 36:  List of source countries .............................................................................. 268 
Table 37:  OLS estimation results for specific source contagion with general           
time trend ................................................................................................... 269 
 
 10
List of Figures 
Figure 1:  Spatial dependence in monadic data ............................................................ 16 
Figure 2:  Spatial dependence in undirected dyads ...................................................... 18 
Figure 3:  Spatial dependence in directed dyads: directed dyad contagion .................. 19 
Figure 4:  Spatial dependence in directed dyads: aggregate source contagion ............. 20 
Figure 5:  Spatial dependence in directed dyads: aggregate target contagion .............. 21 
Figure 6:  Spatial dependence in directed dyads: specific source contagion ................ 22 
Figure 7:  Spatial dependence in directed dyads: specific target contagion ................. 22 
Figure 8:  Specific source contagion in Chapter 3 ........................................................ 32 
Figure 9:  Newly concluded DTTs per annum (left hand scale) and total number of 
DTTs signed (right hand scale) ..................................................................... 41 
Figure 10:  Median of GDP per capita ratios of the two signatory states (in current  
USD) ............................................................................................................. 50 
Figure 11:  Number of OECD members (left hand scale) and percentage of all possible 
combinations covered by a DTT (right hand scale) ...................................... 52 
Figure 12:  Share of DTTs signed by OECD membership groups ................................. 53 
Figure 13:  Prisoners’ dilemma among developing countries in the area of FDI ........... 61 
Figure 14:  Interaction effect between the spatial lag using common region as a 
weighting matrix and number of DTTs (max) ........................................... 115 
Figure 15:  Interaction effect between the spatial lag using export market similarity      
as a weighting matrix and number of DTTs (max) .................................... 116 
Figure 16:  Interaction effect between the spatial lag using export product similarity     
as a weighting matrix and number of DTTs (max) .................................... 116 
Figure 17:  Interaction effect between the spatial lag using common region as a 
weighting matrix and years of independence ............................................. 118 
Figure 18:  Interaction effect between the spatial lag using export market similarity      
as a weighting matrix and years of independence ...................................... 118 
Figure 19:  Interaction effect between the spatial lag using export product similarity     
as a weighting matrix and years of independence ...................................... 119 
Figure 20:  Interaction effect between the spatial lag using common region as a 
weighting matrix and product of openness’ ............................................... 121 
Figure 21:  Interaction effect between the spatial lag using export market similarity      
as a weighting matrix and product of openness’ ........................................ 121 
 11
Figure 22:  Interaction effect between the spatial lag using export product similarity     
as a weighting matrix and product of openness’ ........................................ 122 
Figure 23:  Share of a donor’s aid at the total global aid budget .................................. 172 
Figure 24:  Total number of asylum applications in industrialised OECD countries 
1980-2009 (in Thousands) ......................................................................... 193 
Figure 25:  Total number of applications in OECD countries by region of origin (in 
Thousands) ................................................................................................. 194 
Figure 26:  Asylum applications in Australia by region of origin ................................ 195 
Figure 27:  Asylum applications in France by region of origin .................................... 196 
Figure 28:  Asylum applications in Germany by region of origin ................................ 197 
Figure 29:  Asylum applications in the United Kingdom by region of origin .............. 197 
Figure 30:  Asylum applications in the United States by region of origin ................... 198 
 
 
 12
1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13
1.1. Introduction 
There is a surging interest in the research of spatial dependence which has already covered 
a wide range of topics in social sciences;1 however, so far the focus of empirical work 
clearly has been on monadic data, while applications in dyadic data are still very rare. The 
terms “Spatial dependence” or “spatial contagion” refer to a phenomenon in which the 
behaviour of an actor is influenced by the action of other actors. In dyadic data, the unit of 
observation is usually a country-pair and the dependent variable describes some form of 
relationship between these two countries, such as a bilateral flow or a contract. Examples of 
existing application encompass trade flows (Porojan 2001), preferential trade agreements 
(Manger 2006), bilateral investment treaties (Elkins et al. 2006, Neumayer and Plümper 
2010), double taxation treaties (Neumayer and Plümper 2012), and conflict (Gartzke and 
Gleditsch 2006). Even though the idea of spatial dependence is not new and there are 
earlier applications in dyadic data, Neumayer and Plümper (2010) were the first to 
categorise and name all potential forms of spatial dependence in these two-country-settings. 
There are different ways to model spatial dependence, namely the spatial-lag, the spatial-x 
and the spatial error model. In the first model, the weighted values of the dependent 
variable in all other dyads are included as an independent variable, while in a spatial-x 
model the dependent variable is regressed on the weighted values of one or more 
explanatory variables in other dyads and spatial dependence is modeled as a part of the 
error term in the spatial error model (Anselin 1988). In this thesis, the spatial-lag model is 
used to test the hypothesis derived from theoretical discussions. In such a model, the 
linkage between two dyads (or individual members of two different dyads) has to be 
modelled. Based on Tobler’s (1970: 236) observation that “everything is related to 
everything else, but near things are more related than distant things”, which commonly has 
become known as the first “law” of geography, the most popular link between two units is 
based on geographical distance, where lower weight is allocated to more remote units. 
However, the concept of distance can also be transferred to other measures of similarity or 
channels through which spatial contagion works. 
 
This thesis contributes to the still very limited literature on spatial dependence in dyadic 
data by analysing three different applications: The second chapter looks at spatial 
dependence in the diffusion of double taxation treaties, i.e. whether the propensity that a 
given country pair enters such a treaty depends on the existing tax treaty network. In the 
                                                 
1 See Plümper and Neumayer (2010) for a list of existing studies.  
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third chapter, spatial dependence in aid allocation is analysed. Specifically, the question 
whether the official development assistance of a donor to a given recipient is influenced by 
aid flows from other donors to the same beneficiary country is addressed. Finally, the 
fourth chapter on the one hand investigates whether the number of asylum seekers from one 
source in a destination country depends on the asylum flow from other source countries in 
the same target country. On the other hand, it is analysed whether the number of asylum 
applications from one country in a destination country is affected by the number of 
applications from the same source country in other target countries. In all three case 
studies, there is comprehensive evidence for spatial dependence which indicates that an 
implicit assumption of empirical studies which neglect spatial dependence, namely that 
governments’ and individuals’ decisions are taken independently of the actions of others, is 
not appropriate in many cases. In the first case study, spatial contagion provides an 
explanation for the seemingly irrational behaviour of developing countries when they enter 
tax treaties with major capital exporters. Bilateral aid and asylum flows have been a 
popular topic in empirical research. While the potential spatial contagion in asylum flows 
has been fully neglected so far, existing work on aid neither has modelled the spatial 
dependence properly nor does it provide theoretical arguments for the specification of the 
linkages.  
 
This introductory part is intentionally kept short and it outlines only the key concepts and 
methodological issues since each chapter has its own introduction to ease the flow of 
reading. In these introductions, the specific topic is set up and the research gap is presented 
in detail. The remainder of this first chapter is structured as follows: In Section 2, the 
theory of spatial dependence and its main causes are discussed followed by an illustration 
of the possible forms of spatial dependence in dyadic data. Section 4 is dedicated to the 
empirical problems when estimating spatial dependence. Finally, Section 5 provides a brief 
summary of the theoretical considerations and the main findings of the three applications 
which form the main part of this thesis. 
 
 
1.2. Theory of spatial interdependence 
There is a plethora of reasons why the action of one individual is influenced by the 
activities of his or her neighbours, peers, friends or competitors. Nevertheless, Franzese and 
Hays (2010) describe a few main sources of spatial dependence, which can be used to 
explain a wide range of observable behaviour. In general, interdependence occurs if the 
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marginal utility of an actor i is influenced by the action of another actor j (Franzese and 
Hays 2010). Spatial dependence can be positive or negative. Positive spatial dependence 
means that contagion leads to a change in the behaviour of the influenced actor in the same 
direction as the behaviour of the actor that causes contagion. This would be the case, if for 
instance, one country lowered its corporate tax rate and other countries follow suit. In 
contrast, negative spatial dependence triggers behaviour of the influenced actor which in 
the opposite direction of the action of the source of contagion. For example, if one country 
cuts its greenhouse gas emissions to combat global warming, other countries might reduce 
their efforts to lower their emissions. 
The first main source of spatial dependence is strategic interaction, which is caused by 
positive or negative externalities. Basically, the externality could either be positive or 
negative. In the first case, the behaviour of another actor j increases the utility of actor i. 
Positive externalities could for example lead to free-riding behaviour, where actor i reduces 
its contribution to a common good if actor j provides more of this good. Another example is 
late mover advantage: this is the case if a company faces lower costs and less risk to enter a 
market when it is not the first to open up this market. An example for a negative externality 
is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, in which the policy action of one country (e.g. a tighter 
asylum policy) lowers the utility of other countries (e.g. rise in asylum applications). As a 
consequence, a race-to-the-bottom could evolve in which the influenced actors have an 
incentive to copy or even magnify the policy action of another country. In general, positive 
externalities lead to negative and negative externalities to positive spatial dependence 
(Franzese and Hays 2010). The second basic source of spatial dependence stems from 
learning from other actors. Learning can also cause both positive and negative spatial 
dependence. In the first case, actor i copies the action of actor j after observing that this 
action proved to be beneficial. Learning could also lead to negative spatial dependence, if 
actor i observes a detrimental effect of an action taken by actor j and decides to do the 
opposite. Finally, also coercion could lead to spatial dependence, most likely in the positive 
form if actor j forces actor i to align its behaviour or policy with its own behaviour or 
policy. On the one hand, such coercion could for example be due to social group pressure 
among individuals. Governments, on the other hand, may exert coercion on other 
governments if they have an economic, ideological, social or cultural incentive to do so 
(Neumayer and Plümper 2012).  
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1.3. Modelling spatial dependence 
While spatial dependence in monadic data is straightforward and the leeway is limited to 
the choice of the appropriate weighting matrix, modelling such dependencies in dyadic 
frameworks allows for a much larger variety of possibilities. After a short review of spatial 
dependence in monadic data, this section first presents all possible forms of spatial 
contagion in dyadic frameworks and then discusses the options for the weighting matrix. 
Much of this work can be credited to Neumayer and Plümper (2010) who were the first to 
address spatial dependence in dyadic data. 
 
 
Forms of spatial dependence 
If spatial contagion exists, in monadic data the outcome in the observational unit i depends 
on the weighted actions of other units k. In social sciences such an outcome could be the 
policy choice of a local or national government, the advertising budget of a company or the 
decision of an individual to buy a certain product, which is influenced by the policy choices 
of other governments, the money spent by other firms or the buying behaviour of friends. 
The linkage between the unit under observation and the other units is modelled in a 
weighting matrix wik, which connects unit i to other units k. This relationship is depicted in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Spatial dependence in monadic data 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Abstracting from all control variables and a potential time-dimension, the spatial lag model 
for monadic data can be formally expressed as follows (Neumayer and Plümper 2010): 
 i ik k i
k
y w y  
 
(1) 
where the dependent variable yi is the outcome in unit i which is explained by the weighted 
sum of the outcomes in other units k and ρ is the spatial lag parameter to be estimated. Yi is 
said to be spatially dependent on yk if the spatial lag parameter is statistically significant 
different from zero. In general, a positive spatial lag parameter indicates a complementary 
relationship between the unit under observation and other units, whereas a negative 
parameter shows that they are substitutes.  
 
In dyadic data generally two different forms can be distinguished, namely undirected and 
directed dyads. In directed dyads, there is a clear distinction between the sender and the 
recipient, the exporter and the importer, or the aggressor and the victim, whereas such a 
differentiation is not possible or not theoretically interesting in undirected dyads.2 
Examples for directed dyads are international flows such as trade, foreign direct investment 
or migration, but also military actions and telecommunication connections, while a 
voluntarily entered international agreement is an example of an undirected dyad. Modelling 
spatial dependence in undirected dyads closely resembles the spatial lag-model in monadic 
data with the notable difference that not units depend on each other but dyads. This 
relationship is shown in Figure 2. Member i and member j are the two countries forming 
the dyad under observation and the double-headed arrow indicates that no direction of their 
interaction can be distinguished. The relationship in dyad ij (or dyad ji) spatially depends 
on the weighted aggregate relationship between other dyads km (or mk), where the weight 
w(km)(ij) determines the influence of a given dyad and represents the connectivity between 
dyad km and dyad ij. The weights are illustrated as dashed arrows in the figure. Formally, 
this reads as follows (Neumayer and Plümper 2010): 
 ij pq km ij
km ij
y w y 

 
 
(2) 
                                                 
2 One can still distinguish dyad member i from dyad member j, but dyad ij is the same as dyad ji. 
 18
where wpq is a more general form of the weighting matrix connecting dyad ij and dyad km.3  
 
Figure 2: Spatial dependence in undirected dyads 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
In directed dyads, there are five different forms of spatial dependence. The one that is 
equivalent to undirected dyad contagion is named directed dyad contagion by Neumayer 
and Plümper (2010) and illustrated in Figure 3. Here, for example, the trade flow between 
source i and target j depends on the weighted trade between other dyads km and the 
weighting matrix w(km)(ij) again represents the connectivity between the influencing dyads 
and the dyad under observation. The formal expression of directed dyad contagion is the 
same as in undirected dyad contagion, since in both cases a dyad depends on a dyad and the 
only difference is the directedness. 
                                                 
3 Note that for clearness, Figure 2 shows a situation in which dyads containing either member i or member j 
have no contagious effect, whereas the mathematical expression only excludes the dyad ij, but for instance not 
the dyads ki and mj. 
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Figure 3: Spatial dependence in directed dyads: directed dyad contagion 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The four remaining forms of spatial dependence are slightly more complex. The basic 
modelling decision is whether the aggregate action of other sources or targets matters or 
their interaction with a specific target or a specific source. Staying with the example of 
international trade, the first type is aggregate source contagion, where the trade volume 
between exporter i and importer j depends on the weighted sum of the trade between all 
other exporters k and all other importers m. In Figure 4, trade flows are depicted as solid 
arrows.4 Under aggregate source contagion, the weighting matrix represents the 
connectivity between sources, more specifically between other sources k and the source 
under observation i. The weights are again pictured as dashed arrows in the graph. 
 
Following Neumayer and Plümper (2010), the most parsimonious estimation model for 
aggregate source contagion reads as follows: 
 ij pq km ij
k i m
y w y 

 
 
(3) 
 
                                                 
4 Again, for reasons of clarity trade involving either source i or target j is excluded in the graph, but this is not 
necessarily warranted, as such a choice must be justified theoretically. 
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Figure 4: Spatial dependence in directed dyads: aggregate source contagion 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The counterpart to aggregate source contagion is aggregate target contagion (Figure 5), 
where the trade flow between source i and target j again depends on the weighted sum of 
the trade flows between all other sources k and all other targets m. However, here the 
weighting matrix measures the connectivity between target k and target j. The formal 
expression of aggregate target contagion is (Neumayer and Plümper 2010): 
 ij pq km ij
k m j
y w y 

 
 
(4) 
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Figure 5: Spatial dependence in directed dyads: aggregate target contagion 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
Finally, in the last two forms of spatial dependence only a subset of sources or targets 
influences dyad ij, namely those sources and targets which are linked to target j and source 
i, respectively. First, under specific source contagion (Figure 6), the trade volume between 
source i and target j depends on the weighted sum of trade between all other sources k and 
the same target j. The weighting matrix represents the connectivity between source k and 
source i and the formal expression is as follows (Neumayer and Plümper 2010): 
 ij pq kj ij
k i
y w y 

 
 
(5) 
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Figure 6: Spatial dependence in directed dyads: specific source contagion 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The second specific form is specific target contagion, under which the trade flow between 
exporter i and importer j is influenced by the weighted aggregate of trade between source i 
and other targets m (Figure 7). The weighting matrix measures the connectivity between 
other targets m and the target under observation j. The mathematical expression for specific 
target contagion is (Neumayer and Plümper 2010): 
 ij pq im ij
m j
y w y 

 
 
(6) 
 
Figure 7: Spatial dependence in directed dyads: specific target contagion 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
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The choice of the weighting matrix 
In general, the weighting matrix is used to model the connectivity between units in monadic 
data, between dyads under undirected and directed dyad contagion  and between sources or 
targets in the remaining four forms. This section addresses only the key issues, a more 
comprehensive discussion can be found in Neumayer and Plümper (2010) and on the row-
standardisation in Plümper and Neumayer (2010) as well as in Neumayer and Plümper 
(2012). Based on Tobler’s (1970) first law of geography, the most common weighting 
matrix is based on geographical distance (Beck et al. 2006), in which the allocated weight 
decreases with distance or the influence is limited to adjacent units. However, spatial 
influence often is not only determined by geographical distance, but it could also be due to 
a common membership in an international organisation or by the degree of structural 
similarity of countries. Such dependencies can also be modelled in the weighting matrix. 
Independent of whether the data is monadic or dyadic and the directedness of the dyad, the 
connectivity in the weighting matrix itself can be directed or undirected (Neumayer and 
Plümper 2010). Geographical distance, export product similarity and common membership 
are examples of an undirected connectivity. In this case the weighting matrix wik is identical 
to wki due to the undirectedness of the connectivity. An example for a directed connectivity 
is imports, if a country is influenced by other countries and the extent of this influence is 
determined by the import volume from a given exporter. Here, with exports as the 
connectivity variable, the weighting matrix wik, in which case connectivity measures 
exports from country i (the country under observation) to country k, is different from the 
weighting matrix wki, where connectivity measures exports from country k to country i. 
Such a simple form of the weighting matrix is appropriate if the connectivity between 
single countries is modelled rather than between dyads, for instance in monadic data or 
between sources in specific and aggregate source contagion. If the connectivity in dyadic 
data is not modelled between the member of one dyad and the member of another dyad, but 
between dyads as a whole, the weighting matrix gets more complicated. Basically, there are 
two main options. First, the linkage between one dyad and another is still represented by 
the connectivity between individual members of different dyads, but these linkages have to 
be combined to form the connectivity between two dyads. For instance, if theory suggests 
that all countries with a common border exert the same amount of influence, the weighting 
matrix between dyad member i of the dyad under observation and the dyad member k of 
other dyads contains the value of one if i and k share a common border. Similarly, the 
corresponding cell of the weighting matrix between dyad member j of the dyad under 
observation and dyad member m of other dyads gets the value of one, if j and m are 
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adjacent countries. These two weighting matrices have to be combined into one to represent 
the connectivity between dyad ij and dyad km. The two most straightforward ways of doing 
this are either summing the two matrices up or multiplying them. If the weighting matrices 
are added up, a substitutive relationship between the two linkages is assumed. In this case, 
the weighting matrix w(ik+jm) contains a one if either country i shares a border with country k 
or country j has a common border with country m.5 In contrast, both linkages are regarded 
as complements, if the product of both weighting matrices is taken. Here, the weighting 
matrix w(ik*jm) contains a one only if both country i shares a border with country k and 
country j is adjacent to country m. Second, and alternatively, the weighting matrix could 
consist of a link between a property of the dyad ij itself on the one hand and the dyad km on 
the other, in which case the weighting matrix would be w(ij)(km).  
 
The second important question regarding the weighting matrix is whether to row-
standardise or not. In a row-standardised matrix, each cell of the matrix is divided by the 
sum of its row. As a consequence, the spatial lag is no longer the weighted sum of the 
lagged dependent variable in other units or dyads but the weighted average. Row-
standardisation has several advantages for the interpretation of the results: First, the spatial 
lag has the same metric unit than the dependent variable itself, which allows a direct 
comparison of the coefficient of the spatial lag with the coefficient of a temporal lag (Ward 
and Gleditsch 2008). Second, it enables the researcher to interpret the coefficient size of the 
spatial lag as the approximate strength of interdependence (Franzese and Hays 2008). And 
third, the stationarity requirement can be checked easily if the sum of the coefficient of the 
spatial lag and the coefficient of the temporal lag is less than one (Franzese and Hays 
2008). While row-standardisation is common practice in spatial econometrics (Anselin 
2002, Francese and Hays 2006), Plümper and Neumayer (2010) argue that this procedure 
has to be theoretically justified as it changes the relative weight that is given to other 
observations, unless the special case of a unitary weighting matrix is used, which gives 
equal weight to all other observations. Staying with the example of a contiguity weighting 
matrix, Portugal has only one neighbour, namely Spain, whereas the Netherlands have two 
neighbours (Belgium and Germany). Without row-standardisation, Spain exerts the same 
influence on Portugal as Belgium and Germany on the Netherlands. In a row-standardised 
weighting matrix, however, Belgium and Germany both exert 50 percent of the total weight 
                                                 
5 In this case of a binary weighting matrix, the combined matrix contains the value of two if both country i 
and country k and country j and country m share a border. As a consequence, the influence of such a dyad 
would be twice as high as the impact of a dyad in which only one dyad member has a common border. The 
researcher has to decide whether this is theoretically justified. 
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on the Netherlands, while Spain’s influence is a 100 percent of all impact on Portugal. This 
is because row-standardisation removes all level effects in the weighting matrix (Neumayer 
and Plümper 2012). 
 
 
1.4. Empirical problems to identify spatial dependence  
Even if spatial patterns are found in a regression analysis, i.e. the coefficient of the spatial 
lag is statistically different from zero, these effects do not necessarily represent spatial 
contagion, but they could also be due to spurious effects. The reason is that geographically 
close units are likely to be more similar than more remote units, as many observable and 
unobservable phenomena such us cultural habits, preferences or institutions are spatially 
clustered (Plümper and Neumayer 2010). If these influencing factors can be observed, they 
are referred to as spatial clustering. They are less problematic in an empirical analysis if 
appropriate measures or proxies allow controlling for them. More challenging are 
unobserved factors which are spatially correlated and are known as unobserved spatial 
heterogeneity. If these factors are correlated both with the outcome and the spatially lagged 
dependent variable, the latter is correlated with the error term and hence endogenous as one 
of the main assumptions of the OLS model is violated. In this case, the estimated 
coefficients are biased. Distinguishing spatial clustering and unobserved spatial 
heterogeneity from causal effects is widely known as Galton’s Problem (Galton 1889).6 
Apart from observable and unobservable factors that are spatially correlated, also common 
trends and common shocks could lead to spurious spatial dependence. A common trend 
exists if there is a factor which varies over time in numerous units that are connected via 
the weighting matrix. For instance, population grows in nearly all countries, even though it 
is likely that there is no contagious effect of population growth in one country on the 
fertility of the population in other countries. However, the inclusion of the weighted 
population growth rate in neighbouring countries would probably indicate a positive effect. 
Similarly, a common shock is a one-time event which affects the outcome in more than one 
unit and thereby both the dependent variable in a given unit and the spatial lag. For 
instance, a wide-spread drought might affect child mortality in geographically close 
countries without representing a contagious effect. Both common shocks and common 
trends lead to upward biased estimates of the spatial lag. 
                                                 
6 Some authors, such as Gibbons and Overman (2010), argue that distinguishing these effects and hence 
identification is nearly impossible and advocate exploiting variance caused by “natural experiments”. While 
such an approach would render internal validity more likely, it considerably limits external validity if the 
results are not generalisable. 
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Plümper and Neumayer (2012) suggest several steps in model specification to mitigate the 
influence of common shocks and trends and to alleviate the problem of unobserved spatial 
heterogeneity, hence, to make spurious spatial effects less likely.  First, and most 
importantly, the inclusion of dyad-level fixed effects helps to mitigate the problem of 
unobserved spatial heterogeneity as they capture all time-invariant factors that are specific 
to a dyad. While this has the drawback that no estimates for time-invariant control variables 
can be obtained, it has the big advantage that all unobservable factors which do not vary 
over time are automatically controlled for. Estimation of the coefficients is based on over-
time variation of the variables only. This means that identification of spatial effects rests on 
the much weaker assumption that there is no unobserved spatial heterogeneity in changes, 
rather than in levels. Second, the model specification should be as broad as possible to 
account for spatial clustering in observable variables. If these variables are excluded from 
the regression but are correlated with the spatial lags, the coefficient estimates for the 
spatially lagged dependent variable suffer from an omitted-variable bias. Third, the 
inclusion of a temporal lag of the dependent variable captures common trends and also 
accounts for temporal dynamics. Finally, the inclusion of a t-1 set of year dummies controls 
for any general global trend in the dependent variable which leads to the common trend 
phenomenon described above, but it also captures the effect of common shocks. However, 
modelling such a general time trend assumes that the year effects are the same for every 
dyad in the sample which might not adequately address the common trend problem if the 
trend is specific to a subset of dyads. A more flexible way of modelling is the inclusion of 
dyad-specific time trends, or even time-trends that are specific to one or both of the dyad 
members. While these trends effectively control for common trends, they aggravate the 
problem of multicollinearity especially with trended variables such as population size.  
 
 
1.5. Summary of the findings  
This thesis provides three applications of spatial dependence in dyadic data, namely in the 
diffusion of double taxation treaties, in the patterns of bilateral and multilateral aid giving 
and in asylum migration. While these examples differ in some terms, they share certain 
important common characteristics. Starting with the differences, the first is an example of 
an undirected dyad, whereas the latter two are directed dyads. In the first two applications, 
the dependent variable is a government choice, while in the last it is the aggregate of 
individuals’ decisions to migrate. The most prominent common feature is that all three are 
based on dyadic data, specifically on country-pairs. In all case studies it is analysed, how 
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policy choices or migration flows in one country are affected by the actions of - or the 
migration patterns in - other countries. More specifically, each example addresses the 
relationship between developing and developed countries, even though from a different 
angle of view: the first example - double taxation treaties - analyses how strategic 
interaction between developing countries can explain their seemingly irrational behaviour. 
The second chapter examines how the aid allocation decision of a donor to a developing 
country is influenced by the aid amount that other donors give to the same recipient. 
Finally, the third case study scrutinises whether the number of asylum seekers from one 
source country in a destination country depends on the size of the asylum flows from other 
sources and to other targets. Here, developing countries are the main countries of origin of 
asylum migration, while the flows are often directed to industrialised nations. In the 
following, the research gap, the main theoretical arguments and the findings of each chapter 
are presented. 
 
 
Spatial dependence in the diffusion of double taxation treaties 
Double taxation treaties (DTTs) are international contracts which are concluded between 
two independent tax jurisdictions with the main task of allocating the taxation rights 
between the two signatory states. By alleviating twofold taxation, the aspired goal of such 
treaties is to facilitate the exchange of goods and services and to promote the exchange of 
capital and persons. Subordinate goals are administrative collaboration of tax authorities, 
facilitating the enforcement of domestic tax laws, combating tax evasion and the 
enshrinement of fiscal investment incentives which can be neutralised under certain 
circumstances in the international tax regime. Another advantage, particularly relevant for 
developing countries, is that tax treaties might be regarded as a commitment to 
jurisdictional predictability and stability by potential investors. Finally, tax treaties provide 
a global standard which lowers communication and enforcement costs and leads to positive 
network externalities if a large number of countries entered such a treaty. Concluding such 
a treaty, however, can lead to sizeable costs. The first cost bloc is administrative resources 
which are tied up during the negotiation and ratification process and which can be 
tremendous particularly if the tax systems of the signatory states differ widely and different 
languages have to be synchronised. The second and even more important cost factor is the 
potential loss of tax revenues for one of the contracting states. The vast majority of tax 
treaties are based on the OECD model treaty. These DTTs strongly favour residence- over 
source-taxation. This means that in the case of foreign direct investment, more taxation 
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rights are granted to the residence country of the investor than to the source country in 
which the taxable profit is generated. These source countries (in terms of profit) are left 
with a withholding tax usually ranging between zero and 15 percent which is specified in 
the treaty and credited against the tax liability of the investor in its country of residence to 
avoid double taxation. This does not impose a burden on the domestic tax revenues if the 
bilateral FDI stocks between the two contracting states are roughly equal as benefits 
granted in the own country to an investor from the other state should be offset by benefits 
offered to the own investors in the other state. In practice, however, bilateral FDI stocks are 
often highly asymmetric, where one country is a net-capital exporter and the other a net-
capital importer. In such a constellation, the net-importer faces a considerable net-loss in 
tax revenues which is determined by the level of domestic tax rates, the withholding tax 
rate and the degree of asymmetry in the FDI stock. Developing countries are not always but 
quite often in the position of a net-capital importer if the treaty is concluded between a 
developing and an industrialised country. Even though these countries might be worse off 
by signing a DTT, treaties between a developing and a developed nation are a widespread 
phenomenon. While theoretical arguments have been brought forward to explain this 
seemingly irrational behaviour, the analysis presented in chapter two is the first to address 
this issue empirically.  
 
To start with, there are two arguments for developing countries to enter a DTT which do 
not lead to spatial dependence in the diffusion of tax treaties: First, fiscal incentives in the 
form of tax reductions or tax holidays which are provided by a country to attract FDI can be 
neutralised if the country of residence of the investor grants tax credits for the amount of 
taxes paid in a foreign country to unilaterally avoid double taxation. In this case, a lower 
tax rate in the host country has no effect as this leads to less tax credits in the home country 
and does not affect the overall tax burden of a company. To avoid this, many DTTs contain 
a tax-sparing provision under which the original amount of tax is credited in the home 
country. The second argument for net-capital importing countries to enter a tax treaty is the 
dynamic inconsistency problem. The tax jurisdictions particularly of developing countries 
might be perceived as unreliable by investors. In fact, due to the fact that FDI is at least 
partly irreversible, the host country has an incentive to attract investors by lower tax rates 
and raise taxes after the investment took place. Since provisions for the maximum host 
country tax rate are included in a DTT, such a treaty mitigates the dynamic inconsistency 
problem. The final two arguments lead to spatial dependence, one through positive 
externalities and the other through strategic interaction among host countries. A dense 
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network of tax treaties that are based on the same model treaty lowers communication and 
enforcement costs not only for existing treaties, but also for newly entered DTTs. This 
positive network effects make the conclusion of an additional tax treaty more likely, the 
larger the network of existing treaties already is. The most important argument to explain 
the conclusion of a tax treaty in an asymmetric dyad, however, is strategic interaction 
among host countries. Baistrocchi (2008) describes the situation net-capital-importers find 
themselves in as a prisoner’s dilemma: Host countries are usually keen to attract FDI and 
tax treaties are perceived as one way to make the own country a more attractive investment 
location. If a country signs a DTT with a major capital exporter, it gains a relative 
advantage over its competitors and these have an incentive also to enter a tax treaty with 
the same capital exporter to offset their relative disadvantage. As a consequence, no host 
country has an advantage (in terms of FDI attractiveness) of entering a tax treaty, but net-
capital-importing countries would be better off, if none signed a DTT with a major capital-
exporter. By deteriorating the relative competitive position of other countries, a net-capital-
importer which enters a DTT imposes a negative externality on other countries. 
 
To test the argument that DTT diffusion is driven by the behaviour of competitors for FDI, 
the treaty formation between 186 countries in the period from 1969 to 2005 is analysed. 
The sample covers more than 2,300 treaty conclusions. Since there are theoretical 
arguments for both the capital-exporter (maximise tax revenues) and the capital-importer 
(attract FDI) to start the treaty-negotiations and such information is not available for many 
treaties, DTT conclusion is modelled as an undirected dyad. To delineate competing 
countries, three different concepts are used: First, all countries in the same region are 
assumed to compete for the same FDI. Second, countries which export a similar basket of 
goods and third, countries that serve similar export markets are taken as competitors. The 
main estimation technique is a Cox proportional hazard model, which provides estimates 
for factors influencing the time until a tax treaty is signed in a dyad. 
 
In line with the theoretical expectations, robust evidence is found that the treaty conclusion 
between two countries is positively influenced by tax treaties that are negotiated by 
competing countries. However, while competitive pressure is exerted by countries that 
export similar goods and from countries in the same region, no effect can be established for 
countries which serve similar export markets. This indicates that countries with a similar 
production structure are regarded as competitors for foreign capital as countries strive to 
attract a certain type of capital rather than a broad range of investors which export finished 
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products to specific markets. It is also found that the degree of spatial dependence 
systematically varies across countries: Fist, the spatial effect decreases with the number of 
DTTs a country already has signed. If a country already has a dense DTT network, likely it 
has covered all major capital exporters and is less influenced by the actions of other 
countries. Once a country gains independence, it is able to enter its own tax treaties. It is 
argued that such a newly independent country faces a higher competitive pressure as it has 
to neutralise its relative disadvantage. In line with this argument, spatial dependence is 
found to decrease with the years from independence.  
 
The consequences of such behaviour can be far-reaching for developing countries, which 
find themselves frequently in the position of a net-capital-importer: First, they lose tax 
revenues. Second, the effectiveness of a DTT to gain a competitive edge in the rivalry for 
foreign capital is lost once other competitor countries also have signed DTTs with major 
capital exporters. Collective action among developing countries could solve this dilemma, 
but is unlikely given the large number of parties involved and due to the fact that no single 
country could gain an advantage with a multilateral treaty. Also model treaties which are 
more favourable for developing countries failed to gain influence in international taxation. 
 
 
Spatial dependence in bi- and multilateral patterns of aid giving 
The third chapter deals with the question, whether the decision by a donor how to allocate 
its official development assistance (ODA) is influenced by the aid allocation decisions of 
other bilateral and multilateral donors. There are theoretical reasons for both positive and 
negative spatial dependence. In the first case, a given donor will increase (decrease) its aid 
to a given recipient if other donors give more (less) aid to the same recipient. Negative 
spatial dependence is found if a donor reduces (raises) the aid budget to a recipient country 
if other donors allocate more (less) aid to this recipient. The first reason for positive spatial 
dependence is the uncertainty necessarily involved in aid projects, e.g. whether the money 
actually reaches the beneficiary, how the money will be spent and whether the envisaged 
development effects will materialise. Since aid authorities are accountable to the national 
taxpayer, donors might follow the example of other donors and give funds to the same 
recipient countries since their allocation might be a signal for good aid projects (Vázquez 
2008). The second cause for positive spatial dependence is strategic interaction among 
donors. If aid is at least partly used to pursue national economic, political and military 
interests of the donor, each donor has to closely observe the actions of other donors and 
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react correspondingly. For instance, if another donor allocates a larger budget to an 
important trade partner and this is also an important trade partner of the donor under 
observation, this donor should follow suit and increase its aid budget in the recipient 
country to avoid losing influence. Negative spatial dependence could be a sign of donor 
specialisation over time if each donor concentrates its activities on a limited set of countries 
and this set is not identical for all donors. Such a specialisation would be in line with 
various political pledges to improve donor coordination. Taken together, either learning 
from others or strategic interaction form the cause of spatial dependence in this context. 
 
While the analysis provided in Chapter 3 is not the first to include the aid allocation by 
other donors into an estimation model, it is the first to model the spatial dependence 
explicitly by using appropriate weighting matrices. All former studies simply add the 
average or aggregate aid by other donors as a control variable, without providing 
theoretical arguments for this specification choice. They also never talk about “spatial 
dependence” which corroborates the assumption that the authors are not consciously 
analysing spatial dependence. The empirical work in Chapter 3 makes use of a newly 
published aid dataset and covers 20 bilateral donors and three multilateral donor 
organisations, 139 recipient countries and spans the period from 1974 to 2008. The aid 
allocation decision is modelled as a two-step process and spatial dependence is analysed in 
both steps: in the first step, a donor decides to which recipient countries a positive amount 
of aid is allocated in a given year (eligibility stage) and in the second step, the actual aid 
budget is distributed to the countries on the recipient list (allocation stage).  Aid allocation 
is a classical example of a directed dyad. The type of spatial dependence analysed is 
specific source contagion, however, some of the weighting matrix used to model the 
connectivity between different sources (donors) take their relationship with the target 
(recipient) into account. This is illustrated in Figure 8, in which for reasons of simplicity 
only two donors are shown. As in Section 3, the solid lines show the flow from the source 
to the target country, in this case the aid from donor i and donor k to recipient j. The first 
set of weighting matrices w(ik) is straightforward and models the direct connectivity 
between donor i and donor k. The empirical specification includes weighting matrices 
which allocate equal weight to all other donors, equal weight to members of a specific 
subgroup of donors and weight according to the importance of a given donor, measured by 
its share at the global aid budget. In contrast, the weights in the second set w(ij x kj) depend 
on the bilateral relationship both between donor i and recipient j and between donor k and 
recipient j. The product of these two relationships is taken to form the weight between 
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donor i and donor k. The relationships which are tested in the empirical work encompass 
trade relations, diplomatic relations and military strategic relations.   
 
Figure 8: Specific source contagion in Chapter 3 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
In the first stage, the eligibility stage, comprehensive evidence for positive spatial 
dependence is found. A donor is more likely to give aid to a specific recipient, if other 
donors also allocate some positive amount of aid to this recipient. The same effect holds 
true if the recipient-specific weighting matrices are used. Also in the second stage, all 
spatial lags are positive and statistically significant as long as they are estimated 
individually. If they are all included in one estimation model, only the spatial lag which 
allocates weight to donors according to their relative importance and the spatial lag 
accounting for military strategic relationships remain statistically significant. If different 
donor groups are analysed separately, it can be seen that the above results are representative 
for bilateral donors in general and the big Western donors in particular, whereas no 
evidence is found for spatial dependence among multilateral institutions. Interestingly, for 
the group of like-minded donors, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, 
which have the reputation that the promotion of good governance and democracy plays an 
important role in their aid allocation decisions, a different result is found: these donors 
generally allocate more aid to recipients which receive more aid from all other donors and 
particularly from other like-minded donors.  
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The results suggest that there is a considerable degree of spatial dependence in aid 
allocation – but only very limited evidence for strategic interaction among donors; at least 
not to pursue their economic and diplomatic goals. In their decision to allocate aid, donors 
clearly follow the aid allocations of other donors and they take aid allocation decisions of 
large donors as a guideline for the distribution of their own aid budget. 
 
 
Spatial dependence in asylum migration 
Finally, the fourth chapter deals with spatial dependence in international asylum migration 
flows. Two different forms of spatial dependence are analysed, namely specific source 
contagion and specific target contagion. The first type means that the number of asylum 
applications from one source country in a target country depends on the number of 
applications from other source countries in the same destination country. In contrast, under 
specific target contagion is the number of asylum seekers from a source country in a target 
country influenced by the number of applications from the same country of origin in other 
destination countries.  Migration in general and asylum migration in particular is subject to 
a great deal of uncertainty, as the migrant has to leave the familiar surroundings and social 
ties and accommodate to a new environment. Personal networks reduce the risk of 
migration since the members can assist in the search for accommodation or employment, 
help with language problems or provide other benefits such as a feeling of belonging. The 
importance of such networks is already well documented in the empirical and qualitative 
literature; however, so far it has always been assumed that these personal networks are 
confined to nationals of the migrant. This is not necessarily the case if also migrants from 
other adjacent or geographically close source countries facilitate transition and thereby 
reduce migration costs. If this is true, a higher number of asylum migrants from other 
countries in a given destination country should lead to more asylum seekers from the 
source country in question in the same target country. The second argument for specific 
source contagion is that there are scale effects in the international people smuggling 
networks. Many destination countries have strict border controls to combat illegal 
immigration and to deter asylum seekers. This is why the large majority of asylum migrants 
rely on the services of human traffickers. These agents invest time and money to make 
contacts with carriers, find suitable routes and loopholes to cross the border of the target 
country. If main routes have been established between a major source and a destination 
country or region, getting connected to the network is cheaper for surrounding countries via 
feeder routes. This should lower transport costs for migrants from geographically close 
 34
countries and make their numbers dependent on the size of the asylum flow from a major 
source country. Learning from role-models and the positive externality provided by other 
migrants are the main cause of specific source contagion. 
 
Policymakers in destination countries use a wide range of measures to discourage asylum 
seekers from lodging their application in their country, such as border controls, visa 
restrictions and sanctions against carriers which transport people without a valid visa, 
penalties for human traffickers, lower recognition rates, and restrictions on employment or 
limited welfare benefits. This is not only because of the fiscal costs associated with hosting 
asylum seekers, but also because of strong public resentments against asylum migrants, 
even though these are generally more directed against bogus refugees. These measures 
increase migration costs and could thereby deter some people from leaving their home 
country. However, most will either try their luck and lodge an application despite of a 
restrictive asylum policy or immigrate without applying for asylum and stay underground. 
Yet, some asylum seekers might also decide to file their application in a more lenient target 
country, i.e. they are not deterred, but only deflected. In this case, a lower number of 
asylum seekers from a source country in one target country should be associated with 
higher number of asylum migrants from the same source country in other targets, which 
means that there is negative specific target contagion. Here, deflecting asylum seekers to 
other countries represents a negative externality as the main source of specific target 
contagion as a form of spatial dependence. 
 
Both forms of spatial contagion are tested using a dataset which includes the bilateral 
number of asylum applications from 138 sources in 21 destination countries over the period 
1982 to 2008. To analyse specific source contagion, several weighting matrices based on 
geographically proximity of the source countries are used. Furthermore, to test whether 
personal networks are also based on a common language, an appropriate weighting matrix 
is employed. For specific target contagion, it is tested whether asylum seekers are attracted 
from more restrictive destination countries and deflected to countries with a more liberal 
asylum policy.  
 
The estimation results show comprehensive evidence for positive specific source contagion. 
This is in line with both theoretical explanations outlined above. The number of asylum 
seekers from a given source in a target country is positively influenced by the number of 
asylum seekers from other source countries which share a common border with the source 
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country in question, source countries from the same region or source countries in which the 
same language is spoken. The same holds true if all other source countries are weighted 
according to their geographical proximity to the country of origin under observation. If all 
spatial lags are estimated together, however, the spatial lag with the common language 
weighting matrix loses significance. This indicates that there is no personal network effect 
from migrants from other source countries with the same language, which are not 
geographically close to the source country in question. For specific target contagion, the 
expected negative spatial effects are found, i.e. asylum seekers are in fact deflected to 
countries with a more lenient policy and attracted from countries with a tighter asylum 
regime.  
 
Both findings have some important policy implications: It has been argued that personal 
networks originating from migrants from the same source country limit the effectiveness of 
deterrence policies, as a larger stock of migrants already in the country reduces the costs for 
each additional migrant (Hatton 2004). As a consequence, if a host country starts tightening 
asylum policy as a consequence of a mass influx, this step might be too late as those 
already in the country are not affected by the policy changes. A similar argument applies to 
migrants from other source countries if deterrence measures are targeted against migrants 
from a specific source country. Migrants from other source countries are not affected, but 
provide a benefit to asylum seekers from a given source country and lower thereby their 
migration costs. Hence, the effectiveness of targeted policy measures is curtailed. On the 
other hand, a tighter asylum policy provides a negative externality to other destination 
countries as these face higher application numbers as a consequence. They in turn have an 
incentive to react with tightening their policy which fuels a race-to-the-bottom in asylum 
standards. This negative externality provides one more reason for policy harmonisation and 
coordinated approaches to share the burden – not only, but particularly in order to 
guarantee a minimum treatment to refugees. 
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2. Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial Dependence in 
the Diffusion of Double Taxation Treaties 
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2.1. Introduction 
Double taxation treaties (DTTs) are international contracts which are concluded between 
two independent tax jurisdictions and determine to what extent either of the contracting 
states is allowed to tax revenues of companies operating in both countries. The ultimate aim 
of such a treaty is therefore the division of the international tax base. Furthermore, there are 
a number of sub-motives. Even though the OECD (2005: 52) states that “the principal 
purpose of double taxation conventions is to promote, by eliminating international double 
taxation, exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of capital and persons”, one 
of the most important objectives is the exchange of information on the revenues of 
companies in the respective contracting state to enforce domestic tax laws and combat tax 
evasion (Doernberg 2004). Apart from lessening administrative efforts as well as 
uncertainty faced by investors, curtailing tax evasion is also one of the reasons why DTTs 
harmonize calculation methods and definitions. This is particularly true for internal transfer 
pricing (Davies 2003). A motive that is especially important for developing countries is 
enshrining the effectiveness of tax related investment incentives to attract foreign capital, 
which can be neutralised without cooperation under certain conditions (Doernberg 2004). 
Besides, Baistrocchi (2008) argues that membership of the international tax treaty network 
based on the OECD model is associated with a minimisation of communication and 
enforcement costs as well as exclusive access to resources such as the multilateral advance 
pricing agreement. Finally, tax treaties regularly contain a dispute settlement mechanism. 
Some authors argue however that the benefits of entering a DTT may go beyond the mere 
treaty provisions in a way that signatory countries may gain “international economic 
recognition” (Dagan 2000: 32) or convey a “credible commitment to predictability and 
legal stability” (Baistrocchi 2008: 383). This argument might be even more relevant for 
developing countries as their regimes might be perceived to be less reliable and predictable 
(Arnold, Sasseville und Zolt  2002). 
 
On the other hand, concluding a DTT is accompanied by a series of costs. First, the process 
of negotiating and ratifying the treaty ties up administrative resources.7 These costs 
increase if the tax systems of the negotiation parties differ widely and if versions in 
different languages have to be synchronised. Second, sometimes the domestic tax laws 
have to be adapted to the provisions of the treaty. In this case the national fiscal sovereignty 
is curtailed. However, most important is the potential loss of tax revenues at least for one 
                                                 
7 These costs can be quite significant; Anecdotally, Shelton (2004: 1.74) points out that the negotiation of the 
Netherlands-US treaty took more than ten years and consumed probably several person-years of work. 
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contracting state. Most DTTs favour residence over source taxation: the domicile country 
of the investor is allowed to tax the worldwide income while taxation in the host country 
(and thereby the source country of the taxable income) is confined to the withholding taxes 
whose upper limits are set in the treaty negotiations.8 Due to the reciprocity of FDI flows, 
benefits offered to an investor from one contracting state should - in theory - be balanced 
out by the benefits given to the other country’s investors in the own country. Especially 
between developing and developed countries, FDI flows (and stocks) however are often 
highly asymmetric, so that the revenue sacrifice is regularly one-sided with the net-capital 
importer (Easson 2000). Thereby, the loss of tax revenues for the net-capital importer is 
generally increasing in the degree of asymmetry and decreasing in rising withholding tax 
rates.9 This problem is even more significant, as corporate taxes play a much more 
dominant role in funding public expenditures in developing countries as compared to richer 
nations, while the overall level of tax revenues (as a percentage of GDP) is considerably 
higher in the latter (Gordon and Li 2009).10 After concluding a DTT in an asymmetric 
dyad, a larger share of the tax revenues accumulates in the net-capital exporting country. 
This can be illustrated by a simple example:11 There are two countries, E and I, each with 
one investor that only invests in the other country. The E’s investor invests 100m in 
country I, while I’s investor only invests 20m in country E. Domestic corporate tax rates 
are 20 percent in country E and 30 percent in I, respectively. For reasons of simplicity, one 
would assume that without a tax treaty both countries avoid double taxation by exempting 
                                                 
8 Repatriation of profits from a foreign subsidiary to the parent company usually works through dividends, 
interest, and royalty payments. Since these payments are costs to the subsidiary firm, they are not subject to 
taxation in the host country as part of the income of the subsidiary. Most host governments tax these 
repatriations through withholding taxes at least partly (Chisik and Davies 2004a). Ceilings for the withholding 
tax rates are agreed upon in tax treaties for these three types of income and usually lie in the range of 0 to 15 
percent as proposed by the OECD model treaty. Furthermore, they are almost always identical for both treaty 
partners (Chisik and Davies 2004b). It is assumed throughout this chapter that domestic non-treaty 
withholding tax rates are equal to the domestic corporate tax rates, i.e. that there is no discrimination between 
foreign and domestic investors nor between repatriated and reinvested profits. The non-treaty withholding tax 
rates can be quite high, often around 25 to 30 percent and sometimes even higher (Easson 2004). 
9 Chisik and Davies (2004a) show theoretically that asymmetric countries will negotiate higher withholding 
tax rates. An empirical analysis of US treaties and treaties within the OECD confirms their finding. They 
additionally find evidence that highly asymmetric countries are less likely to enter such a treaty. This 
alleviates the problem to some extent. However, their first sample is restricted to OECD members and the 
second sample includes US treaty partners, but among them, there are only six developing countries 
(Indonesia, Egypt, Pakistan, China, Morocco, and India).  
10 Using data from between 1996 and 2001, Gordon and Li (2009: 857) show that while corporate income tax 
contributes to 19.3 percent of revenue in developing countries, compared with 9.7 percent in richer countries, 
the latter collect 25.0 percent of tax revenues as a fraction of GDP as opposed to 17.6 percent in the former.  
11 Recent research (Barthel et al. (2010) and Neumayer (2007)) suggests that the conclusion of a DTT on 
average leads to higher bilateral FDI stocks. This has two opposing impacts on the level of tax revenues in the 
host country: if the withholding tax rate is lower than the domestic corporate tax rate, the tax authority 
collects less from a single company, but on the other hand overall tax revenues may increase due to the 
increased tax base. Yet, these additional capital flows may even aggravate the asymmetry if the DTT leads to 
more inflows to the net-capital importing country than to the net-capital exporter.  
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foreign profits from domestic taxation.12 Without a DTT, country E collects 4m of tax 
revenues and country I 30m. If both countries negotiate a typical DTT, it is agreed that the 
host country retains 10 percent withholding taxes while the residence country has the right 
to full taxation but deducts the withholding taxes paid in the other country from the 
domestic tax bill. Now country E collects tax revenues of 22m (2m withholding and 20m 
domestic tax) and country I 16m (10m withholding and 6m domestic tax). Crediting the 
withholding tax paid in the other country leaves a net-tax revenue of 12m for E and 14m in 
I. Compared to the situation without a tax treaty, E increased its revenues by 8m while I is 
worse off by 16m. 
 
Figure 9: Newly concluded DTTs per annum (left hand scale) and total number of DTTs 
signed (right hand scale) 
 
Data Source: IBFD (2009). 
 
                                                 
12 The result holds true if profits are taxed both in the residence country of the investor and in the host country 
or if both countries unilaterally avoid double taxation using tax credits.  In the former case, by avoiding 
double taxation, a DTT leads to a decrease in the total tax burden of both investors, and both countries lose 
tax revenues. But, importantly, the net capital-importer loses more than the net capital-exporter compared to 
the original situation. If the agreed maximum withholding tax rates equal or exceed the domestic corporate tax 
rate, the position of the host country does not change. However, as Chisik and Davies (2004a) argue, at least 
among US treaties, the agreed withholding tax rate is in no case greater than either country’s non-treaty rate. 
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The fact that concluding a DTT is not unambiguously favourable for both contract partners 
has not prevented its spread. As Figure 9 illustrates, over the last eight decades, nearly 
2,800 DTTs concerning the taxation of income and capital have been signed.13 As of 2007, 
188 tax authorities have at least signed one tax treaty with France and the UK leading the 
ranking with 123, and 118 respectively, treaties signed (Table 1). Since the number of high 
income countries is limited, it is not surprising that the more DTTs a specific country 
signed, the higher the share of treaties is where the partner country represents a developing 
nation. As can be seen from the table, the fraction of FDI outward stocks covered by a DTT 
is usually very high at least for those countries that signed many treaties. Most importantly, 
as can be seen in columns 6 and 7, asymmetric FDI stocks are clearly the rule rather than 
the exception. For example, on average, in 2004 the FDI outward stock of the UK in a 
contracting partner was 16.7 times the respective outward stock of this partner in the UK, 
while 42 partner countries report no FDI in the UK at all.14 The average ratios are 
considerably smaller if weighted by the relative shares foreign countries account for as a 
percentage of overall FDI coming from a source country, but even then asymmetry is 
highly prevalent. In fact, only Australia has a mean weighted FDI asymmetry ratio of close 
to one, indicating that it’s FDI in- and outward stocks are nearly balanced on average. 
Furthermore, developing countries usually have a FDI ratio of less than 1, which means 
that the average inward stock is higher than the respective outward stock.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Apart from tax treaties that are related to the double taxation of income and capital, there are also tax 
treaties regarding estates, inheritances, gifts, shipping and air transport as well as social security. However, 
since DTTs concerning income and capital are by far the most prevalent and are closely linked to FDI they are 
the focus of the analysis. Furthermore, because the goal of this analysis is to scrutinise the diffusion of DTTs, 
all figures stated refer to the number of DTTs signed which might differ from the actual number of treaties in 
force as some contracts were terminated.   
14 FDI data for the year of treaty conclusion is not available for many treaties. Yet, the adverse effects on the 
fiscal situation of the net-capital importer persist as long as the treaty is in force. 
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Table 1:  DTT details and FDI stock asymmetry of selected countries 
Rank a Country 
Number of 
DTTs 
Percentage 
with 
developing 
countries
Fraction of 
outward 
stocks 
covered by 
DTT b 
Mean FDI 
asymmetry 
ratio 
(unweighted) c
Mean FDI 
asymmetry 
ratio 
(weighted) d N e 
Number of DTT 
partners without 
FDI stock in country
1 France 123 64.2% 99% 6.5 2.7 58 9 
2 United Kingdom 118 60.2% 98% 16.7 7.5 70 42 
3 Norway 107 63.6% 85% 1.1 0.4 75 54 
4 Denmark 105 59.0% 93% 4.1 2.4 81 25 
5 Sweden 102 62.7% 100% 6.6 2.2 63 45 
7 Switzerland 96 60.4% 92% 5.0 3.4 76 48 
9 China 93 51.6% 94% 0.7 0.5 75 51 
11 Germany 91 60.4% 98% 20.6 9.8 68 26 
12 India 86 55.8% 100% 0.8 0.2 67 48 
12 Netherlands 86 55.8% 96% 47.1 25.4 59 10 
14 Russian Federation 85 56.5% 84% 1.1 0.5 68 45 
15 Romania 84 56.0% 100% 0.7 < 0.01 71 47 
19 Malaysia 76 60.5% 83% 2.4 7.0 59 43 
21 South Africa 73 52.1% 93% 1.3 5.6 54 33 
24 United States 69 47.8% 92% 25.3 7.7 58 10 
31 Singapore 61 45.9% 72% 9.8 71.3 47 29 
33 Japan 60 56.7% 92% 71.9 82.4 47 18 
57 Australia 42 40.5% 87% 3.7 1.2 27 9 
89 Argentina 19 21.1% 71% 0.2 0.1 11 2 
Notes: a Countries ranked according to total number of DTTs signed; b Year 2004 chosen for data availability;  
c Calculated as the FDI outward stock of country i in country j over the FDI stock of country j in country i:  
FDIij/ FDIji; d weighted by FDIij/ ∑FDIi; e Number of countries for which information on outward stock 
available. 
 
Since the prevention of twofold taxation is nowadays done unilaterally through tax 
exemptions and tax credits by almost all countries, tax treaties have lost much of their 
original intend (Easson 2000). Nevertheless, the number of DTTs signed proliferated over 
the last decades, increasingly including treaties between two countries with asymmetric 
FDI stocks, in which the FDI stock from one contracting partner in the other state 
considerably exceeds capital stocks in the reverse direction. This development is 
remarkable since the revenue sacrifice in such cases is one-sided with the net-capital-
importer. Mostly developing countries find themselves in such a position. This chapter 
seeks to investigate why these countries voluntarily resort to entering tax treaties. It is 
argued that even if capital-importing countries would collectively be better off not signing 
DTTs, individually they still have an incentive to sign DTTs. If other focal countries have 
 44
entered such treaties, then they are likely to lose out even more if they themselves do not 
sign DTTs. In other words, the proliferation of DTTs is driven by spatial dependence 
among capital-importing countries caught in a prisoners’ dilemma. A country’s propensity 
to enter a tax treaty therefore depends on whether other countries, which compete with the 
country for scarce foreign capital, have already signed a DTT with the same capital 
exporter.  
 
This is the first analysis which tackles this question empirically and provides results based 
on a large country sample over a long period of time rather than on anecdotal evidence. The 
remainder of the work is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant 
literature on policy diffusion and on tax treaties. Section 3 provides a more detailed 
descriptive analysis of the DTT network while section 4 presents some theoretical 
explanations for the popularity of these treaties in asymmetric dyads. It is argued that 
positive network effects play a role and that countries relying on fiscal incentives to attract 
foreign investment need DTTs to enshrine the effectiveness of their tax incentives. 
Furthermore, tax treaties help to overcome the dynamic inconsistency problem that may 
emerge in such cases. Finally, the situation of net-capital importing countries can be 
described as a prisoners’ dilemma leading to an outcome which is not optimal for the 
players. Section 5 briefly describes the data and the methodology used. In Section 6, the 
main results are discussed whereas some tests for the robustness of the results are presented 
in Section 7. In Section 8, the empirical work is extended to an analysis of conditional 
spatial policy dependence. Finally, Section 9 concludes.  
 
 
2.2.  Review of Literature 
This work builds on previous work in two so far separated areas of research: on the one 
hand, the growing field on spatial dependence in policy affairs and on the diffusion 
processes of policy measures and on the other hand the theoretical and empirical literature 
on tax treaties. Spatial dependence in the diffusion of policy has been analysed in a variety 
of areas, such as social policy (e.g., Jahn 2006, Brooks 2007) and trade and investment 
policy (e.g., Simmons and Elkins 2004). Also, spatial contagion in tax and fiscal policy has 
been widely examined (e.g., Hayashi and Boadway 2001, Hays 2003, 2009, Basinger and 
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Hallerberg 2004, Rork 2003, Swank 2006, Plümper et al. 2009, Plümper and Neumayer 
2010).15 
Empirical evidence on policy diffusion in a dyadic setting, however, is by far more limited. 
Manger (2006) analyses the spread of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and finds 
positive evidence for spatial contagion, as countries in a fear of trade and investment 
diversion are more likely to sign a PTA if competitor countries do so. He argues that the 
main reason is regional competition for trade and foreign direct investment, as 
geographically close countries tend to produce similar goods and export these to similar 
markets. However, instead of modelling these similarities explicitly with appropriate 
weighting matrices, Manger only uses inverse distance as a link between potentially 
competing nations. The basic argument is, as it will be also argued in the case of DTTs 
below, that developing countries find themselves in a classical prisoners’ dilemma situation 
and enter a preferential trade agreement because other countries do so as well. While the 
results suggest that countries are not motivated by the total number of PTAs in the 
international system, Manger finds evidence that countries are geared to agreement 
conclusions of geographically closer countries.     
 
Elkins et al. (2006) examine the diffusion process of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). 
These treaties enhance the international reputation of a potential host government by 
providing a commitment for respecting contractual and property rights of foreign investors. 
However, just like DTTs, these treaties curtail national sovereignty. By the same token as 
Manger (2006) they argue that the spread of these treaties is driven by international 
competition for capital. Testing several hypotheses, they find empirical evidence for the 
competition hypothesis, i.e. that countries are more likely to sign BITs if their most 
important competitors recently entered such treaties. Furthermore, they find that coercion 
and learning play a crucial role in explaining BIT conclusions. Neumayer and Plümper 
(2010) readdress this issue and find different channels through which these treaties diffuse. 
They argue that it is not only the aggregate number of treaties signed by competitor 
countries that matters; rather, a specific capital importing country has a higher propensity to 
sign a BIT with a capital exporter if competing countries have entered a treaty with the 
same exporter. Furthermore, they find evidence that capital exporters are influenced by 
treaty conclusions of other exporters, too. 
 
                                                 
15 Hochgatterer and Leibrecht (2009) provide a very comprehensive literature review on tax competition. 
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In research, DTTs have been the focus of both legal scholars and economists. The latter 
approach tax treaties either theoretically to explain their role in avoiding double taxation or 
empirically to analyse their effectiveness in spurring bilateral FDI. Generally, the law 
literature on international taxation is broad and deep.16 However, the number of 
publications specifically dealing with tax treaties is more limited by nature. Irish (1974) 
discusses several early reasons for the emergence of a network of unfavourable tax-treaties 
between developing and developed countries: (1) Developing countries feel obligated to 
accept any provision to remove impediments to FDI contained in the domestic tax law of 
developed countries and to provide assurances of stability to foreign investors. (2) Capital-
exporting nations are disinclined to give up revenues that would be lost through greater 
taxation in the host countries, also because they perceive this as a further financial transfer 
in addition to official development assistance. (3) Developed nations are in a superior 
bargaining position and are able to dictate the terms of a treaty. (4) Developing countries 
are not fully aware of the adverse nature of tax agreements with a bias for residence and 
have not yet recognised that alterations can be achieved in certain areas or with particular 
countries. A very sceptical view on the necessity of tax treaties to avoid double taxation is 
expressed by Dagan (2000), calling them a “myth” and arguing that they “serve much less 
heroic goals, such as easing bureaucratic hassles and coordinating tax terms between 
contracting countries, and much more cynical goals, particularly redistributing tax revenues 
from the poorer to the richer signatory countries” (Dagan 2000: 939). Rejecting this view, 
Brauner (2003) stresses the achievements of tax treaties in bringing tax authorities from 
many countries at the same table, fostering communication among them and advancing 
international tax harmonisation. Contrary to the argument made here, he sees their 
“enthusiasm to conclude as many treaties as possible with developed countries” (Brauner 
2003: 308) as evidence that developing countries have immensely benefited from these 
treaties.17 Focussing on a hypothetical DTT between the US and Ghana as an example of a 
treaty between an industrialised country and an LDC, Christians (2005) analyses the 
potential of such a treaty to foster FDI from the US to Ghana. Arguing that (1) the scope of 
such a treaty would be too narrow as many non-income taxes are not covered, (2) that 
double taxation is a disappearing phenomenon due to global tax-competition and the wide-
spread availability of opportunities for tax evasion, (3) that the provisions in a DTT would 
not differ significantly from domestic law, (4) that non-tax issues such as inadequate 
                                                 
16 Literature surveys are provided by Avi-Yonah (1996), Brauner (2003), and Ring (2007). 
17 In Section 4 it will be argued that developing countries find themselves in the situation which can be 
described as a prisoners’ dilemma and that signing DTTs is not the optimal solution for them. 
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infrastructure dominate investors’ decisions and (5) that a DTT does not deliver a 
significant signal of stability to potential investors, the author concludes that a tax treaty 
would offer few commercial benefits to investors which renders a significant impact on 
investment unlikely. Baistrocchi (2008) seeks to explain why a representative developing 
country has an incentive to sign a DTT with a developed country based on the OECD 
model treaty, even though these treaties are strongly biased towards residence taxation. 
First, the author argues that developing countries face a prisoners’ dilemma and follow the 
OECD model for fear of driving FDI away to competing countries. Second, the properties 
of a network market help to shed light on the emergence of DTTs in asymmetric dyads, that 
is, specific positive network externalities such as minimisation of communication and 
enforcement costs or reputation advantages are only available to members of the network.18 
 
In the realm of theoretical economics, researchers try to answer the question whether DTTs 
are a superior method to avoid double taxation than unilateral approaches and which 
method should be applied in order to reach this goal (Hamada 1966, Musgrave 1969, 
Hartman 1985, Bond and Samuelson 1989, Janeba 1995, Davies and Gresik 2003, Davies 
2003a, Chisik and Davies 2004).19 Empirical evidence regarding the question whether the 
conclusion of a tax treaty in fact increases bilateral foreign investment, deserves closer 
attention since attracting further capital is one of the major motives for developing 
countries to sign DTTs with capital exporting nations. Quantitative work can be divided in 
the use of monadic and dyadic datasets. Di Giovanni (2005) examines the impact of various 
macroeconomic and financial variables on cross-border M&A activities as a component of 
FDI over the period from 1990 to 1999, covering 193 countries in a monadic setting. He 
finds that a DTT is accompanied by increased cross-border acquisition activities. Neumayer 
(2007) estimates the effect of DTTs on FDI to developing countries, using both dyadic 
outbound FDI stocks from the US, as well as the total inbound FDI stocks of developing 
countries and the FDI inflows to developing countries as dependent variables. The former 
dataset encompasses data from 1970 to 2001 and 114 host countries; the latter dataset 
covers 120 host countries from 1970 on for the FDI flows and from 1980 on for the stocks, 
respectively. Neumayer finds a positive relationship both for the dyadic and the monadic 
                                                 
18 See Section 4 for a more detailed presentation. 
19 There are three methods to tackle the problem of twofold taxation (Dagan 2000): (1) Tax exemption, where 
foreign income is not taken into account in the computation of taxable income in the home country, (2) tax 
credit, where the taxes paid abroad are credited against the tax liability in the home country, and (3) tax 
deduction, where taxes paid abroad are treated as costs and are deducted in the computation of the taxable 
income in the home country. In the latter case, double taxation is offset only partially, for which reason DTTs 
either prescribe tax exemption or tax credit. 
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data as well as both for middle and low income developing countries. Turning towards pure 
dyadic approaches, Davies (2003b) examines the impact of treaty renegotiations over the 
period 1966 to 2000 on both inbound and outbound US FDI and finds that DTT 
renegotiations had no effect on FDI.20 Focusing on US inward and outward investment 
stocks, Blonigen and Davies (2004) examine the influence of a DTT conclusion on the size 
of bilateral FDI. Using a dataset of 88 partner countries over up to 20 years from 1980 
through 1999, they conclude that DTTs have no positive effect on inward or outward FDI. 
Blonigen and Davies (2005) broaden their research by using OECD data on bilateral FDI 
stocks and flows covering 23 developed source countries over the period of 1982-1992. 
They generally find no robust results. Depending on the estimation methodology, they find 
either a positive or a negative relationship between the existence of a DTT and higher FDI 
stocks and flows. Egger et al. (2006) estimate the effect of tax treaties on bilateral outward 
FDI from OECD source countries over the period of 1985-2000 with a two-step selection 
model and find a negative effect of DTTs on FDI. Coupé, Orlova and Skiba (2008) 
concentrate their research on the influence of both BITs and DTTs on the FDI flows from 
OECD into transition economies, covering 17 source and 9 host economies over the period 
of 1990-2001. No consistent results are found as the sign and statistical significance of the 
estimated treaty coefficients depend largely on the estimator used. Finally, Barthel et al. 
(2010) use a dyadic dataset encompassing FDI stocks from 30 home to 105 host countries, 
out of which 10 and 84, respectively, are developing countries. Covering the years from 
1978 to 2004, they find a positive and significant relationship between the existence of a 
DTT and the bilateral FDI stock. 
 
 
2.3.  Descriptive Analysis of DTT Diffusion 
The agreement between France and Belgium closed in 1843, with its provision of 
information exchange regarding all documents and information which might improve the 
effective tax collection, can be seen as the forerunner of classic DTTs (Seligman 1928). 
The first bilateral treaties with the intention of avoiding double taxation were concluded 
between Prussia and Saxony and between Austria and Hungary as early as 1869. However, 
the Austria-Hungary and Prussia treaty agreed on 22 June 1899 is considered to be the first 
international double taxation treaty which resembles modern treaties. After World War I, 
concluding DTTs became more popular especially among countries on continental Europe 
                                                 
20 Davies (2004) comes to similar conclusions. 
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(Easson 2000). The first model treaty was published in 1928 by a Group of Experts which 
had been convoked by the League of Nations in 1921 in order to develop possible solutions 
to the problem of international taxation. Even though the international tax legislation has 
become considerably more complex, the commentaries more extensive and some tax 
loopholes have had to be closed since then, this model treaty still forms the basis for all 
DTTs in force today (Graetz and O'Hear 1997).   
 
So far, the diffusion of DTTs has not been examined empirically and also the amount of 
descriptive analysis is very limited. Easson (2000) distinguishes several geographical 
waves in the history of treaty formation: before the end of World War II, relatively few 
treaties were concluded and these mainly among countries in Europe. Until the 1970s, most 
DTTs were agreed upon between industrialised countries with market economies. Around 
1970 several developing and less developed nations, mostly in Asia and Africa, started to 
conclude tax treaties with developed countries, with the goal of attracting more FDI. In the 
1980s, some of the socialist countries began to enter DTTs, and during the 1990s, the 
transition economies and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union followed 
suit. The latest wave encompasses the countries in Latin America and the Middle East. 
Kolm (2005) tracks the history of tax treaties from its early beginnings after the foundation 
of the German Empire and Austria-Hungary in the 19th century to the evolution of model 
treaties after World War II, while the focus is on the historical analysis. 
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Figure 10: Median of GDP per capita ratios of the two signatory states (in current USD) 
 
Note: To avoid double counting, all ratios smaller than one are dropped. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 9, until the end of World War II only very few treaties were 
signed. During the 1950s, an average of eleven treaties was signed per year. In the 
following decades, the diffusion of DTTs gained momentum with an average of 33 treaties 
p.a. in the 1970s, 65 treaties in the 1980s and 88 treaties per year in the 1990s. 1994 
marked a peak with 140 newly signed treaties in this year alone. Since then, the extension 
of the treaty network lost some speed, but remains at an average level of 80 treaties per 
year since the millennium. Figure 10 illustrates the annual median of the GDP ratios of the 
two contracting states for the DTTs entered and a fitted trend line. There is no evidence that 
GDP asymmetry between the treaty partners changed over time. The trend line has a 
negative slope (-0.105), but the coefficient is not statistically significant (t-value: -1.18). 
Table 2 provides a geographical breakdown of 2,779 tax treaties which have been signed 
until the end of 2007.21 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Information on the contracting states, the type of treaty, and the date of signature are taken from IBFD 
(2009). 
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Table 2:  Regional distribution of DTTs and percentage of possible combinations 
covered by a DTT 
Region 
No. of 
countries/ 
tax 
authorities 
a 
Australia 
& 
Oceania 
East 
Asia 
Eastern 
Europe 
& 
Central 
Asia 
Western 
Europe 
Latin 
America 
& The 
Caribbean
Middle 
East & 
Northern 
Africa 
North 
America 
South 
Asia 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Australia & 
Oceania 
18 
6         
3.9%         
East Asia 19 
28 68        
8.2% 39.8%        
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia 
29 
9 152 264       
1.7% 27.6% 65.0%       
Western Europe 29 
45 161 458 206      
8.6% 29.2% 54.5% 50.7%      
Latin America & 
The Caribbean 
43 
4 25 23 169 68     
0.5% 3.1% 1.8% 13.6% 7.5%     
Middle East & 
Northern Africa 
20 
1 61 129 128 8 70    
0.3% 16.1% 22.2% 22.1% 0.9% 36.8%    
North America 4 
5 16 46 41 20 14 1   
6.9% 21.1% 39.7% 35.3% 11.6% 17.5% 16.7%   
South Asia 8 
3 38 46 57 3 32 8 21  
2.1% 25.0% 19.8% 24.6% 0.9% 20.0% 25.0% 75.0%  
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
48 
2 31 34 147 6 43 11 15 56 
0.2% 3.4% 2.4% 10.6% 0.3% 4.5% 5.7% 3.9% 5.0% 
Total b 218 109 648 1,425 1,618 394 556 163 244 401 
Notes: a Based on World Bank country list plus other tax authorities that signed at least one DTT; b To be read 
as number of treaty signatories from each region. 
 
The two most active regions are Western Europe and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
hosting 1,618 and 1,425 signatories, respectively.22 The principal diagonal shows treaties 
that were signed between two countries within the same region. In absolute terms, most 
inter-regional treaties were signed between countries in Western Europe and Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (458), between Western Europe and Latin America and the 
Caribbean (169) and Western Europe and East Asia (161). When regarding the coverage of 
DTTs, expressed as the percentage of possible dyad-combinations covered by a tax treaty, 
an intra-regional bias is revealed. For instance, 75 percent of all possible country-
combinations within South Asia are covered by a DTT, followed by 65 percent for 
                                                 
22 Out of these, 206 treaties were signed within Western Europe and 264 within Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, i.e. both contracting states came from the same region. For example, out of 1,618 signatories in Western 
Europe, 412 (2x206) represent intra-regional treaty conclusions. The remaining 1,206 represent DTTs signed 
with a partner country outside Western Europe (e.g., 169 with countries from Latin America and the 
Caribbean and 161 signed with East Asian nations). 
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countries in Eastern-Europe and Central Asia. Inter-regional coverage is the highest 
between Western and Eastern European nations (54.5 percent). DTT diffusion in Sub-
Saharan Africa is limited both in absolute terms as well as in terms of coverage. 
 
Table 3:  Share of DTTs by income group dyad-type 
Income group dyad Share Income group dyad Share 
High income - high income 22.1% Upper middle income - upper middle income 4.9% 
High income - upper middle income 21.5% Lower middle income - lower middle income 4.5% 
High income - lower middle income 20.5% Lower middle income - low income 3.7% 
Upper middle income - lower middle income 9.2% Upper middle income - low income 3.3% 
High income - low income 9.1% Low income - low income 1.2% 
Note: Classification according to World Bank GDP per capita limits. 
 
This pattern is confirmed when looking at the GDP per capita level of signatory states 
(Table 3). More than one fifth of all treaties where signed between two high income 
countries, and nearly three quarter comprise a high income country at least as one signing 
partner. Treaties between developing countries still represent only 26.8 percent of all DTTs 
signed with only 32 contracts between low income countries (1.2 percent). 
 
Figure 11: Number of OECD members (left hand scale) and percentage of all possible 
combinations covered by a DTT (right hand scale) 
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A closer look at the OECD is justified as tax treaties are an important means for bilateral 
economic cooperation and because its members represent a more economically 
homogenous group of countries (thereby on average having less asymmetric FDI stocks), 
Figure 11 illustrates that the coverage has risen steadily since the foundation in 1961 
reaching a level of 95 percent in 2007 despite an increasing number of member states.  
 
Figure 12: Share of DTTs signed by OECD membership groups 
 
Note: Based on actual OECD membership; Before 1961 foundation members taken as OECD members; 
Number in brackets behind the dates shows total number of treaties signed during the respective period. 
 
The type of country that signed DTTs has changed considerably over time. Figure 12 
pictures the share of tax treaties signed between OECD countries, between an OECD 
country and a non-OECD member and between two non-OECD countries. While the very 
few treaties before the end of the Second World War were signed exclusively among future 
OECD members, after 1945, already 80 percent of all treaties concluded in the following 
decade were signed between a prospective OECD member and a non-member. These 
mixed dyads accounted for two third of all signed treaties between mid 1980s, after that 
their relative importance decreased somewhat. This is due to a considerable increase in the 
number of DTTs signed between two non-OECD members. Their share started at 22.1 
percent (118 out of 533 treaties) in the period from 1976 to 1985, and rose to 46.6 percent 
and 56.8 percent in the subsequent two decades. While treaties between developing (non 
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OECD) countries became more widespread over time, the share of newly signed DTTs 
between two OECD members declined steadily since the early 1970s, mirroring the rising 
total number of signed treaties as well as the increasing coverage of potential treaties within 
the OECD.  
 
 
2.4.  Theoretical Foundations 
Putting aside negotiation costs and costs of curtailed fiscal sovereignty, tax treaties between 
two symmetric countries are beneficial for both. However, as shown in the introduction, 
DTTs among asymmetric countries, i.e. where one signatory state is a net-capital importer 
and the other one a net-capital exporter, are a frequent phenomenon. This is despite the fact 
that in such dyads one treaty-partner can loose significant amounts of tax revenues 
compared to a situation without a DTT.23 This section tries to find answers to this 
seemingly irrational behaviour. One explanation might be that the other benefits associated 
with a DTT conclusion simply outweigh the costs and that the net-benefit therefore is 
positive. Without consideration of the cost of negotiation and ratification, the costs of lost 
tax revenues increase with the asymmetry of the FDI stocks and decrease with the level of 
agreed withholding taxes. On the other hand, some benefits, such as administrative savings 
and enforcement of domestic tax laws, decrease with the amount of outward FDI and are 
zero if one country has no outward investment in the partner country. In fact, as can be seen 
from the last column of Table 1, for each of the major DTT-signatories, there is a large 
number of partner countries that do not report any FDI outward stocks in this country. For 
example, out of 70 UK treaty-partner countries, for which FDI data is available, 42 have a 
FDI stock of zero in the UK. Another potential benefit is the increased FDI from the DTT 
partner. Barthel et al. (2010) show that a DTT, on average, is associated with an 
approximately 30 percent higher FDI stock and that this effect is larger for developing host 
countries. Here, two opposing effects occur: on the one hand, if the agreed withholding tax 
rate is lower than the domestic corporate tax rate, the host country will collect less from a 
single firm, but since there is more investment, the taxable profits should rise, too. A 
comprehensive analysis of the net-effect needs to be done on a country-level and needs to 
take into account not only the level of the applicable withholding and corporate tax rate, but 
                                                 
23 If not stated otherwise, it is assumed that a DTT is based on the OECD model treaty, which has an explicit 
residence-bias in Article 21 and limits taxation in the host country to withholding taxes. For a justification of 
uniform treatment of all treaties, see Section 5. However, this problem is not confined to developing 
countries. In the aftermath of World War II, Western European countries agreed to enter DTTs with a strong 
emphasis on the resident principle to attract US capital and technology to rebuild and modernise their war-
ravaged economies (Irish 1974). 
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also country-specific tax calculation rules and tax incentives. This is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. However, if a host country has no outward FDI in the partner country, if its 
domestic tax rate is 30 percent and if the inward FDI is increased by 30 percent, a 
withholding tax of 23 percent would be necessary to maintain the original amount of tax 
revenues. This is substantially above the conventional levels ranging from 0 to 15 percent. 
Given the ambiguous effect of a DTT on the overall tax revenues and the existence of 
positive effects from FDI that are hard to quantify, it is impossible to ascertain the net-
effect of a DTT for a large sample of countries. This needs to be undertaken on a case study 
basis. However, it is clear that a net-capital importing country would be better off if it could 
attract the same amount of FDI without entering the kind of tax treaties that are common 
today. In the following, four other possible explanations for the widespread emergence of 
tax treaties in asymmetric dyads will be discussed: positive network effects, strategic 
interaction among host-countries, fiscal incentives, and the dynamic inconsistency problem, 
whereby the latter two are more extensions of the second rather than independent 
explanations. 
 
 
Positive network effects 
Network markets normally share three characteristics (Baistrocchi 2008: 359): (1) network 
externalities, (2) expectation and (3) a lock-in effect. Network externalities occur if the 
benefit for each member of a network increases in case the number of members rises. A 
classical example is the telephone market, where having a telephone is the more beneficial 
the more other people own one (Katz and Shapiro 1985). Expectation denotes the 
phenomenon that a certain standard may prevail over others, not necessarily because it is 
superior, but because it is promoted by an influential player. For example, the fact that the 
MS-DOS standard was initially promoted by IBM was a more important success factor than 
its technical superiority (Besen and Farrell 1994). Finally, the lock-in effect describes the 
situation that an established standard survives even it is inferior to a new arriving 
technology. An example is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard (David 1985). As illustrated 
by Baistrocchi (2008), the positive network externalities can deliver an explanation for the 
emergence of tax treaties in asymmetric FDI settings.24  The argument is that the tax treaty 
                                                 
24 Baistrocchi (2008) focuses on the OECD model as a basis for treaty negotiations. Since this model treaty 
favours residence over source taxation, it aggravates the problem of reduced tax revenues in asymmetric 
dyads. However, as argued in Section 5, because most existing treaties are based on this model treaty and the 
UN model treaty became more similar to the OECD model over time, this argument should be applicable to 
all treaties.  
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network produces positive network externalities only for its members, while the extent of 
benefits in some cases depends on the underlying model treaty. Communication costs, i.e. 
the cost of disseminating information about the content of the law among the members of 
society (which includes foreign investors) are a major cost block in legal institutions. Since 
most of the treaties are based on the same model and are usually provided in English, the 
communication costs are minimised within the tax treaty network. As the network grows 
larger, the average communication costs diminish (Baistrocchi 2008). The same effect of 
reduced average costs occurs with respect to enforcement cost, i.e. with applying the law to 
a particular dispute. For instance, domestic courts in developing countries gain access to 
legal sources (e.g., case law produced by foreign domestic courts interpreting OECD based 
tax-treaties) which are unavailable to countries outside the OECD network (Baistrocchi 
2008). Furthermore, membership in a growing international network of tax treaties might 
radiate a stronger commitment to stability than a single bilateral DTT. If the cost-benefit 
analysis discussed above leads to a negative net-benefit for a specific country (with regard 
to a specific potential treaty partner), the cost-saving effects and increasing benefits of an 
extending DTT-network can change the calculation for certain dyads on the margin. Here, 
treaty conclusions by other countries increase the probability that other countries join the 
network by negotiating DTTs. As long as the benefits do not depend on the size of the 
outward FDI stock, this argument helps to explain the diffusion of tax treaties in symmetric 
as well as in asymmetric dyads. However, as Dagan (2000: 996) concludes, developing 
countries “have to sacrifice more to become a member of the ‘treaty-club’”.  
 
 
Strategic interaction among host countries 
Since FDI can provide a multitude of potential benefits, it is not surprising that host 
countries engage in a fierce competition for these long-term investment flows. One positive 
impact is the provision of new capital which allows additional investment in both physical 
and human capital. This is particularly beneficial for developing countries in which 
liquidity constraints are more prevalent (Busse and Groizard 2006). Moreover, foreign 
investment inflows are generally seen as a means to integrate new knowledge from abroad. 
The theory of the multinational firm states that multinational enterprises (MNEs) have a 
technological advantage over domestic firms that outweighs the cost associated with 
operating in external markets (Caves 2007, Markusen 2002). On the one hand, local 
companies may benefit from the influx of new knowledge through imitation and learning 
(Findlay 1978, Mansfield and Romeo 1980, Blomström 1986). On the other hand, 
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increased competition in local markets, enhanced human capital mobility among firms 
(Fosfuri et al. 2001, Glass and Saggi 2002) and vertical linkages (Rodríguez-Clare 1996, 
Markusen and Venables 1999) serve as catalysers for knowledge diffusion. All these 
factors can raise the productivity level and promote a higher growth rate.25 As discussed 
above, another advantage of increased foreign investment is the generation of taxable 
income in the host country (Gresik 2001). Finally, compared to other capital flows, FDI 
exhibits a greater continuity compared to short term capital flows in times of crisis. 
 
A tax treaty is only one measure among a variety of factors that determine the 
attractiveness of a jurisdiction as a place to invest. Some of these factors, such as the 
geographical location of a country, the endowment with natural resources, the cultural 
proximity to major source countries or the access to natural transport infrastructure (e.g., 
rivers), are beyond the control of the host governments. Others, such as the education and 
productivity of the labour force, the quality of transport and TCT infrastructure or the 
purchasing power of the population, cannot be influenced within a short time horizon. 
However, there are some factors which can be altered by the host government and for 
which improvements can be achieved more rapidly. Unilateral examples for these 
encompass the a favourable national tax system (e.g., tax rates, simplicity, transparency, 
certainty and stability in the application of the tax law), fiscal incentives or alleviating red 
tape, while bilateral and multilateral measures can be the conclusion of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs), regional trade agreements (RTAs) or double taxation treaties. A tax treaty 
can increase FDI by reducing uncertainty, by lowering the effective tax rate, by abating 
administrative efforts or simply because of positive signalling effects.26 
 
However, as outlined above, a DTT is not unambiguously favourable for both treaty 
partners in asymmetric dyads, because the net-capital importer might face a loss in tax 
revenues which might not be offset by increased inward FDI nor by other positive effects of 
a DTT. Therefore, after entering a DTT with a developed country, a representative 
developing country might be worse off compared to a situation without a treaty. Yet, due to 
international competition for FDI, a developing country still can have an incentive to 
conclude such a tax treaty, because its own situation without a treaty deteriorates if 
competitor countries enter treaties with major capital exporters and thereby gain a 
                                                 
25 Markusen (2002), Navaretti and Venables (2004), Helpman (2006), and Caves (2007) provide extensive 
literature surveys. 
26 However, on the other hand, a DTT might also lower FDI flows because the information exchange and 
transfer pricing provisions discourage tax-evading FDI on the margin. 
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competitive edge. As pointed out by Guzman (1998) in the comparable case of BITs, an 
individual country has an incentive to negotiate a treaty with potential investors to make 
itself a more attractive location relative to other potential hosts, but developing countries as 
a group presumably will not have any benefit.27 If similar host countries act as a group, 
there would be less competition and more market power for ‘sellers’ (of investment 
locations). As a consequence they would be able to increase the price (in terms of less fiscal 
and non-fiscal investment incentives). Even though this would discourage FDI on the 
margin, the overall gains would outweigh the losses. Yet, this behaviour cannot be 
observed in practice. One possible explanation is that this situation can be described as a 
classical prisoners’ dilemma.  
 
In the following, India and China as two emerging countries competing for the same FDI 
are used as a case study, while a more comprehensive empirical analysis is presented in 
Section 6.28 With 1.32bn people living in China and 1.12bn in India, respectively, both 
countries lead the table of the largest countries in terms of population. Yet, regarding 
economic size the differences are more pronounced – China produced a GDP of USD 
3,382bn in 2007, compared to USD 1,177bn in India. This is equivalent to a GDP per 
capita of USD 2,562 in China and USD 1,050 in India, exhibiting considerable difference 
in terms of development level and purchasing power. Both countries are export orientated; 
however, China’s exports of goods and services amount to 42.5 percent of GDP, twice as 
much as India’s 21.2 percent. The same discrepancy is evident when comparing the FDI net 
inflows: while China attracted USD 138,41bn of foreign capital, or 4.1 percent of GDP, 
India only received USD 22.95bn or 2.0 percent of GDP (all data for 2007, World Bank 
2009a). Locking at the Ease of Doing Business Indicators produced by the World Bank, 
China is ranked 89 out of 183 in the overall ranking and 125 in the paying taxes category. 
This is slightly higher than India on rank 133 and 169, respectively (World Bank 2009b). In 
the Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International, China and India 
are listed on rank 79 and 84 in 2009, achieving a score of 3.6 and 3.4, respectively 
(Transparency International 2009). Taken together, even though there are some differences 
between the two countries, they might be regarded as substitutes from an investor’s 
                                                 
27 Guzman (1998) seeks to explain the apparent paradox that developing countries on the one hand fought to 
defeat the “Hull Rule” as customary international law which requires “prompt, adequate, and effective” 
compensation after expropriation, but on the other hand “enthusiastically signed BITs with developed 
countries” (Guzman, 1998: 666) which guarantees the investors even stronger protection of their investment 
against expropriation. 
28 Baistrocchi (2008) uses a law case involving China and India as a specific example of how both countries 
are worse off due to competition for FDI. However, this can be generalised to illustrate their respective 
strategic behaviour when entering treaty-negotiations as net-capital importers.  
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viewpoint. This is mirrored in an export market similarity of 0.62 in 2005 (down from 0.71 
in the year 2000) and an export product similarity of 0.78 (down from 0.86 in 1994).29 Both 
countries engaged heavily in the international DTT network, even though there are 
considerable differences in their starting points. India has signed 86 treaties in total, the 
first with Sierra Leone in 1956, followed by treaties with Sweden and Germany in 1958 
and 1959. The first treaty with Japan in 1983 marked the beginning of comprehensive 
treaty negotiations in China resulting in treaties signed with 93 partner countries at the end 
of 2007. Both countries are on average net-capital importers with a weighted FDI 
asymmetry ratio of 0.5 in the case of China and 0.2 in the case of India. Their respective 
treaty networks overlap considerably, as 70 countries have signed a treaty with both India 
and China. For all treaties, the median time difference between the years of treaty signature 
with a partner country for both countries is five years, indicating that if one country entered 
a DTT with a specific contracting partner, the other country followed after five years. 
When focussing on treaties after 1983, when China first joined the international DTT 
network, the median time difference is reduced to four years. Before 1983, India has signed 
DTTs with ten OECD members, with eight of them China concluded a treaty within three 
years after its first appearance on the treaty stage. Regarding mutual treaty partners, since 
1983, India was the first to sign a treaty with a specific country in 31 cases, while China 
was first only in 20 cases (in five cases, China and India concluded a DTT with a country in 
the same year). This suggests that India acted as a leader more frequently and China as a 
follower.  
 
Formally, the respective positions of China and India can be displayed graphically (Figure 
13). For illustrative purposes and to abstract from other FDI influencing factors, it is 
assumed that India and China are equally good at attracting (a specific type) of FDI. 
Furthermore, their decisions shall not be influenced by other parties, such as other 
competitor nations, so that both India and China only have to observe the behaviour of the 
other country. Both countries can choose between two alternative strategies: co-operate 
with each other and not to engage in harmful tax competition, or defect by concluding a tax 
treaty with major capital exporters.30 Figure 13 shows the four possible combinations in 
such a situation and the respective outcomes. The numbers stand for the payoff for each 
outcome and are ordinally ranked, with 1 > 2 > 3 > 4 for each player. The payoffs to each 
                                                 
29 See Section 5 for a detailed description of these measurements. 
30 These major capital exporters are basically OECD countries. Treaty conclusions with other nations should 
not induce the same pressure as they are less important in terms of exported capital. Furthermore, in these 
DTTs with non-OECD countries, asymmetry generally is less pronounced.  
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player for each potential solution are shown in the cells, with China’s payoff being 
indicated by the first number, and India’s by the second. Given that China does not 
conclude a treaty, India’s best strategy (1) is to defect and to sign a DTT. Hence, the 
foreign investor will prefer India over China as an investment location. India’s worst 
outcome (4) is to co-operate unilaterally, i.e. while China signs a tax treaty and attracts the 
investment, India does not. India’s second best strategy (2) is to co-operate by not signing a 
treaty if China does the same. The third best strategy for India (3) is to sign a treaty if 
China also has a treaty. The same is true for China: the best outcome is to enter a treaty if 
India does not, followed by mutual cooperation and not to sign a DTT if India also refuses 
to conclude a DTT. The third best solution for China is to sign a treaty if India also has 
signed one, and the least preferable outcome is to co-operate unilaterally and not to sign a 
treaty, while India defects and signs a DTT. The dominant strategy for each country in this 
example is to defect and sign a treaty. Because both countries act in the same way, both 
will sign a treaty and thereby reach their third best solution. However, this is not the social 
optimum since both countries would be better off if they cooperated and mutually refused 
to sign a DTT. 
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Figure 13: Prisoners’ dilemma among developing countries in the area of FDI 
 
Source: Baistrocchi (2008). 
 
Yet, in the resulting situation, where both countries sign a tax treaty, none is able to 
maintain a relative competitive advantage. In this case, both countries have an incentive to 
offer additional investment benefits to the potential investor in order to attract foreign 
capital as long as the gains of the investment to the country exceed the cost of these 
concessions. As a consequence, the two potential host countries might surpass each others 
in concessions (Guzman 1998). In a competitive market, this bidding up will continue until 
the net benefit enjoyed by the winner is zero. In this case, the firm does not have to share 
the surplus with the host country and it would choose the location which offers the highest 
overall return.31 The country that wins the competition is able to attract further capital, yet 
little is gained from the victory as benefits in terms of employment, technology transfer, 
and tax revenues will be offset by incentives and concessions, such as reduced pollution 
control, tax breaks, or relaxed employment regulations. Baistrocchi (2008) suggests two 
basic solutions to overcome the prisoners’ dilemma: in the contract solution, both countries 
enter a treaty in which they agree not to sign a DTT. However, an external authority is 
necessary to enforce this contract, which is not available. In this setting, each partner has an 
incentive to violate the contract and to sign a DTT in order to gain a (temporal) competitive 
advantage. Another solution emerges through iteration if the game is played repeatedly. 
                                                 
31 This zero-benefit outcome will not be achieved if the two potential hosts differ. In this case, the bidding 
continues until one country drops out. The remaining country will have some gains (Guzman 1998). 
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Under this assumption, a country starts with a co-operative behaviour and defects only if 
the other partner has defected on the previous move. For this tit-for-tat solution three 
conditions need to be met. (1) The relationship between the players must be durable. This 
might not be given between relatively unstable developing countries, with a frequent 
turnover of both governments and officials.32 (2) Co-operation needs to be based on 
reciprocity and (3) the players have the ability to observe defection when it occurs. In the 
context of tax treaties, these conditions are likely to be met, as the signing of a DTT is 
made public, even though the negotiation process is usually kept secret (Christians 2005) 
and as the non-defecting country could start treaty-negotiations itself. The widespread 
asymmetric DTT network in force shows that this tit-for-tat solution has not emerged in 
practice. Insufficient stability and predictability of the developing countries’ behaviour can 
serve as one explanation; however, more significant is the fact that in practice there are 
more than two competing countries and collaboration is harder to achieve the larger the 
number of players involved. In a game with more than two players, each country has an 
incentive to sign a DTT to attract a competitive edge over its rivals and all other countries 
have an incentive to follow in order to equalise their competitive disadvantage. In a group 
of competing countries, the pressure on a single country to offset its deficit is the greater 
the larger the share of competitors that have already signed a treaty. The group of 
competing countries is defined as the set of jurisdictions which act as substitutes from an 
investor’s point of view. In general, the degree of substitutability of countries increases 
with their similarity.33 This strategic interaction among governments also helps to explain 
why nearly all DTTs are bi- rather than multilateral, as in a multilateral setting no single 
country is able to gain a competitive advantage. However, the situation might change as the 
net grows denser since then the choice is no longer between no DTT and a multilateral 
DTT, but between a bilateral and a multilateral DTT (Guzman 1998). 
 
Apart from potential positive network effects and strategic interaction among governments, 
fiscal incentives and the lacking ability to make credible commitments to potential 
investors can also serve as a motive for developing countries to conclude treaties with 
asymmetric contracting partners. Rather than being completely separate arguments, 
however, they are closely linked to international competition for foreign capital, since 
DTTs help to maintain the effectiveness of investment promotion projects as well as to 
                                                 
32 Axelrod (1984) shows empirically that tit-for-tat normally emerges if both players have a relatively stable 
identity. 
33 In the empirical analysis in Section 5, three different measures of similarity will be used: countries within 
the same region, countries that export to similar markets and countries which export a similar basket of goods.  
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mitigate the dynamic inconsistency problem – both factors might improve the position of a 
host country in the global rivalry for FDI. 
 
 
Fiscal incentives to attract FDI 
Tax incentives to attract inward foreign investment come in various forms and generally 
grant benefits in form of tax reductions that otherwise would be payable. Most commonly 
employed are reduced rates on corporate income taxes, property taxes or value added taxes 
(VAT), as well as tax holidays (i.e., reduction or exemption from tax for a limited period of 
time), investment credits or allowances, accelerated depreciation of capital assets, and 
reduced import duties (Easson 2004). In 2000, the UNCTAD conducted a cross-sectional 
analysis on the use of tax incentives to attract FDI in 53 countries, of which 44 are 
classified as developing countries. Tax exemption or tax holidays were offered in nearly all 
jurisdictions (96 percent), while investment allowances and exemption from duties and 
VAT are in place in three out of four countries (Table 4).  
 
Table 4:  The Use of Fiscal Incentives 
Region 
Countries in 
Study 
(developing 
countries) 
Corporate 
Tax Rate a 
Tax 
Exemption/ 
Tax Holiday
Reduced 
Tax Rate 
Investment 
Allowance/ 
Tax Credit 
Duty/ VAT 
Exemption/ 
Reduction 
R&D 
Allowance 
Africa 14 (14) 35-40 100% 29% 71% 79% 14% 
Asia & The Pacific 17 (10) 30 94% 53% 65% 65% 59% 
Europe & EIT b 10 (8) 30 90% 40% 70% 70% 10% 
Latin America 12 (12) 30 100% 50% 100% 92% 8% 
Total c 53 (44)  96% 44% 75% 76% 26% 
Notes: a In percent of taxable income, regional averages; b Economies in transition; c Average weighted by 
countries in region. Data source: UNCTAD (2000). 
 
In general, fiscal incentives are a widespread phenomenon; however, their effectiveness in 
inducing (additional) FDI inflows may be limited for two reasons:34 (1) investors simply 
might not react to these incentives and (2) the tax-reducing effect of unilaterally offered 
                                                 
34 See de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) for a meta-study on taxation and FDI. Buss (2001) provides a literature 
overview of tax incentives and firm location decisions. Reviewing the literature on the potency of tax 
incentives, Easson (2004: 68) concludes that their overall effectiveness is “somewhat mixed” and that “even 
though a majority of investors may be unimpressed by the availability of tax incentives there is abundant 
evidence that such incentives can be an important factor for certain types of investment.”  
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lower tax rates can be offset in international taxation under certain circumstances. The 
latter effect occurs, if the home country of the investor (the source country of FDI), 
provides a tax credit for the amount of tax paid in the host country in order to unilaterally 
avoid double taxation, as it is common practice in almost all countries (Brooks 2008). 
Where no tax, or a reduced tax, is paid to the host jurisdiction because of a fiscal incentive, 
the investor pays the same amount of taxes as he would in a situation without a tax 
incentive, but pays a larger share of it in the home country. Stated differently, a tax 
incentive offered by a low-income host country has the effect of a revenue transfer to the 
high-income home country. If both states negotiate a so called tax sparing provision in their 
tax treaty, the home country agrees to credit the amount of taxes that would have been paid 
in the absence of a tax incentive, thereby preserving the incentivising effect of the reduced 
taxes and lowering the overall tax burden of the investor (Brooks 2008).35 With the 
exception of the United States, tax-sparing provisions are usually included in DTTs 
between asymmetric dyads if the net-capital exporting (developed) country applies the 
credit method (Easson 2004). However, in recent years tax sparing has become somewhat 
less popular and several OECD members are now more restrictive in granting it in their tax 
treaties (Thuronyi 2003). Nevertheless, this provision can provide a motive to net-capital 
importers to sign a treaty with a major capital exporter, as it maintains the effectiveness of 
its tax commitments in the global competition for foreign capital.  
 
 
Dynamic inconsistency problem 
In a negotiation between the government of a potential host country and a major investor, 
the host country wants to encourage a major investor to invest while the company, on the 
other hand, wants to achieve the highest return possible and will only choose to invest if 
that country offers a higher anticipated profit than other potential locations. If the investor 
and the government were able to credibly commit themselves to an agreed set of conditions 
regarding the investment, the investor would select the most efficient location and a 
binding contract establishing the division of the surplus from the investment would be 
concluded (Guzman 1998). In this contract, the government could for instance pledge 
certain fiscal incentives or guarantee full repatriation of profits, while the investor commits 
itself to a certain level of employment, training of the workforce and technology transfer. 
However, due to a lacking superior authority, this contract between the investor and the 
                                                 
35 This is a very simplified example to illustrate how tax sparing provisions work. See Brooks (2008) for a 
more comprehensive and critical view on the need for these provisions in DTTs.  
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host country is not enforceable. Furthermore, once the investment has been made, the host 
country does not need to attract the investment, but only has to treat the investor well 
enough to keep the investment (Guzman 1998). The distinction between a pre- and after-
investment period is relevant, because the investment, once it has been established, cannot 
be withdrawn without cost to the investor. This irreversibility encompasses time and effort 
to dismantle or sell off assets, a reduced resale value, training of the local workforce, or 
adoption of the products to the local demand. Formally, Zt ≥ γZt-1, where Z is the value of 
investment and γ  [0;1] the irreversibility parameter (Chisik and Davies 2004b). In a two 
period model, depending on the value of γ, the amount of investment that can be recovered 
in the year after the investment has been made (Zt) is a share of the original sum of 
investment in the first year (Zt-1). If γ = 1, the investment is completely irreversible, 
whereas the whole amount can be recovered if γ = 0. The host government can take 
advantage of this by extracting more value from the company as previously agreed, e.g. by 
increasing the tax rate.36 Had the tax rate been set at this level during the negotiations, the 
investor might have chosen another – more profitable – location to invest. However, since 
it is not able to fully recover its initial investment, it might be cheaper for the company to 
pay the higher tax rates rather than to disinvest and reallocate the investment (Guzman 
1998). Obviously, both the host government and the potential investors are aware of this 
dynamic inconsistency problem. As a consequence, the investor may decide not to invest. 
Yet, the host government wants to attract the investment and would, in order to receive the 
investment, be willing to bind itself to a set of commitments. However, as a credible 
commitment mechanism is not available, the investment may not take place.  
 
Due to its focus on a single investment decision, this example neglects one important cost 
factor, namely reputational cost, which accrues to the host country if it breaches the 
original agreement and raises tax rates after the establishment has been set up. These costs 
of losing the reputation as a reliable host country occur if other potential investors observe 
the host country’s behaviour and as a consequence eschew this country in their location 
decisions. As argued by Guzman (1998), however, even if the host country takes these 
costs into account, it will weigh the gains from breaching the agreement against any lost 
benefits caused by sanctions of other countries. There is no guarantee that balancing costs 
and benefits a priori completely abolishes the risk of time inconsistency. Working through 
                                                 
36 Yet, if the resident country of the investors unilaterally grants tax credits to avoid double taxation, this 
increase in tax rate in the host country has no effect on the overall tax burden of the investor as long as the 
host’s tax rate remains equal to or below the corporate tax rate in the residence country. 
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several channels, a bilateral tax treaty is one possibility to mitigate the dynamic 
inconsistency problem:37 (1) DTTs clarify tax rules; (2) a tax treaty sets limits on certain 
host country tax rates; (3) due to the influence of tax treaty provisions on the domestic tax 
laws, a DTT lowers, though not eliminates, the risk of future alterations to existing tax laws 
(Dagan 2000). All three arguments work similarly, as a DTT reduces the opportunities for 
the host government to unilaterally change domestic tax laws in order to extract more value 
from the investment than previously agreed. This is particularly true for corporate tax rates, 
as maximum boundaries for withholding tax rates are specified for interest, royalties and 
dividends,38 but also for the tax calculation methods which could provide a more subtle 
way to increase the fiscal benefits from an investment compared to raising tax rates. 
Terminating a treaty is more time consuming than the abrogation of domestic tax 
legislations which can be implemented over night in some jurisdictions (Baistrocchi 2008). 
Furthermore, the unilateral cancellation of a DTT could be perceived as a by far stronger 
negative signal than the positive signalling effect radiated by signing a treaty. This positive 
signal towards stability in investment and business climate and the dedication to protect and 
foster FDI which is expressed by the treaty partners in general can contribute to reduce the 
risk of adverse policy changes in the host country perceived by the investor. However, 
there are other methods, namely BITs, to provide an even stronger signal to stability than a 
DTT (Christian 2005).39 A fourth channel through which a tax treaty can reduce dynamic 
inconsistencies in the host country’s behaviour is the dispute resolution mechanism 
provided in most treaties. If an investor considers the action of the host government 
resulting in taxation not to be in accordance with the DTT, official representatives of its 
country may have to negotiate a reasonable solution with the tax authorities of the host 
country. Even though Article 25:3 of the OECD model treaty states, that the negotiating 
parties “shall endeavour to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising 
as to the interpretation or application of the convention“, there is no recourse if the 
authorities fail to reach a conclusion (Christians 2005). Finally, an argument brought 
                                                 
37 Other mechanisms include: the setting up of a joint partnership with the host country (incentive for host to 
let the investor maximise profits), the placing of a few critical operations abroad (host gains little from 
expropriation), and the demanding of a signed agreement (non-compliance will increase international 
embarrassment to the host) (Guzman 1998). 
38 This argument is supported by Chisik and Davies (2004b: 116), pointing out that „without a treaty, 
governments cannot credibly commit to efficient tax rates, resulting in an inefficient equilibrium wiht high tax 
rates and low FDI. A tax treaty improves on this outcome by allowing governments to coordinate on a pair of 
Pareto-improving tax rates“. 
39 As argued by Christians (2005), there is evidence that DTTs are not a sufficient signal of stability for US 
firms. For example, although Brazil and the US never concluded a DTT, there are significant US FDI flows to 
Brazil. On the other hand, despite a tax treaty between the US and Venezuela, FDI dropped due to concerns 
over regulatory and political stability in Venezuela. 
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forward by Elkins et al. (2006) for bilateral investment treaties, namely that these treaties 
increase the ex post costs of non-compliance, is also valid for DTTs. Tax treaties are 
negotiated between sovereign states and these state-to-state contracts implicate the direct 
interests of the  resident country of the investor in a more direct way than contracts between 
an investor and the government. The home government has an interest in the broader 
principles of good-faith treaty observance. Any action by the host government that violates 
the DTT qualifies as a breach of the fundamental principle of international law that is 
‘pacta sunt servanda’ (treaties are to be observed). A non-compliance of an international 
treaty may have tremendous negative spill-over effects on other areas of foreign policy. 
  
 
An illustrative example 
The significance of DTTs in gaining a competitive edge against competitor countries, their 
role to maintain the effectiveness of fiscal investment incentive and their potential to 
overcome the dynamic inconsistency problem can be illustrated with a simple example:40 
Assuming a company is considering opening a branch in one of two potential host countries 
and that it will cost USD 60m for the initial investment and USD 10m for salaries, 
maintenance and so on. The costs and revenues can be regarded as discounted values and 
are therefore stated as lump sums. They are assumed to be the same for both host countries. 
Provided that the firm eventually decides to invest in one of the two locations, because it is 
offered a complete exemption from corporate taxes for five years and a reduced tax rate of 
15 percent for the following 10 years. With these concessions, the investment yields 
expected revenues of USD 100m. The host country has agreed to the terms because even in 
absence of tax revenues the benefits in terms of employment and technology transfer leave 
a positive net-gain. Without the tax incentive, however, the host would not have been able 
to attract the investment. Under these assumptions, both the investor and the host country 
would be willing to sign a binding agreement in which they commit themselves to the terms 
stated above, as long as the agreement was credible and enforceable. However, due to the 
lack of a superior authority, the agreement is not enforceable, nor is it credible as the host 
has a positive incentive to change to conditions after the company invests. This is because 
the host country government knows that the investor cannot easily recoup its initial capital 
investment, i.e. that the investment is at least partly irreversible. Assuming now that the 
                                                 
40 This example is a simplified version of the one presented in Guzman (1998). The author shows how BITs 
might help to mitigate the dynamic inconsistency problem, but ignores the problem of international taxation. 
Nevertheless, the point made regarding any non-tax investment incentive such as the preferential access to 
water and power, no local content requirement and the promise of unlimited profit repatriation remains valid.  
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host country, after the firm built its facility at a cost of USD 60m, imposes a tax of 40 
percent on revenues, this leaves a after tax revenue of USD 60m. Clearly, if the firm had 
known beforehand that the host government would behave in that way, it would never have 
invested since the total cost of investment (USD 70m) is larger than the after-tax profit 
(USD 60m). Yet, because the company has already spent USD 60m, and supposing that the 
investment cannot be regained by tearing down or selling the facility, it must choose 
between continuing to operate the branch and face a loss of USD 10m, or closing down the 
operation and realise a loss of USD 60m. Obviously, the company will choose to remain in 
the host country.  
 
The role of a tax treaty between the home country of the investor and the host country is 
threefold: (1) if only one of the two potential host countries has signed a DTT with the 
home country, this treaty could be the decisive factor on the margin since both countries are 
close substitutes. (2) If the home country eliminates twofold taxation unilaterally by 
granting tax credits for the taxes paid in the host country, as long as the DTT contains a tax 
sparing provision, the tax treaty secures preserving the effectiveness of the tax holiday and 
the reduced corporate tax rate. (3) Since the treaty specifies a maximum level of 
withholding taxes, it mitigates the dynamic inconsistency problem by limiting the amount 
of tax payment the host country can demand once the operation has been established.  For 
all three reasons, the defeated host country also has an incentive to negotiate a DTT with 
the home country in order to offset its inferior bargaining position. This is true for the non-
fiscal benefits as well, the defeated host country’s tax incentives would be neutralised 
without a DTT or if it could not make a credible commitment. 
 
 
Summing up: Why policy choices in other focal countries drive the diffusion of DTTs 
With multiple competing countries, the pressure on a single country to sign DTTs is the 
greater the larger the share of competitors that have already signed a treaty, where 
competitors are simply other states acting as substitutes from an investor’s point of view. In 
general, the degree of substitutability of countries increases with their structural similarity 
as a potential location for FDI. This strategic interaction among governments also helps to 
explain why nearly all DTTs are bi- rather than multilateral, as in a multilateral setting no 
single country is able to gain a competitive advantage.  
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Which other focal countries are countries likely to look at? Since competition among 
countries is the main hypothesized reason for the diffusion of DTTs, it is contended that 
countries look at their main competitors for scarce foreign capital as focal countries. 
Competitor countries can be identified in a multitude of ways, but in the empirical part 
three specific variables are chosen: one captures competition in the markets a country 
exports to, the second competition in the products a country exports to world markets, 
while the third captures the regional identity of countries.41 Countries in the same region 
are competitors for scarce foreign capital as they are often functional equivalents for 
foreign investors, particularly for FDI of the market-seeking type, i.e. for FDI set up for the 
purpose of producing for a particular foreign macro-region. Countries competing in the 
same range of products and services are competitors for a specific type of investment in 
specific economic sectors producing these goods and services. Countries exporting to the 
same foreign markets are competitors in these foreign markets, but do not necessarily 
compete for FDI. This connectivity variable is included to examine whether countries are 
simply driven by the DTT signing activity of generally competing countries, rather than 
countries specifically competing for scarce foreign capital. 
 
If competition for scarce foreign capital drives spatial dependence in the diffusion of DTTs, 
then the remaining question is why this does not lead to situation in which all possible 
country pairs are covered by a DTT? The reason is that while countries fear to lose out in 
the scramble for FDI if they fail to sign a specific DTT, they need to balance this cost 
against the costs of concluding the DTT. First, there is a post-treaty cost stemming from the 
potential loss in tax revenue already mentioned. Second, there is also an upfront cost. 
Despite the wide-spread use of model treaties, the negotiation of a tax treaty is a lengthy 
process which ties up a large amount of administrative resources. Especially developing 
countries lack the capacities to handle a significant number of simultaneous treaty 
negotiations. This is aggravated by the fact that some existing treaties are amended from 
time to time if general economic conditions change. Thuronyi (2010: 444) argues that “it 
would take a lifetime for most developing countries to negotiate a substantial number of 
treaties”, since these countries only have weak capacity to administer treaties and their tax 
administrations are typically challenged in terms of human resources. However, the same 
                                                 
41 While countries often look at their regional peers in terms of competition for FDI, competition is not the 
only reason why countries may regard their regional peers as focal countries. Countries often also learn from 
others in their region as well as imitate or emulate their behaviour. This is not a problem for the present 
analysis; rather it ensures that it also captures some other reasons for spatial dependence in the diffusion of 
DTTs. 
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restrictions apply, if less severely, to more advanced economies. The US Treasury 
Department has stated (US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2006): 
 
“The primary constraint on the size of our tax treaty network may be the complexity of 
the negotiations themselves. Ensuring that the various functions to be performed by tax 
treaties are all properly taken into account makes the negotiation process exacting and 
time consuming.” (Statement of Patricia A. Brown, 02 February 2006). 
 
As a consequence, policy makers have to prioritise potential partner countries with which 
they strive to negotiate a treaty. In line with the theoretical argument, the extent to which 
competing nations have already signed tax treaties will affect the relative cost of holding 
out and not signing a treaty. Moreover, industry structure as well as the composition and 
destination of exports of a country change over time. Consequently, also the set of 
competing countries is bound to change over time. As a result, more and more treaties will 
be signed over time, but the process of diffusion will slow down and potentially come close 
to a halt when the web of treaties covers the main competitors and concluding further DTTs 
generates higher costs than benefits to countries. 
 
 
2.5.  Data and Methodology 
This section describes the data and methodology used to test the hypothesis derived in the 
preceding section, that the propensity for a specific dyad to conclude a tax treaty is 
influenced by DTTs signed between competitor countries, i.e. that there is spatial contagion 
between country pairs with respect to tax treaties. To begin with, the modelling of the 
dyadic setting is discussed, followed by a brief presentation of the dependent and the 
explanatory variables. Subsequently, the spatial weights used are discussed. Finally, the 
Cox proportional hazard model as primary estimation method is presented. 
 
 
Choice of dyadic setting 
Since a tax treaty is concluded between two states, a dyadic data setting where each 
observation consists of a country pair is the appropriate form of analysis. Basically, one can 
differentiate between directed and undirected dyads (Neumayer and Plümper 2010): while 
in the former case dyadic activity between the dyad members i and j initiates with i and is 
directed towards j, in the latter case such a distinction is either not possible or theoretically 
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unimportant and dyadij is therefore indistinguishable from dyadji. Examples of directed 
dyads generally encompass inter- and intraregional as well as international flows such as 
trade, FDI, remittances or migration, but also interstate armed conflicts where one state is 
an aggressor and another is the victim. On the other hand, examples for undirected dyads 
are bilateral treaties between more or less equal partners, for which the initiator of the 
negotiations cannot be identified. In the context of DTTs, modelling either a directed or an 
undirected dyad can theoretically be justified. Power based - or ‘coercive’ (Simmons et al. 
2006: 790) - theories suggest that dominant capital-exporters such as the United States or 
Germany are able to control the agenda and start treaty negotiations according to their 
schedule and needs (Elkins et al. 2006). By the same token, these net-capital-exporting 
nations benefit most from a DTT in terms of tax revenues and enforcement of domestic tax 
laws, which gives them an incentive to approach potential treaty partners. On the other 
hand, if developing countries regard a DTT as an effective mean to attract more FDI, they 
could pursue treaties with targeted industrialised nations from which they expect the most 
potential investment. This argument is supported by Brauner (2003: 308), arguing that there 
are many cases in which developing countries wish to conclude tax treaties with developed 
countries, “which often reject their overture”. Anecdotally, Nigeria sought to negotiate a 
DTT with the United States in 1978, however, despite lasting negotiations the treaty was 
never signed (Christians 2005). Furthermore, a major investor facing twofold taxation of its 
income can lobby both the home and the host government to sign a DTT. Since there is no 
conclusive theoretical argument for the choice of direction in a DTT-dyad and information 
on who started the negotiations is not available in individual cases, the present analysis is 
based on undirected dyads.42 However, in the robustness section, following the lead of 
Elkins et al. (2006) and Neumayer and Plümper (2010) DTTs are modelled as directed from 
OECD to non-OECD countries. 
 
 
Data description 
The dataset covers 186 countries and spans 37 years from 1969 to 2005. Modelled as 
undirected dyads, 186 countries can be combined to 17,205 country-pairs.43 The dataset 
encompasses 2,325 tax treaties, covering 87.8 percent of all treaties up to 2005 in the IBFD 
database. 270 treaties are lost as their date of signature is before 1969; another 53 treaties 
                                                 
42 As a consequence, in the context of this analysis, dyadij is the same as dyadji. Therefore, the dataset is 
halved to avoid double counting of identical observations. Furthermore, since a country cannot enter treaty 
negotiations with itself, all dyads dyadii are dropped. 
43 The number of possible combinations can be calculated as ((186*186)-186)/2. 
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are excluded because either one or both of the contracting states is not in the sample due to 
a lack of data. With the exception of West Bank and Gaza and Greenland, these countries 
are small island states or mini-states such as Monaco and San Marino. Their exclusion 
should not affect the results.44  
 
To begin with, the dependent variable is the signature of a DTT concerning the taxation of 
income and capital in a given year between a specific country-pair, which is measured by a 
simple dummy variable taking the value of one, if a dyad signed a DTT in certain year and 
zero if otherwise. Since the focus of the analysis is on the diffusion of tax treaties, the date 
of signature, rather than the date of ratification or the date of effectiveness is taken. For the 
same reason, all renegotiated contracts which replace a former treaty are excluded. Since 
the treaty partners can phrase their own wording of the agreement there is some 
heterogeneity among existing DTTs, however, most treaties follow the recommendations of 
the different model tax treaties, which are used as a basis and are adopted during the 
negotiation process. Several arguments justify the homogenous treatment of all tax treaties: 
First, the focus of analysis lies on treaties on the taxation of capital and income, which form 
a more homogenous subgroup of all possible tax treaties. Second, Avi-Yonah (2009) 
estimates that about 75 percent of the words of any arbitrary DTT are identical with the 
words of any other DTT. Third, the OECD Model Treaty is by far the most prevalent basis 
for existing DTTs. For instance, the pro-host country taxation Andean Model treaty is 
practically irrelevant since it has never been used as a basis for negotiations between a 
developed and developing country (Baistrocchi 2008). The UN Model Treaty, on the other 
hand, may be the preferred choice of developing countries when starting treaty 
negotiations.45 Yet, they often lack the political clout to prevail in treaty negotiations with 
developing countries. Regarding the UN Model and the OECD Model as the two opposing 
ends of a continuum, however, there is some evidence that the larger a developing country, 
the closer the agreed treaty is to the UN Model. For example, the asymmetric tax treaty 
network of Brazil is closer to the UN Model, than the asymmetric DTT network of 
Kazakhstan (Baistrocchi 2008). On the other hand, in the 2001 update of the UN Model 
several changes were made “to bring the UN Model more in line with the OECD Model” 
(Kosters 2004: 7). Taken together, there is sufficient reasoning for a uniform treatment of 
                                                 
44 Many of the excluded island states are classified as offshore financial centres, which can lead to a sample 
selection bias for this variable. However, the diffusion of DTTs among OFCs is not the focus of analysis.  
45 The UN Model Treaty was first published in 1980, motivated by the fact that the OECD Model does not 
adequately take into account the fiscal interests of developing countries. Compared to the OECD Model, the 
UN Model contains 27 adoptions with the aim of enlarging taxation in the host country vis-à-vis the residence 
country (Wijnen 1998). 
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DTTs and thereby to follow the example of almost all other empirical studies examining 
tax treaties. 
 
Contrary to datasets consisting of directed dyads, where one country clearly is the sender 
(e.g., exporter) and the other country the recipient (e.g., importer), such a distinction is not 
possible in undirected dyads. As a consequence, because dyadij cannot be distinguished 
from dyadji, it is not possible to easily include characteristics of only one country (e.g., 
GDP per capita); rather the relationship between the characteristics of both dyad members 
has to be modelled and theoretically justified. An example for such a linkage is a 
substitutive, represented by the sum of a characteristic of both countries (e.g. sum of GDP 
per capita of both dyad members) or a complementary, modelled through the product of a 
characteristic of both countries (e.g., product of GDP per capita of both dyad members), 
relationship. Another possibility is to take either the maximum or the minimum of the 
values of both countries, e.g. the higher value of GDP per capita. The same is true for 
directed linkages, such as trade or migration flows. The inclusion of relational variables 
(e.g., distance or bilateral contracts), on the other hand, is straightforward. 
 
Besides the spatial lags, described in detail in the next subsection, the standard estimation 
model contains the following explanatory variables: 
 Product of populations: The population of a country is taken as a measure of its 
size, while the use of the product implements a complementary relationship. Ceteris 
paribus, it is expected that two large countries are more likely to sign a DTT than a 
large and a small country or than two small countries, because more populous 
nations generally are more important players on the international stage. 
 Product of GDPs per capita: To control for economic development, the product of 
the GDP per capita for both dyad members is included. As with population, it is 
anticipated that two rich countries have a higher propensity to enter a tax treaty than 
a developed and a less developed nation and particularly than two developing 
countries. 
 Bilateral Trade: The sum of bilateral exports and imports is taken as an 
approximation for the intensity of the bilateral economic ties. To reduce the 
skewness of the data, the log is taken and to mitigate the potential endogeneity bias, 
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the variable is lagged by one year.46 A positive influence on the propensity to sign a 
DTT is expected. 
 Product of both countries’ openness to trade: Openness to trade is defined as the 
sum of imports and exports divided by GDP. The product of both countries’ 
openness to trade is taken to model a complementary relationship. Since two open 
countries should be more likely to sign a DTT, a positive sign is anticipated. 
 BIT: A dummy variable taking the value of unity if the two countries have signed a 
BIT. These investment protection treaties are an important mean for bilateral 
economic cooperation. In order to secure cross-border investment, both countries 
commit themselves to a fair and equitable treatment of investments, to refrain from 
unreasonable and discriminatory measures as well as expropriation and to guarantee 
the free transfer of assets (Guzman 1998). Furthermore, a dispute settlement 
mechanism is included in most treaties. With respect to the positive signalling 
effect to potential investors, a DTT and a BIT might act as substitutes; however, 
since they differ in their key aspects, a complementary relationship and therefore a 
positive influence of a BIT is expected. 
 RTA: Another mean for economic cooperation is the conclusion of a Regional 
Trade Agreement (RTA). This dummy takes the value of one if both signatory 
states are members of the same RTA. A positive association with the propensity to 
sign a DTT is expected. 
 OFC: A dummy which takes the value of one, if one of the dyad members is 
classified as a tax haven or as an Other Financial Centre using the OECD country 
list. The OECD defines countries as tax havens, if a country (1) imposes no or low 
nominal taxes on the relevant income, (2) refuses to effectively exchange 
information with other jurisdictions, (3) lacks transparency, and (4) has no 
requirement that an activity must be substantial (OECD 1998).47 The OECD 
advises its members not to enter, to limit or to terminate tax treaties with these 
countries (OECD 1998, OECD 2004). Therefore, a lower propensity to sign a DTT 
is anticipated if one of the dyad members is on the OECD list. 
 Diplomatic representation: A dummy equal to one, if one country has a diplomatic 
representation in the other country. Since diplomatic relations are a signal for 
                                                 
46 To keep zeros in the sample, the smallest existing positive value is added to each observation before taking 
the log. 
47 The absence of a requirement that an activity has to be substantial indicates that a country attempts to 
attract purely tax-driven FDI, i.e. an activity with little value added in the country such as booking centres 
(OECD 1998). 
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political cooperation and reduce transaction cost in the negotiation process, a 
positive influence is expected. 
 Distance: It measures the distance between the capitals of both dyad members. On 
the one hand, a high distance increases transaction costs in the negotiation of a 
DTT; on the other hand, as far as a tax treaty provides a positive signal towards 
stability and investor-friendliness, these effects might be more important for 
remoter countries. The sign is therefore uncertain. 
 Product of political constraints: Political constraints on the executive branch as an 
approximate measure for the institutional development of a county is included, as 
poor institutions could hamper DTT negotiations (e.g., by increasing the transaction 
cost) or as less discretion is supposed to render credible commitments to foreign 
investors more likely. On the other hand, in its role of providing stability for 
investors, a tax treaty might be more beneficial with countries with poorly 
developed institutions. Therefore, the sign is unclear. As these arguments apply to 
both dyad members, a complementary relationship is assumed.  
 Minimum years of independence: Measures the years of independence of the dyad 
member, which became politically independent at a later stage. Since only 
independent countries can sign DTTs, newly independent countries might need to 
catch-up with other nations and sign treaties with the most important capital 
exporters. Therefore, the probability to enter a DTT is expected to decrease with 
years of independence. 
 Maximum number of DTTs: Measures the higher of the number of existing treaties 
of either of the two countries in a dyad. As a country with a high number of 
exisiting treaties is likely to have signed DTTs with all important partner countries, 
the probability to negotiate a further DTT is anticipated to decrease with increasing 
number of existing treaties. 
 Country group dummies: To control for inherent differences in the probabilities of 
signing a DTT between OECD and non-OECD countries,48 a dummy taking the 
value of unity if the dyad consists of two OECD countries and a dummy that is 
equal to one if an OECD and a non-OECD country form the country pair is 
included. The omitted reference category are dyads in which neither of the two 
countries are member of the OECD. 
                                                 
48 Only Western developed OECD members are taken as OECD members: Australia,  Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
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 Cumulative number of DTTs: Two variables capturing the cumulative number of 
DTTs that country i and country j, respectively, have signed until year t-1 to control 
for the general, but time-varying propensity of a country to enter such treaties.  
 
Ideally, one would control for the size of bilateral FDI stocks as a measurement of foreign 
investment exposure in the partner country and the degree of asymmetry of the dyad. 
Unfortunately, this data is not available before 1970 and very scarcely until the early 
1990ies. Furthermore, data availability is non-random with information more completely 
obtainable for OECD countries. Including this variable may therefore lead to a severe 
sample selection bias. Furthermore, as predicted by the gravity-model, empirical work has 
found a high explanatory power of market size and distance on FDI, both included in the 
model (Blonigen et al. 2007). 
 
 
Spatial lag variables 
To analyse the potential influence of DTT conclusions by competitor countries, a spatial 
lag model is used. Contrary to a spatial-x model, where the dependent variable is regressed 
on the weighted values of one or more explanatory variables in other dyads, and to the 
spatial error model, in which spatial dependence is modelled as a part of the error term, 
spatial lag models include the weighted values of the dependent variable in all other dyads 
as an independent variable (Anselin 1988). In undirected dyads as opposed to directed 
dyads, the flexibility to model spatial dependence is limited considerably. While in the 
former case, policy choices of a dyad can only depend on the choices of other dyads, 
directed dyads allow testing far more elaborated channels of policy diffusion (Neumayer 
and Plümper 2010). Ignoring other control variables, the basic model takes the form  
ij pq km ij
km ij
y w y 

         (7)  
 
where ykm represents the total sum of DTTs signed by all other dyads and wpq is the 
weighting matrix measuring the connectivity between dyadij and other dyads km 
(Neumayer and Plümper 2010). Other than in a monadic data setting, where the weighting 
matrix simply represents the connectivity between unit i and unit k (e.g., reversed 
distance),49 modelling the weighting matrix in a setting where dyads depend on dyads is 
                                                 
49 The spatial weight itself can be directed (e.g., exports) or undirected (e.g., distance). Since all weights used 
are undirected, this discussion is set aside here. 
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more complex. Since each dyad member i and j may be influenced by the sum of DTTs 
signed by every other dyads except the dyadij, the weighting matrix wpq contains the 
linkages between country i and all other dyads as well as linkages between country j and all 
other dyads. These linkages might be considered as complements or substitutes, i.e. in the 
first case both dyad members must be spatially influenced while in the latter it is sufficient 
that only one dyad member must be subject to contagion.50   
 
To model the strength of connectivity between two units, three concepts of similarity are 
employed:51 
 Common region: Dichotomous weighting matrix that takes the value of 1 if both the 
influenced and the influencing country are in the same region. This means that each 
dyad member is only influenced by DTT conclusions of jurisdictions in the same 
region. For instance, in the dyad Germany-Ghana, Germany is influenced by other 
European countries, while Ghana is influenced by all other nations in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. A complementary relationship between the two linkages in the weighting 
matrix is assumed, i.e. the dyad Germany-Ghana together is only influenced by 
DTTs signed between European countries (excl. Germany) with Sub-Saharan 
nations (excl. Ghana).  
Formally, this spatial lag is modelled as follows:  
( )ik jm km
km ij
w w y

 , with i k and j m , where ikw takes the value of one if both 
country i and k are within the same region (analogous for jmw ).  
 Export market similarity: Two countries are supposed to be close competitors if 
they export to similar partners. Here, a substitutive relation between the two 
linkages is taken. In the Germany-Ghana example, a strong export similarity 
between Germany and third country can offset a low similarity between Ghana and 
a fourth country. On the other hand, the higher both export market similarities, the 
higher their overall weight in the weighting matrix. More specifically, in 2005, the 
export market similarity of Germany and Italy was 0.72 and 0.14 for Ghana and El 
Salvador, respectively. A DTT between Italy and El Salvador is therefore weighted 
with 0.86 (compared to 0.10 if a complementary relationship was assumed).  
                                                 
50 Substitutes are modelled by taking the sum of the both weighting functions, while for a complementary 
relation their product is taken (Neumayer and Plümper 2010). 
51 The spatial lags were created using the ado-file spundir.ado by Neumayer and Plümper, described in 
Neumayer and Plümper (2009). 
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 Export product similarity: Two nations are supposed to be close substitutes as an 
investment location from the point of view of a foreign investor if they export a 
similar basket of goods, based on thirteen product categories. As with export 
market similarity, the linkages in the weighting matrix are assumed to be 
substitutes. Formally, these spatial lags are represented by: ( )ik jm km
km ij
w w y

 . 
 
To calculate the export market and export product similarity, an approach suggested by 
Finger and Kreinin (1979) is adopted:  
( ) { [ ( ), ( )]}t c t c t
c
Similarity ab Min X ac X bc     (8) 
          
Where a and b are two countries exporting either a commodity c or to a market c and 
Xc(ac) is the share of exports in commodity c or to market c of the total exports of a in year 
t. The similarity of a and b is the sum of the minima of the shares of a certain commodity 
(or a target market) of the total exports of a and b, respectively. The resulting index ranges 
from 0 to 1 and takes the value of 0 if the two countries export completely different 
products (e.g., country a only exports agricultural products and country b only ores and 
metals) and the value of 1 if both countries export exactly the same basket of goods (e.g., 
50 percent of country a’s and country b’s exports are agricultural products and 50 percent 
ores and metals).52 The resulting weighting matrix is row-standardised, i.e. for each row of 
the matrix, each cell is divided by its own row sum.53 The spatial lag is then the weighted 
average of the number of DTTs concluded by competitor countries. Apart from having 
some convenient characteristics such as an intuitive interpretation of the coefficients, there 
is a theoretical reason behind row-standardisation: every country should be subject to the 
same “amount of contagion”, regardless how many competitors it has. For example, in the 
case of common region, the sum of all contagious influences is the same whether it is a 
small or a large region. If the weighting matrix was not row-standardised, any result could 
be driven by the fact that regions differ in size. Furthermore, it could be argued that a 
                                                 
52 Missing data in the export structure (e.g., country a’s export in ores and metals) are implicitly set to zero in 
this approach, since the export shares of the remaining twelve product groups are calculated without ores and 
metals. As the minimum of the share of a certain product category for country a and b is taken, in this 
example country a’s zero is smaller than any value for country b in this product group. As a consequence, if 
missing values are in fact positive and not zero values, the similarity measure underestimates the true 
similarity. Therefore, these similarity measures should be regarded as the lower bound. Contrary, simply 
taking the correlation between country a’s and country b’s export structure would overestimate the similarity 
in case of missing values.  
53 This is a very common procedure in spatial literature; yet, Plümper and Neumayer (2010) argue that since 
row-standardising changes the relative weights of influencing units, it needs to be well justified. 
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specific country observes the actions of countries in the same region more closely if the 
region is small. For instance, South Asia consists of eight nations and Sub-Saharan Africa 
of 48. India therefore should monitor the action of each of its seven regional competitors 
more closely and react adequately than Ghana with its 47 regional competitors. By the 
same token, the total influence of other dyads in terms of export product and export market 
similarity is taken as fixed with the weights depending on the degree of similarity where 
more similar dyads are assigned more weight than less similar dyads. Table 5 provides 
summary statistics and data sources for all variables. 
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Table 5:  Summary statistics and data sources 
Variable Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Source 
DTT 212,244 0.007 0.081 0 1 IBFD (2009) 
Product of populations (ln) 212,244 31.592 2.363 22.276 41.543 World Bank (2009) 
Product of GDPs per capita (ln) 212,244 14.765 2.079 9.374 21.072 World Bank (2009) 
Bilateral trade (ln, t-1) 212,244 9.986 7.765 0 25.237 Rose (2009) 
Product of openness’ to trade 212,244 5,296.2 4,604 65.432 94,121.9 World Bank (2009) 
BIT 212,244 0.046 0.209 0 1 UNCTAD (2007) 
RTA 212,244 0.079 0.269 0 1 WTO (2009) 
OFC 212,244 0.209 0.407 0 1 OECD (2009) 
Diplomatic representation 212,244 0.307 0.461 0 1 Bayer (2006) 
Distance (ln) 212,244 8.782 0.705 4.54 9.90 Bennett and  Stam 
(2005) 
Product of Political Constraints 212,244 0.125 0.191 0 0.786 Henisz (2000) 
OECD-OECD dyad 212,244 0.009 0.009 0 1  
OECD-nonOECD dyad 212,244 0.262 0.440 0 1  
Min. years of independence 212,244 36.718 17.10 2 81 CIA (2010) 
Max. number of DTT (t-1) 212,244 24.428 23.98 0 118 IBFD (2009) 
Cumulative number of DTTs 
country i (t-1) 
212,244 12.993 19.52 0 120 IBFD (2009) 
Cumulative number of DTTs 
country j (t-1) 
212,244 15.987 21.73 0 120 IBFD (2009) 
       
Spatial lags:       
W: Common region (product) (t-1) 212,244 0.049 0.081 0 1 
own calculations, based 
on IBFD (2009) and 
World Bank (2009) 
W: Export market similarity (sum) 
(t-1) 
212,244 0.094 0.046 0.015 0.219 
own calculations, based 
on IBFD (2009) and 
World Bank (2009) 
W: Export product similarity (sum) 
(t-1) 
212,244 0.100 0.050 0.012 0.279 
own calculations, based 
on IBFD (2009) and 
World Bank (2009) 
Note: W denotes the weighting matrix used to create the spatial lags. The spatially lagged variable is a 
dummy taking the value of one in years a DTT has been signed and in all subsequent years. 
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Estimation methodology 
The aim of this analysis is to find out whether specific factors, particularly the treaty 
conclusions of competitor countries, have a significant influence on the propensity to sign a 
treaty for a specific dyad, i.e. how these factors influence the time until two specific 
countries conclude a DTT. Using this time in years as dependent variable, the influence of 
the spatially lagged treaties of competitor countries could be estimated by OLS. However, 
this estimation technique has several limitations in this setting (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2004): (1) duration data, i.e. years until treaty conclusion, are always possible and 
some observations have very long duration times which leads to considerable skewness in 
the data. Taking logs can mitigate, but not solve the problem. (2)  Many dyads have not 
concluded a treaty until the end of 2007 and it is unknown when or whether they will do so 
in future. These observations are right censored and OLS does not distinguish between 
uncensored and right-censored observations; 54 (3) OLS implicitly treats time varying 
covariates as time-invariant. Another approach would be to model the decision whether a 
dyad does or does not enter a treaty as a simple logit or probit-model. However, this 
estimation technique does not take into account the time structure of treaty diffusion.55 
 
Therefore, the primary estimation technique applied in this work is a semi-parametric Cox 
proportional hazard model (Cox 1972) from the family of survival models, which provide 
estimates for factors influencing the time until a certain event occurs. In this setting, this 
failure is defined as the conclusion of a tax treaty in a specific dyad. The Cox model is 
superior to other (parametric) event history models as in this analysis time dependency is 
more a nuisance while the interest lies in the relationship between the covariates and the 
hazard rate. Furthermore, theory does not provide a clear functional form of the baseline 
hazard. 
 
The estimated Cox model is thus specified as follows: 
0( | ) ( ) exp( ' ' )ijt ijt ijt ijth t X Y h t X Y       (9) 
 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function which also absorbs effects that do not vary 
across dyads and is not estimated, Xijt is the set of dyad control variables outlined above, 
where i and j are the two dyad members. Yijt a matrix containing the spatial lag variables, 
                                                 
54 A Tobit estimation that explicitly takes into account censored observations could be an alternative for this 
problem.  
55 Yet, some authors argue that an adequately specified logit model is a feasible alternative to the survival 
model (Beck et al. 1998, Carter and Signorio 2007).  See the Appendix for a brief overview of this discussion. 
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which capture the DTT signing behaviour of other focal countries. The covariates only 
induce proportional shifts in the baseline hazard, but do not change its shape. The 
parameters β and γ are estimated via maximisation of the partial likelihood (Blossfeld et al. 
2007). The date from which on a dyad starts accumulating risk (of signing a tax treaty) is 
taken as 1925 since in this year the first modern treaty was signed between countries that 
still exist nowadays, namely, Italy and Germany. However, because DTTs can only be 
signed between two independent tax jurisdictions, a dyad enters the analysis only in the 
year in which the latter of both countries became independent.56 For such late entering 
countries, the amount of risk accumulated in their first year in the analysis has to be 
determined. The basic question is whether their risk accumulation starts at zero or is the 
same as all other dyads in this year. For example, Eritrea became independent in 1993, so 
all dyads containing Eritrea as one partner enter the study in 1993. A decision has to be 
made whether the risk of dyads with Eritrea in 1993 is the same as of independent dyads in 
1925 (the first year of treaty conclusion) or the same as of independent dyads in 1993. The 
later assumption is taken since the international awareness of DTTs increased since the first 
treaty in 1925, and this is awareness is the same for independent and non-independent 
countries. Once a nation becomes independent, it finds itself in the competitive situation of 
the actual year and not in the situation back in 1925. As theory suggests, a newly 
independent country should have more pressure to sign tax treaties if DTTs are already 
widespread among competitor countries. This is reflected in the higher amount of risk 
accumulated in the year of independence. This argument is also supported by the fact that 
East European countries entered a multitude of DTTs with western European countries in 
the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and that China, as outlined above, 
signed a lot of treaties once it opened its economy. 
 
The inclusion of a spatially lagged dependent variable introduces a potential, but probably 
small degree of endogeneity since dyads affect each other. Fully solving this problem 
would require a full spatial maximum likelihood Cox estimator, which is currently not 
available. To address this problem, the spatial lags are lagged by one year.57 In addition, 
                                                 
56 Information on independence of tax jurisdictions unfortunately is not available. Therefore, the year of 
political independence of a country is taken as independence date. In the cases where a DTT was signed 
before this date, the year of DTT signature is taken as year of independence. 
57 Even though this procedure might not fully solve the problem, it should at least mitigate endogeneity. 
Basically, the temporal lag should only be applied to the DTTs and not to the weighting matrix. However, due 
to computational intensity, the spatially weighted sum of DTTs (i.e. pq km
km ij
w y

  instead of kmy ) is lagged 
by one year. This does not make any difference for time invariant weighting matrices such as common region. 
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this is reasonable since the spatial effect is unlikely to occur instantaneously, but countries 
need some time to react. Another potential problem is typically referred to as spatial 
clustering or unobserved spatial heterogeneity. This occurs since spatial patterns may not 
be due to spatial dependence, but can be due to the fact that close dyads are more likely to 
be similar than more distant dyads. In this case, the spatial lags could spuriously capture 
effects which have nothing to do with spatial dependence (Plümper and Neumayer 2010). 
Ideally, one would include dyad fixed effects to control for time-invariant dyad specific 
heterogeneity in the propensity to sign a tax treaty. However, this is not feasible since the 
Cox proportional model essentially performs a binary-outcome analysis at each point in 
time where at least one DTT is concluded (Cleves et al. 2004). Therefore, insufficient 
degrees of freedom are available to include a full set of dyad-dummies. As an alternative, 
as already mentioned above, two variables measuring the total number of DTTs signed by 
country i and country j, respectively, in year t-1 to control for the general, but time-varying 
propensity of a country to enter tax treaties are included. Since this measure is time variant, 
it captures the overall propensity of a country towards signing DTTs more closely than a 
country fixed effects approach which would be feasible but would assume that this effect is 
constant over time. A non-constant measure is appropriate because some countries reveal 
principal changes in their DTT-signing behaviour with periods of inactivity followed by 
periods of activity and the reverse (e.g., China’s first treaty with Japan in 1983 marked the 
beginning of a period of comprehensive treaty negotiations).  
 
 
2.6.  Main Results  
Table 6 provides results for the Cox proportional hazard model covering the whole sample. 
Looking at the control variables first, the results generally are in line with expectations. 
Ceteris paribus, two more populous countries are always while two richer countries are in 
some specifications more likely to sign a DTT. Even after controlling for size (population) 
and the level of development (GDP per capita) of the two dyad members, there is evidence 
that bilateral trade increases the propensity to enter a tax treaty. Countries which already 
have signed a BIT are more likely to sign a DTT as well. The positive sign indicates that a 
BIT and a tax treaty are regarded as complements rather than substitutes. Oddly, the 
coefficient of RTA is negative in all specifications, but not statistically significant. A dyad, 
                                                                                                                                               
The other two weighting matrices, namely export market and export product simililarity, are highly time 
consistent, minimising the potential bias. 
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in which one or both countries are classified as an offshore financial centre by the OECD, 
is statistically significant less likely to sign a DTT in all model specifications. If two 
countries have diplomatic representations, they face an increased hazard of signing a DTT, 
which could be either due to closer political ties in general or due to reduced transaction 
costs. On the other hand, more distant countries are less likely to enter a DTT. The stability 
of political systems, as measured by the product of the Political Constraints variable, 
exhibits a positive and highly significant influence on the hazard to sign a tax treaty. OECD 
members are generally richer, trade more and have closer political ties. After controlling for 
these factors and their general propensity to enter tax treaties, dyads consisting of two 
OECD countries are not more likely to sign a DTT, while dyads with one OECD member 
and a non-member are less likely to sign a DTT compared to a dyad with two non-OECD 
members. This is somewhat unexpected, but is driven by the covariates: once the controls 
for population size and GDP per capita as well as for their DTT history are removed, the 
dummy for an OECD-OECD dyad becomes positive and highly significant throughout. 
However, the OECD-non-OECD dummy variable remains negative and statistically 
significant. Newly independent countries have a higher propensity to sign DTTs. The 
higher the maximum number of DTTs signed by either of the two dyad members, the lower 
the likelihood of signing a DTT, consistent with theoretical expectations. A higher 
propensity to sign DTTs, as captured by the cumulative number of DTTs signed by either 
dyad member, increases the likelihood that this dyad will sign a DTT as well. 
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Table 6:  Estimation results of Cox proportional hazard model 
Model I II III IV V VI VII 
Spatial Lags        
W: Common region 
 (t-1) 
1.419***   1.483*** 1.353***  1.421*** 
 (5.51)   (5.73) (5.29)  (5.51) 
W: Export market similarity  
(t-1) 
 6.143  -4.287  5.577 -4.507 
  (1.07)  (-0.78)  (0.97) (-0.81) 
W: Export product similarity  
(t-1) 
  11.06***  9.965*** 11.00*** 9.982*** 
   (4.00)  (3.55) (3.97) (3.56) 
        
Control Variables        
Product of populations (ln) 0.117*** 0.127*** 0.0945*** 0.114*** 0.0909*** 0.0982*** 0.0878*** 
 (4.18) (4.50) (3.33) (4.01) (3.19) (3.41) (3.04) 
Product of GDPs per capita (ln) 0.0560* 0.0728** 0.0407 0.0538* 0.031 0.043 0.0287 
 (1.96) (2.56) (1.39) (1.87) (1.05) (1.47) (0.97) 
Bilateral trade (ln, t-1) 0.126*** 0.120*** 0.118*** 0.125*** 0.123*** 0.118*** 0.123*** 
 (7.03) (6.88) (6.69) (7.05) (6.83) (6.67) (6.85) 
Product of openness' to trade 6.6e-05*** 6.6e-05*** 6.0e-05*** 6.5e-05*** 6.1e-05*** 6.1e-05*** 6.0e-05*** 
 (10.45) (10.53) (9.46) (10.25) (9.62) (9.64) (9.45) 
BIT 1.322*** 1.359*** 1.356*** 1.326*** 1.313*** 1.348*** 1.317*** 
 (16.28) (16.84) (17.03) (16.32) (16.38) (16.93) (16.42) 
RTA -0.161 -0.132 -0.125 -0.170* -0.144 -0.112 -0.154 
 (-1.58) (-1.31) (-1.24) (-1.68) (-1.43) (-1.13) (-1.53) 
OFC -0.441*** -0.416*** -0.439*** -0.446*** -0.452*** -0.433*** -0.457*** 
 (-3.85) (-3.68) (-3.98) (-3.88) (-4.05) (-3.92) (-4.08) 
Diplomatic representation 1.157*** 1.110*** 1.126*** 1.155*** 1.174*** 1.131*** 1.171*** 
 (11.91) (11.27) (11.43) (11.88) (12.12) (11.51) (12.08) 
Distance (ln) -0.273*** -0.364*** -0.379*** -0.277*** -0.280*** -0.367*** -0.284*** 
 (-5.56) (-7.80) (-8.18) (-5.65) (-5.66) (-7.85) (-5.77) 
Product of political constraints 0.718*** 0.752*** 0.736*** 0.728*** 0.686*** 0.719*** 0.697*** 
 (4.57) (4.88) (4.82) (4.65) (4.43) (4.73) (4.52) 
Dummy for OECD-OECD dyad -0.286 0.0786 0.146 -0.294 -0.221 0.135 -0.23 
 (-1.26) (0.37) (0.70) (-1.30) (-0.98) (0.65) (-1.03) 
Dummy for OECD-non-OECD 
dyad 
-0.609*** -0.412*** -0.341*** -0.603*** -0.558*** -0.362*** -0.551*** 
 (-6.31) (-4.44) (-3.76) (-6.20) (-5.78) (-3.94) (-5.67) 
Min. years of independence -0.0064*** -0.0078*** -0.0069*** -0.0066*** -0.0055*** -0.0066*** -0.0057*** 
 (-3.38) (-4.09) (-3.66) (-3.45) (-2.88) (-3.47) (-2.95) 
Max. number of DTTs (t-1) -0.0331*** -0.0362*** -0.0372*** -0.0334*** -0.0336*** -0.0366*** -0.0339*** 
 (-8.66) (-9.47) (-10.10) (-8.60) (-9.00) (-9.77) (-8.94) 
Cumulative number of DTTs 
country i (t-1) 
0.0418*** 0.0442*** 0.0438*** 0.0421*** 0.0411*** 0.0433*** 0.0414*** 
 (10.81) (11.40) (11.70) (10.67) (10.68) (11.21) (10.55) 
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Table 6:      Estimation results of Cox proportional hazard model (continued) 
Model I II III IV V VI VII 
Cumulative number of DTTs 
country j (t-1) 
0.0405*** 0.0431*** 0.0432*** 0.0407*** 0.0402*** 0.0427*** 0.0405*** 
 (10.79) (11.49) (11.98) (10.69) (10.90) (11.54) (10.80) 
Observations 212,244 212,244 212,244 212,244 212,244 212,244 212,244 
DTT conclusions covered 1,385 1,385 1,385 1,385 1,385 1,385 1,385 
Notes: W denotes the weighting matrix used; Coefficients displayed; Robust standard errors clustered on 
country dyads; Z-values in parenthesis; Breslow approximation for tied events; * statistically significant at 
0.1, ** 0.05, or *** 0.01 level. 
 
Turning to the variables capturing spatial dependence, the first three models estimate the 
effect of each of the spatial lags separately. Yet, the effects are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive and can occur simultaneously. Therefore, in models IV to VII, different 
combinations of the spatial effects are estimated. For treaties signed by countries in the 
same regions, the effect of an increase by one standard deviation (0.081) is to raise the 
hazard of signing a DTT by 12.2 percent in model I. For the export product similarity 
measure in model III, this effect is 73.8 percent. The spatial lag using export market 
similarity as a weighting matrix is insignificant throughout. Looking at model V, which 
includes both common region and the export product similarity, it can be seen that both 
effects become somewhat smaller, but remain statistically significant. When all three 
spatial lags are incorporated into model VII, the effects are not much different compared to 
the other model specifications.  
 
It seems that countries are not only influenced by the behaviour of their regional peers, but 
also and, in substantive terms, much more strongly by the treaty signing of countries which 
export a similar basket of goods. No evidence, however, is found that policy-makers 
respond to DTT actions of countries which serve similar export markets. This is exactly 
what one would expect if the argument is correct that countries are not affected by what 
other countries do, with which they generally compete in third markets, but are affected by 
what other countries do with which they specifically compete for FDI. Most countries try to 
attract a specific type of FDI, such as investment in a particular economic sector, from 
which they can reap the most benefits, rather than investment whose finished goods are 
exported to a specific market. Furthermore, each country has a given set of natural 
endowments and domestic capabilities and is thereby able to attract a certain type of 
investment which can make productive use of these inputs. Similar export products thus 
indicate a similar industrial and endowment structure which in turn makes these countries 
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close substitutes from a foreign investor’s point of view. In other words, countries which 
export similar products strongly compete with each other for FDI, whereas countries which 
are located in the same macro-region also compete, if less so, and countries which merely 
export any range of goods and services to similar markets generally compete with each 
other, but do not necessarily compete with each other for scarce foreign capital. 
 
 
2.7.  Robustness Tests 
The argument on the causes of spatial dependence relates to net capital-importing countries 
competing for scarce foreign capital. Some developed countries also fall into this category, 
but predominantly developing countries face an asymmetric capital position. Competition 
for scarce foreign capital should also be stronger among developing countries, which can 
benefit more from FDI and face tighter capital constraints. Even though the main 
specification controls for different types of dyads, the first robustness check constrains the 
analysis to dyads consisting of one OECD member and one non-member. The results are 
presented in Table 7. The significance levels and effect sizes of the controls are by and 
large the same as in the whole sample (Table 6). Regarding the spatial lags, the effects are 
in general similar to the whole sample: the spatial lag using the common region and the 
export product similarity weighting matrix are positive and significant, while no evidence 
for a (positive) effect for the spatial lag using the export market similarity can be 
established. The effect sizes of the two former spatial lags differ from the whole sample, 
with the spatial lag using the common region weighting matrix being slightly smaller and 
the coefficient on the spatial lag using the export product similarity weighting matrix being 
considerably larger. In model VII, an increase in the common region weighted spatial lag 
by one standard deviation raises the propensity of a dyad to sign a DTT by 10.8 percent, 
while the effect for the spatial lag weighted by export product similarity is 146.6 percent. 
This indicates that regional peers matter less in heterogeneous dyads in which competition 
for FDI is generally stronger (and asymmetry is higher), while treaty conclusions of 
countries with a similar export product structure matter more. 
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Table 7:  Estimation results for OECD member and non-member country dyads 
Model I II III IV V VI VII 
Spatial Lags        
W: Common region (t-1) 1.145***   1.293*** 1.122***  1.266*** 
 (3.09)   (3.57) (3.08)  (3.53) 
W: Export market similarity (t-1)  -11.11  -19.52*  -9.57 -18.23* 
  (-0.99)  (-1.89)  (-0.84) (-1.73) 
W: Export product similarity (t-1)   18.75***  18.39*** 18.56*** 18.05*** 
   (3.56)  (3.44) (3.52) (3.37) 
        
Control Variables        
Product of populations (ln) 0.0996* 0.111** 0.0698 0.0927* 0.0549 0.067 0.0483 
 (1.84) (2.08) (1.25) (1.72) (0.97) (1.20) (0.86) 
Product of GDPs per capita (ln) 0.0639 0.0831 0.0359 0.051 0.0133 0.0309 0.00159 
 (1.12) (1.50) (0.62) (0.90) (0.23) (0.53) (0.03) 
Bilateral trade (ln, t-1) 0.169*** 0.147*** 0.156*** 0.167*** 0.177*** 0.154*** 0.176*** 
 (3.81) (3.40) (3.51) (3.80) (3.90) (3.47) (3.89) 
Product of openness' to trade 7.1e-05*** 7.2e-05*** 6.6e-05*** 7.1e-05*** 6.5e-05*** 6.6e-05*** 6.4e-05*** 
 (7.15) (7.18) (6.49) (6.94) (6.36) (6.39) (6.15) 
BIT 0.979*** 1.034*** 1.028*** 1.010*** 0.994*** 1.045*** 1.022*** 
 (8.65) (9.04) (9.12) (8.88) (8.88) (9.25) (9.11) 
RTA 0.00268 0.16 0.0672 0.0659 -0.0487 0.104 0.00963 
 (0.01) (0.71) (0.29) (0.28) (-0.20) (0.46) (0.04) 
OFC -0.555*** -0.552*** -0.601*** -0.552*** -0.597*** -0.600*** -0.592*** 
 (-3.87) (-3.89) (-4.25) (-3.86) (-4.20) (-4.24) (-4.18) 
Diplomatic representation 0.941*** 0.908*** 0.910*** 0.926*** 0.936*** 0.904*** 0.923*** 
 (5.74) (5.55) (5.60) (5.66) (5.76) (5.57) (5.69) 
Distance (ln) -0.295*** -0.461*** -0.418*** -0.336*** -0.286*** -0.446*** -0.323*** 
 (-3.58) (-5.88) (-5.46) (-4.06) (-3.49) (-5.72) (-3.93) 
Product of political constraints 1.214*** 1.298*** 1.268*** 1.202*** 1.182*** 1.271*** 1.175*** 
 (5.65) (6.25) (6.17) (5.63) (5.62) (6.21) (5.63) 
Min. years of independence -0.00413 -0.00487 -0.00325 -0.00436 -0.00285 -0.00333 -0.00304 
 (-1.41) (-1.63) (-1.09) (-1.49) (-0.97) (-1.11) (-1.03) 
Max. number of DTTs (t-1) -0.0446*** -0.0494*** -0.0480*** -0.0460*** -0.0443*** -0.0488*** -0.0455*** 
 (-8.51) (-9.39) (-9.31) (-8.74) (-8.57) (-9.37) (-8.75) 
Cumulative number of DTTs 
country i (t-1) 
0.0578*** 0.0620*** 0.0600*** 0.0588*** 0.0567*** 0.0607*** 0.0576*** 
 (10.92) (11.74) (11.45) (11.15) (10.81) (11.55) (10.99) 
Cumulative number of DTTs 
country j (t-1) 
0.0540*** 0.0582*** 0.0572*** 0.0548*** 0.0538*** 0.0578*** 0.0545*** 
  (10.56) (11.46) (11.37) (10.84) (10.68) (11.50) (10.91) 
Observations 55,633 55,633 55,633 55,633 55,633 55,633 55,633 
DTT conclusions covered 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 
Notes: W denotes the weighting matrix used; Coefficients displayed; Robust standard errors clustered on 
country dyads; Z-values in parenthesis; Breslow approximation for tied events; * statistically significant at 
0.1, ** 0.05, or *** 0.01 level. 
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Estimations presented in Table 8 go one step further in not only restricting the sample to 
dyads consisting of one OECD and one non-OECD country, but also in presuming that 
DTTs are directed from the OECD to the developing country. As discussed above, power-
based or ‘coercive’ (Simmons et al. 2006: 790) theories suggest that dominant capital-
exporters such as the United States or Germany are able to control the agenda and start 
treaty negotiations according to their schedule and needs (Elkins et al. 2006). Furthermore, 
due the redistributive effect of tax treaties, capital exporters are able to increase their tax 
revenues at the expense of capital importers by signing a DTT. Therefore, in Table 8 DTT 
conclusions between an OECD member and a non-member are modelled as a directed dyad 
in which the process is initiated by the former and directed towards the latter. In such a 
setting, various forms of spatial contagion can be tested (Neumayer and Plümper 2010). 
Following the theoretical argument, the analysis is restricted to specific target contagion, in 
which the propensity of a non-OECD member to sign a DTT with a given specific OECD 
member depends on the weighted sum of DTTs signed by other non-OECD members with 
the very same OECD member. The results for the control variables are consistent with the 
previous analysis in an undirected dyad and also the results for the spatial lags are in line 
with the previous findings. In model VII, a one standard-deviation increase (0.14) in the 
spatial lag using the common region weighting matrix increases the probability of signing a 
DTT by 17.0 percent, whereas the corresponding effect for the spatial lag using the export 
product similarity weighting matrix is 47.6 percent. 
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Table 8:  Estimation results for specific target contagion in a directed dyad dataset 
(from OECD member to non-member country) 
Model I II III IV V VI VII 
Spatial Lags: specific target contagion    
W: Common region  (t-1) 0.941***   1.089*** 0.831***  1.120*** 
 (3.11)   (3.30) (2.60)  (3.38) 
W: Export market similarity  
(t-1) 
 0.72  -1.49  -1.832 -4.215** 
  (0.53)  (-1.06)  (-1.06) (-2.51) 
W: Export product similarity 
(t-1) 
  2.302**  1.538 3.162*** 3.269*** 
   (2.37)  (1.51) (2.73) (2.98) 
        
Control Variables        
Product of populations (ln) 0.101* 0.129** 0.120** 0.0935* 0.0994* 0.113** 0.0768 
 (1.86) (2.38) (2.22) (1.70) (1.83) (2.06) (1.38) 
Product of GDPs per capita 
(ln) 
0.0749 0.100* 0.0885 0.0683 0.0708 0.0807 0.0468 
 (1.33) (1.80) (1.58) (1.20) (1.26) (1.42) (0.81) 
Bilateral trade (ln, t-1) 0.161*** 0.143*** 0.147*** 0.167*** 0.161*** 0.152*** 0.178*** 
 (3.63) (3.25) (3.34) (3.67) (3.62) (3.37) (3.82) 
Product of openness' to trade 7.7e-05*** 7.8e-05*** 8.0e-05*** 7.8e-05*** 7.9e-05*** 7.9e-05*** 7.9e-05*** 
 (6.95) (7.06) (7.21) (6.71) (7.05) (7.08) (6.73) 
BIT 0.948*** 0.990*** 0.975*** 0.955*** 0.940*** 0.984*** 0.948*** 
 (8.15) (8.56) (8.37) (8.24) (8.02) (8.47) (8.14) 
RTA -0.107 -0.00211 -0.00467 -0.121 -0.0981 -4.53E-05 -0.126 
 (-0.41) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.46) (-0.38) (-0.00) (-0.48) 
OFC -0.560*** -0.549*** -0.586*** -0.552*** -0.585*** -0.589*** -0.594*** 
 (-3.86) (-3.82) (-4.04) (-3.79) (-4.00) (-4.06) (-4.05) 
Diplomatic representation 0.942*** 0.928*** 0.919*** 0.950*** 0.933*** 0.921*** 0.942*** 
 (5.81) (5.68) (5.62) (5.86) (5.74) (5.64) (5.81) 
Distance (ln) -0.333*** -0.427*** -0.425*** -0.329*** -0.341*** -0.435*** -0.337*** 
 (-4.03) (-5.44) (-5.38) (-3.97) (-4.14) (-5.52) (-4.09) 
Product of political constraints 1.129*** 1.203*** 1.165*** 1.134*** 1.105*** 1.175*** 1.107*** 
 (5.13) (5.66) (5.45) (5.16) (5.02) (5.51) (5.01) 
Min. years of independence -0.00312 -0.00469 -0.00436 -0.00318 -0.00298 -0.00451 -0.00291 
 (-1.04) (-1.55) (-1.44) (-1.06) (-0.99) (-1.48) (-0.96) 
Max. number of DTTs (t-1) -0.0526*** -0.0542*** -0.0605*** -0.0458*** -0.0589*** -0.0557*** -0.0471*** 
 (-9.44) (-6.62) (-9.05) (-5.72) (-8.89) (-6.73) (-5.78) 
Cum. number of DTTs OECD 
member (t-1) 
0.0618*** 0.0640*** 0.0639*** 0.0608*** 0.0622*** 0.0632*** 0.0598*** 
 (11.55) (12.10) (12.17) (11.28) (11.69) (12.00) (11.18) 
Cum. number of DTTs non-
OECD member (t-1) 
0.0585*** 0.0605*** 0.0609*** 0.0569*** 0.0594*** 0.0598*** 0.0561*** 
  (11.24) (11.53) (11.89) (10.72) (11.48) (11.48) (10.67) 
Observations 55,418 55,418 55,418 55,418 55,418 55,418 55,418 
DTT conclusions covered 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 
Notes: W denotes the weighting matrix used; Coefficients displayed; Robust standard errors clustered on 
country dyads; Z-values in parenthesis; Breslow approximation for tied events; * statistically significant at 
0.1, ** 0.05, or *** 0.01 level. 
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A key assumption of a proportional hazard model is that the proportionality is maintained 
over time, that is, the size of the effect of a covariate is independent of the point in time at 
which the effect occurs. To test this assumption, a Grambsch and Therneau (1994) test is 
performed for each model to identify variables that potentially exhibit non-proportional 
effects. Exemplarily, the results of this test are shown in Table 9 for model specification 
VII including all three spatial lags. Only the spatial lag using the common region weighting 
matrix seems to be prone to having non-proportional effects. This might also be the case for 
the product of populations and the product of GDPs per capita, the trade measure, for the 
RTA and OFC dummy, for distance, for the dummy indicating a dyad consisting of two 
OECD members and of an OECD member and a non-member as well as for the minimum 
years of independence and the maximum number of DTTs. The critical variables are then 
interacted with the log of duration to explicitly model time-dependence.58 
                                                 
58 Principally, any interaction with time can be chosen. As argued by Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001) 
using the log of time is the most widely employed version. Applying time or time as multiplicators affects 
the results only marginally.  
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Table 9:  Non-proportional hazard diagnostics (Grambsch and Therneau test) 
  Ρ χ² Prob > χ² 
W: Common region (t-1) 0.05930 6.87 0.0088 
W: Export market similarity (t-1) 0.00377 0.03 0.8597 
W: Export product similarity (t-1) -0.00020 0.00 0.9921 
Product of populations (ln) -0.08211 22.50 0.0000 
Product of GDPs per capita (ln) 0.04078 4.40 0.0360 
Bilateral trade (ln, t-1) -0.08078 28.14 0.0000 
Product of openness' to trade -0.02332 1.01 0.3152 
BIT -0.00550 0.08 0.7708 
RTA 0.12759 46.11 0.0000 
OFC -0.11656 51.59 0.0000 
Diplomatic representation 0.01300 0.31 0.5789 
Distance (ln) -0.04642 5.58 0.0181 
Product of political constraints -0.01548 0.53 0.4648 
Dummy fo OECD-OECD dyad -0.11169 38.50 0.0000 
Dummy for OECD-non-OECD dyad -0.17590 52.73 0.0000 
Min. years of independence 0.11847 26.81 0.0000 
Max. number of DTTs (t-1) 0.04329 4.66 0.0309 
Cumulative number of DTTs country i (t-1) -0.01113 0.45 0.5036 
Cumulative number of DTTs country j (t-1) -0.00812 0.22 0.6398 
Global test   369.62 0.0000 
Notes: W denotes the weighting matrix used; All chi-squared statistics have 1 degree of freedom, except for 
Global test (19 df); Robust standard errors clustered on country dyads. 
 
Table 10 presents the estimation results including time interactions for the full sample. As 
Model IV fails to converge in this specification, estimation results cannot be obtained. 
Since the variables are interacted with log-duration, the estimates of the direct effects can 
be interpreted as the effect of that covariate on the hazard of a treaty conclusion in the first 
year after entering the sample (where T = 1, i.e. in 1926 or in the year after the later of the 
dyad partners became independent). The coefficient of the non-interacted effect of the 
spatial lag variable with the common region weighting matrix is negative while the 
coefficient of its interaction with duration time is positive. This indicates that the effect is 
negative in early years, but becomes positive after some years. For Model I, this break-even 
point is reached after 53 years, which is in 1978. From this time on, a positive effect, which 
is increasing over time, prevails. 2,091 out of 2,325 treaties have been signed since 1978, 
including a large share of treaties involving developing countries, which are regularly net 
capital importers.  
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Briefly addressing the interacted control variables, the effect of population size is still 
positive and highly significant, but its effect is decreasing over time. As expected, the basic 
effect is considerably larger than in a specification without time interactions as in the latter 
an average effect over time is estimated. The classification of one or both countries as an 
offshore financial centre exhibits considerable non-proportional effects. While the main 
effect is positive, great in magnitude and highly significant, the interaction effect is 
negative and significant, indicating a decreasing effect over time. The effect becomes 
negative after 56 years, i.e. in 1981 (Model I). This might reflect a change in the attitude 
towards signing tax treaties with these countries, where the objections against entering 
DTTs with countries not willing to share information became greater over time.  
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Table 10: Estimation results of Cox proportional hazard model (with time interactions) 
Model I II III IV V VI VII 
Spatial Lags    
fails to 
converge 
   
W: Common region (t-1) -23.99**   -20.50**  -23.81** 
 (-2.45)   (-2.17)  (-2.51) 
W: Common region (t-1) x 
ln(time) 
6.030***   5.188**  6.004*** 
 (2.65)   (2.38)  (2.71) 
W: Export market similarity  
(t-1) 
 -0.372   -1.918 -13.55** 
  (-0.07)   (-0.34) (-2.54) 
W: Export product similarity 
 (t-1) 
  10.89*** 9.070*** 11.10*** 9.294*** 
   (4.16) (3.45) (4.28) (3.55) 
       
Control Variables       
Product of populations (ln) 1.093 1.293* 1.443* 1.123 1.354* 1.244* 
 (1.45) (1.76) (1.95) (1.53) (1.85) )1.69) 
Product of populations (ln) x 
ln(time) 
-0.246 -0.293* -0.336* -0.259 -0.316* -0.291* 
 (-1.38) (-1.68) (-1.92) (-1.50) (-1.82) (-1.67) 
Product of GDPs per capita (ln) -2.387*** -2.348*** -2.174** -2.334*** -2.292*** -2.304*** 
 (-2.70) (-2.70) (-2.46) (-2.66) (-2.61) (-2.63) 
Product of GDPs per capita (ln) 
x ln(time) 
0.571*** 0.563*** 0.515** 0.552*** 0.542*** 0.543*** 
 (2.73) (2.71) (2.46) (2.67) (2.62) (2.63) 
Bilateral trade (ln, t-1) 2.774*** 2.765*** 2.822*** 2.842*** 2.818*** 2.813*** 
 (4.41) (4.41) (4.50) (4.52) (4.49) (4.49) 
Bilateral trade (ln, t-1) x 
ln(time) 
-0.625*** -0.623*** -0.637*** -0.641*** -0.636*** -0.634*** 
 (-4.26) (-4.26) (-4.35) (-4.37) (-4.35) (-4.34) 
Product of openness' to trade 6.13e-05*** 6.14e-05*** 5.64e-05*** 5.75e-05*** 5.63e-05*** 5.57e-05***
 (10.03) (10.09) (8.98) (9.17) (8.94) (8.75) 
BIT 1.249*** 1.302*** 1.294*** 1.247*** 1.297*** 1.260*** 
 (16.70) (17.20) (17.20) (16.79) (17.25) (16.91) 
RTA -15.06*** -14.22*** -13.37*** -13.10*** -13.76*** -13.03*** 
 (-3.95) (-3.98) (-3.86) (-3.79) (-3.90) (-3.74) 
RTA x ln(time) 3.508*** 3.324*** 3.134*** 3.058*** 3.222*** 3.036*** 
 (3.95) (3.98) (3.87) (3.78) (3.91) (3.72) 
OFC 10.48*** 10.46*** 10.36*** 10.52*** 10.42*** 10.68*** 
 (5.13) (5.23) (5.23) (5.17) (5.24) (5.25) 
OFC x ln(time) -2.604*** -2.597*** -2.578*** -2.615*** -2.593*** -2.657*** 
 (-5.28) (-5.39) (-5.39) (-5.31) (-5.41) (-5.41) 
Diplomatic representation 1.284*** 1.193*** 1.218*** 1.300*** 1.215*** 1.292*** 
 (12.53) (11.58) (11.79) (12.63) (11.77) (12.56) 
Distance (ln) 0.0912 2.300** 2.371** 0.398 2.492** 0.497 
 (0.07) (2.00) (2.01) (0.30) (2.13) (0.39) 
Distance (ln) x ln(time) -0.0743 -0.629** -0.646** -0.149 -0.675** -0.177 
 (-0.24) (-2.29) (-2.29) (-0.48) (-2.42) (-0.58) 
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Table 10:       Estimation results of Cox proportional hazard model (continued) 
Model I II III  V VI VII 
Product of political constraints 0.507*** 0.565*** 0.527***  0.491*** 0.534*** 0.526*** 
 (3.50) (3.93) (3.63)  (3.39) (3.71) (3.66) 
Dummy fo OECD-OECD dyad 33.08*** 27.43*** 27.33***  31.89*** 26.17*** 32.72*** 
 (4.79) (3.74) (3.88)  (4.74) (3.66) (4.80) 
Dummy fo OECD-OECD dyad 
x ln(time) 
-8.037*** -6.596*** -6.552*** 
 
-7.729*** -6.276*** -7.930*** 
 (-4.70) (-3.61) (-3.74)  (-4.64) (-3.53) (-4.69) 
Dummy for OECD-non-OECD 
dyad 
16.56*** 12.46*** 12.76*** 
 
15.29*** 11.91*** 15.72*** 
 (5.44) (5.13) (5.08)  (5.00) (4.87) (5.11) 
Dummy for OECD-non-OECD 
dyad x ln(time) 
-4.107*** -3.064*** -3.124*** 
 
-3.792*** -2.921*** -3.888*** 
 (-5.70) (-5.32) (-5.25)  (-5.23) (-5.03) (-5.33) 
Min. years of independence -0.153*** -0.109* -0.124**  -0.155*** -0.116** -0.140** 
 (-2.70) (-1.90) (-2.16)  (-2.75) (-2.03) (-2.47) 
Min. years of independence x 
ln(time) 
0.0357*** 0.0249* 0.0287** 
 
0.0362*** 0.0268** 0.0327** 
 (2.65) (1.83) (2.10)  (2.71) (1.97) (2.43) 
Max. number of DTTs (t-1) -0.0731 -0.0402*** -0.0403***  0.0311 -0.0404*** 0.0193 
 (-0.59) (-11.25) (-11.53)  (0.53) (-11.41) (0.33) 
Max. number of DTTs (t-1) x 
ln(time) 
0.00874   
 
-0.0157  -0.0132 
 (0.30)    (-1.15)  (-0.96) 
Cumulative number of DTTs 
country i (t-1) 
0.192* 0.0518*** 0.0506*** 
 
0.0467*** 0.0508*** 0.0479*** 
 (1.83) (15.26) (15.29)  (13.76) (14.83) (13.78) 
Cumulative number of DTTs 
country i (t-1) x ln(time) 
-0.0339   
 
   
 (-1.38)       
Cumulative number of DTTs 
country j (t-1) 
0.0828 0.0505*** -0.00457 
 
0.0455*** 0.0499*** 0.0466*** 
 (0.80) (15.24) (-0.12)  (13.88) (15.06) (13.95) 
Cumulative number of DTTs 
country j (t-1) x ln(time) 
-0.0085  0.0129 
 
   
  (-0.35)  (1.36)     
Observations 212,244 212,244 212,244  212,244 212,244 212,244 
DTT conclusions covered 1,385 1,385 1,385  1,385 1,385 1,385 
Notes: Coefficients displayed; Robust standard errors clustered on country dyads; Z-values in parenthesis; 
Breslow approximation for tied events; Duration time used for time-interactions; * statistically significant at 
0.1, ** 0.05, or *** 0.01 level. 
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2.8.  Conditional Spatial Policy Dependence 
In addition to the robustness tests reported above, the analysis presented in the previous 
section can be extended. If the argument is correct that competition for scarce foreign 
capital drives spatial dependence in the diffusion of DTTs, then the strength of the spatial 
dependence effect should systematically differ across countries in predictable ways. In 
other words, the strength of the spatial effects should increase or decrease depending on the 
values of other variables, i.e. should be conditioned by these other variables. Specifically, 
the number of existing DTTs, the year of a country’s independence and general trade 
openness should condition the spatial effects. The spatial effect should be larger for 
countries that have signed only a few tax treaties, because countries with an extensive DTT 
network are more likely to have covered all important capital exporting countries already 
and are therefore less subject to competitive pressure. Similarly, the spatial effect should be 
larger in the early years of a country’s independence. As long as a country is not 
independent, it cannot sign tax treaties;59 however, over the course of time, other 
independent competitor countries can sign tax treaties and gain a competitive advantage. 
Once a nation becomes independent, it is ‘dropped’ into the actual competitive situation. It 
is therefore expected that the pressure to sign tax treaties is stronger right after gaining 
independence as a country will try to equalise its competitive disadvantage. Finally, the 
spatial effect should be stronger the more open a country is to trade. A positive interaction 
effect is anticipated as the competitive pressure should increase the more open an economy 
is. All else equal, a country, which is more open to foreign trade, should be more exposed 
to competitive pressure from abroad, should be more eager to attract foreign capital and 
more willing to sign international treaties. 
 
Tables 11 to 13 test these conditional spatial policy dependence arguments, based on 
modified versions of models I to III (coefficients of control variables are similar and 
therefore not shown for reasons of space).60 Table 11 reports results from an analysis of 
whether the strengths of the spatial effects depend on the number of treaties a country 
already has signed. The conditioning variable measures the higher of the number of treaties 
signed by either of the dyad members (Number of DTTs (max)). All coefficients of the 
                                                 
59 As discussed above, tax treaties can be signed between independent tax jurisdictions. Since comprehensive 
data is not available, the year of political independence is taken as a proxy. 
60 However, as noted by Ai and Norton (2003) the straightforward interpretation of interaction effects in linear 
models does not extend to non-linear models such as the Cox proportional model used here. Rather, the 
magnitude of the interaction effects in non-linear models depends on the values of the covariates in the model 
and can have different signs for different observations. Therefore, in the Appendix the interaction effects are 
reestimated with a logit model for which appropriate tools for a detailed analysis the interaction effects are 
available. 
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spatial lag variables are positive and significant, providing the spatial effect in dyads, in 
which neither of the dyad member countries has previously signed any treaties. Most 
importantly, in line with theoretical predictions, the interaction effects are negative and 
significant throughout, indicating that the competitive pressure decreases as the number of 
treaties signed increases. 
 
Table 11:  Estimation results for spatial lags interacted with maximum number of 
DTTs 
Model I II III 
W: Common region (t-1) 4.504***   
 (8.07)   
W: Common region (t-1) x max. DTT (t-1) -0.0541***   
 (-5.60)   
W: Export market similarity (t-1)  19.25***  
  (3.19)  
W: Export market similarity (t-1) x max. DTT (t-1)  -0.210***  
  (-7.14)  
W: Export product similarity (t-1)   19.94*** 
   (6.64) 
W: Export product similarity (t-1) x max. DTT (t-1)   -0.192*** 
   (-7.53) 
Max. number of DTTs (t-1) -0.0258*** -0.0126** -0.0125** 
  (-6.47) (-2.42) (-2.51) 
Observations 212,244 212,244 212,244 
DTT conclusions covered 1,385 1,385 1,385 
Notes: To save space, coefficients of control variables not displayed, model specification as in Table 6; W 
denotes the weighting matrix used; Robust standard errors clustered on country dyads; Z-values in 
parenthesis; Breslow approximation for tied events; * statistically significant at 0.1, ** 0.05, or *** 0.01 
level. 
 
Table 12  reports results from testing the hypothesis that the spatial effects are conditioned 
by years since independence. The coefficients of spatial lags using the common region and 
the export product similarity weighting matrix are positive and significant, giving the 
spatial effects in dyads in which one of the dyad members has just gained independence. As 
expected, the interaction effects are negative and statistically significant at least at the ten 
percent level. The effect of tax treaties signed by other countries is the higher the shorter 
the period since independence and decreases over time which supports the argument that 
newly independent countries are subject to a higher pressure to enter DTT negotiations. 
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Table 12:  Estimation results for spatial lags interacted with years since independence 
Model I II III 
W: Common region (t-1) 2.469***   
 (5.69)   
W: Common region (t-1) x min. years of independence -0.0242***   
 (-2.72)   
W: Export market similarity (t-1)  7.825  
  (1.36)  
W: Export market similarity (t-1) x min. years of independence  -0.0684*  
  (-1.74)  
W: Export product similarity (t-1)   13.46*** 
   (4.31) 
W: Export product similarity (t-1) x min. years of independence   -0.0619* 
   (-1.82) 
Min. years of independence -0.000792 0.000223 0.00145 
  (-0.33) (0.05) (0.31) 
Observations 212,244 212,244 212,244 
DTT conclusions covered 1,385 1,385 1,385 
Notes: To save space, coefficients of control variables not displayed, model specification as in Table 6; W 
denotes the weighting matrix used; Robust standard errors clustered on country dyads; Z-values in 
parenthesis; Breslow approximation for tied events; * statistically significant at 0.1, ** 0.05, or *** 0.01 
level. 
 
Table 13 finally presents results for the product of trade openness of the two countries as 
the conditioning variable. The coefficients of the spatial lag variables are positive and 
significant for common region and export product similarity, showing the effect for the 
(non-existing) case in which both countries are fully autarchic. The interaction effect for 
the common region weighted spatial lag variable is significantly positive, in line with 
expectations. However, unexpectedly the interaction effect is significantly negative for the 
export product similarity weighted spatial lag. All in all, there is thus no evidence for a 
higher competitive pressure for more open economies.  
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Table 13:  Estimation results for spatial lags interacted with openness to trade 
Model I II III 
W: Common region (t-1) 1.033***   
 (3.24)   
W: Common region (t-1) x product of openness' 5.86e-05**   
 (2.42)   
W: Export market similarity (t-1)  6.146  
  (1.05)  
W: Export market similarity (t-1) x product of openness'  -0.000000259  
  (-0.00)  
W: Export product similarity (t-1)   12.36*** 
   (4.37) 
W: Export product similarity (t-1) x product of openness'   -0.000203** 
   (-2.23) 
Product of openness' to trade 5.43e-05*** 6.59e-05*** 0.000101*** 
  (6.72) (3.21) (5.48) 
Observations 212,244 212,244 212,244 
DTT conclusions covered 1,385 1,385 1,385 
Notes: To save space, coefficients of control variables not displayed, model specification as in Table 6; W 
denotes the weighting matrix used; Robust standard errors clustered on country dyads; Z-values in 
parenthesis; Breslow approximation for tied events; * statistically significant at 0.1, ** 0.05, or *** 0.01 
level. 
 
 
2.9. Conclusion 
The last decades have witnessed a wide spread of double taxation treaties with an 
increasing spread of diffusion. Many of these treaties involve a developing country as a 
signatory partner, where these countries regularly are in the role of net-capital importers. 
The present system of tax treaties exhibits, due to the strong reliance on the OECD model 
treaty, a considerable resident bias in terms of taxation rights. This means that net-capital 
importers can loose considerable amounts of tax revenues when entering such a treaty with 
dominant capital-exporting countries. Or, as stated by Irish (1974: 292), the scheme “of tax 
treaties creates the anomaly of aid in reverse – from poor to rich countries”. This fact, 
however, has not tarnished the popularity of DTTs in asymmetric dyads where one country 
exports sizably higher amounts of capital into the partner country than the FDI that flows in 
the reverse direction. Several arguments have been brought forward to explain this 
seemingly irrational behaviour by many countries which seem, at least in terms of tax 
revenues, not to profit from these treaties. Most importantly, it was argued that this group 
of countries finds itself in a situation which can be described as a prisoners’ dilemma. 
While it is not beneficial for developing countries as a whole to enter treaties with the 
standard provisions, each single country has an incentive to sign in order to gain a 
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competitive edge in the global competition for capital. Furthermore, if other focal countries 
have signed tax treaties with major capital exporters, a single country has an even stronger 
incentive to conclude a DTT to offset its inferior position. In this chapter, the theoretical 
prediction that treaty conclusion by competing countries affect the DTT-behaviour of 
others was tested empirically. Three different concepts of competing countries were 
employed: (1) countries in the same region, (2) countries that export to similar markets and 
(2) countries that export a similar basket of goods. 
 
In line with theoretical expectations, robust evidence is found that the treaty conclusion 
between two countries is in fact positively influenced by tax treaties that are negotiated 
between competing countries. However, a striking result of this analysis was that countries 
are only influenced by other countries which export a similar basket of goods, but not by 
those serving similar export markets. This indicates that only the former group is regarded 
as competitors for foreign capital as countries strive to attract a certain type of FDI rather 
than a broad range of investors which export finished products to a specific market.  
 
The consequences of this behaviour can be detrimental for the group of net-capital 
importing countries: First, they might loose tax revenues. Second, the competitive 
advantage in the rivalry for FDI a net-capital importer gained by signing such a treaty is 
neutralised once competing countries also entered a DTT with the same major capital 
exporter. Collective action of developing countries could solve the dilemma: however, as 
argued above, this is unlikely given the large number of involved parties and due to the fact 
that no single country could gain a (temporary) competitive edge under a multilateral 
treaty. Model treaties that are more favourable for developing countries, on the other hand, 
are also very unlikely as experience shows: both the ANDEAN and the ASEAN model 
treaty are virtually non-existent on a global basis and even the UNCTAD model treaty 
became closer to the OECD model over time.   
 
Such spatial dependence implies that the diffusion of DTTs becomes a quasi-automatic 
process as there is positive contagion: the more dyads have signed, the higher the pressure 
on the remaining dyads to also sign one. This process is likely to stop when net capital-
importing countries believe that they will no longer lose out by refusing to sign further 
DTTs or, conversely, believe they can no longer benefit from signing further treaties. 
Difficult as a conclusive judgement on this is, a termination of the diffusion process would 
appear to be a long way off still. 
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This work provided a first insight into the global influences in the expansion of the tax 
treaty network. Further research should look at the level of withholding taxes agreed in the 
treaties as these are, together with the level of asymmetry of FDI stocks between the two 
contracting states, the main determinant of the potential loss in tax revenues faced by the 
net-capital importer. By the same token as argued above, competition for foreign capital 
ceteris paribus should decrease the level of withholding taxes negotiated in asymmetric 
dyads. 
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Appendix 
Interaction effects using Logit estimation 
As noted by Ai and Norton (2003) the interpretation of interaction effects in non-linear 
models is not straightforward interpretation as the effect size depends on the values of 
covariates in the model and can have different signs for different observations. Therefore, 
the interaction effects are re-estimated with a logit model, for which the marginal 
interaction effects are computed using the Stata command inteff.ado (Norton et al. 2004). 
 
To mirror the Cox proportional hazard model, Beck et al. (1998) suggest the use of a 
corrected model of cross sectional data with a binary dependent variable (BCTSCS), which 
is estimated with a logit model. The authors propose estimating a complementary log-log 
regression and enriching the model specification with a full set of time dummies. However, 
as argued by Carter and Signorio (2007), this approach suffers from two drawbacks: First, 
under specific circumstances, a time dummy is a perfect predictor of Y = 1 and cannot be 
estimated which leads to a loss of observations. Second, especially in large T datasets, a 
full set of time dummies uses considerable degrees of freedom and reduces efficiency. As a 
remedy, they propose to include time, time² and time³ as regressors.61 More specifically, the 
logit model reads as follows: 
2 3
1 2 3
1Pr( 1)
1 exp( ( ))it i i i
y
X t t t            (10) 
        
where 1ti + 2t2i + 3t3i is a cubic approximation to the hazard which can accommodate a 
very large variety of shapes, while X contains both a constant as well as the spatial lags, 
their interactions and the control variables. Since the focus is on the parameters influencing 
the first signature of a tax treaty (rather than the effects on maintaining a DTT), only the 
first year of treaty conclusion is kept in the dataset while all subsequent years are dropped. 
 
Table 14 shows the results for the interaction of the spatial lags with the maximum number 
of DTTs, where the last row displays the mean of the marginal interaction effects for all 
observations. As in the Cox model, the non-interacted basic effect of the maximum number 
of DTTs is negative and significant; the basic effects of the spatial lags are positive and 
                                                 
61 Conducting a Monte Carlo Simulation, Carter and Signorio (2007) show that their approach is superior to 
the time dummy solution by Beck et al. (1998). 
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highly significant. All three interaction effects are negative and significant, confirming the 
previous results. Figure 14 plots the marginal interaction effect and the z-statistics against 
the predicted probability that a dyad concludes a DTT. The marginal effect for the 
interaction between the spatial lag using common region as a weighting matrix and the 
maximum number of DTTs is negative for virtually all observations, only for a few with a 
predicted probability of less than 0.2 it is positive. The significance if displayed at the 
bottom of the panel: Again, for most of the observations the absolute z-value is greater than 
the critical value, indicating statistical significance. For some dyads with a predicted 
probability below 0.2, however, the effect is not statistically significant at the five percent 
level. 
 
Table 14:  Logit estimation results: Spatial lags interacted with number of DTTs 
(max.) 
Model I II III 
W: Common region (t-1) 3.708***   
 (5.43)   
W: Common region (t-1) x max. DTT (t-1) -0.0483***   
 (-3.97)   
W: Export market similarity (t-1)  18.10***  
  (2.85)  
W: Export market similarity (t-1) x max. DTT (t-1)  -0.203***  
  (-5.86)  
W: Export product similarity (t-1)   18.27*** 
   (5.46) 
W: Export product similarity (t-1) x max. DTT (t-1)   -0.188*** 
   (-6.18) 
Max. number of DTTs (t-1) -0.0377*** -0.0237*** -0.0224*** 
  (-7.22) (-3.67) (-3.54) 
Mean marginal interaction effect -.0006163 -.0030928 -.0031921  
Notes: To save space, coefficients of control variables not displayed, model specification as in Table 6; W 
denotes the weighting matrix used ; Coefficients displayed; Robust standard errors clustered on country 
dyads; Z-values in parenthesis; * statistically significant at 0.1, ** 0.05, or *** 0.01 level. 
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Figure 14: Interaction effect between the spatial lag using common region as a weighting 
matrix and number of DTTs (max) 
 
 
 
Figures 15 and 16 replicate the information for the spatial lag using export market 
similarity and export product similarity, respectively, as a weighting matrix. For both 
interactions, the effect is negative for the vast majority of observations and the overall 
pattern looks very similar: the effect is not statistically different from zero for quite a few 
observations with a predicted probability of less than 0.25 and more than 0.6. 
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Figure 15: Interaction effect between the spatial lag using export market similarity as a 
weighting matrix and number of DTTs (max) 
 
 
Figure 16: Interaction effect between the spatial lag using export product similarity as a 
weighting matrix and number of DTTs (max) 
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Table 15 shows the Logit estimation results for the interactions with the years since 
independence, while Figure 17 to 19 display the interaction effects in more detail. In line 
with the Cox proportional hazard model, the main effects of the spatial lags with the 
common region and the export product similarity weighting matrix are positive and 
significant, whereas all three interaction effects are negative and significant. The graphs 
reveal that the interaction effects are negative and significant for the vast majority of 
observations. 
 
Table 15:  Logit estimation results: Spatial lags interacted with years since 
independence 
Model I II III 
W: Common region (t-1) 2.309***   
 (4.46)   
W: Common region (t-1) x min. years of independence -0.0307***   
 (-2.74)   
W: Export market similarity (t-1)  8.534  
  (1.39)  
W: Export market similarity (t-1) x min. years of 
independence  -0.0904**  
  (-1.99)  
W: Export product similarity (t-1)   12.69*** 
   (3.72) 
W: Export product similarity (t-1) x min. years of 
independence   -0.0796** 
   (-2.00) 
Min. years of independence -0.00204 0.00123 0.00228 
  (-0.77) (0.24) (0.44) 
Mean marginal interaction effect -.0002118 -.0007064  -.0007789  
Notes: To save space, coefficients of control variables not displayed, model specification as in Table 6; W 
denotes the weighting matrix used ; Coefficients displayed; Robust standard errors clustered on country 
dyads; Z-values in parenthesis; * statistically significant at 0.1, ** 0.05, or *** 0.01 level. 
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Figure 17: Interaction effect between the spatial lag using common region as a weighting 
matrix and years of independence 
 
 
Figure 18: Interaction effect between the spatial lag using export market similarity as a 
weighting matrix and years of independence 
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Figure 19: Interaction effect between the spatial lag using export product similarity as a 
weighting matrix and years of independence 
 
 
Finally, Table 16 presents the interaction effect with openness to trade. As in the Cox 
proportional hazard model, the main effect of the product of openness’ is positive and 
significant. Contrary to the Cox model, the spatial lag using the common region weighting 
matrix is not significant. The spatial lag using the export market similarity weighing matrix 
is negative, yet not significant, whereas the spatial lag with the export product similarity 
weighting matrix is positive and significant as in the Cox model. The estimated interaction 
effects are positive and significant throughout. Figures 20 to 22 again present the detailed 
analyses of the interaction effects. For virtually all observations of the spatial lag using the 
common region weighting matrix, the effect is positive and significant for most of the 
observations. Regarding the interaction effect for the spatial lag with the export market 
similarity, it can be seen that the effect is not significant for any observation. Finally, for 
the spatial lag with the export product similarity, the interaction effect is positive for the 
vast majority of observation which have a predicted probability of less than 0.4. However, 
with the exception of a few observations with a predicted probability of less than 0.2, the 
effect is not statistically significant at the five percent level. 
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Table 16: Logit estimation results: Spatial lags interacted with the product of openness  
to trade 
Model I II III 
W: Common region (t-1) 0.234   
 (0.43)   
W: Common region (t-1) x product of openness' 0.0131*   
 (1.89)   
W: Export market similarity (t-1)  -2.244  
  (-0.35)  
W: Export market similarity (t-1) x product of openness'  0.0889***  
  (4.34)  
W: Export product similarity (t-1)   5.758* 
   (1.74) 
W: Export product similarity (t-1) x product of openness'   0.0630*** 
   (3.55) 
Product of openness' to trade 6.90e-05*** 4.05e-05*** 4.16e-05*** 
  (7.49) (3.13) (3.22) 
Mean marginal interaction effect 6.48e-07  2.49e-06  3.06e-06 
Notes: To save space, coefficients of control variables not displayed, model specification as in Table 6; W 
denotes the weighting matrix used ; Coefficients displayed; Robust standard errors clustered on country 
dyads; Z-values in parenthesis; * statistically significant at 0.1, ** 0.05, or *** 0.01 level. 
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Figure 20: Interaction effect between the spatial lag using common region as a weighting 
matrix and product of openness’ 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Interaction effect between the spatial lag using export market similarity as a 
weighting matrix and product of openness’ 
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Figure 22: Interaction effect between the spatial lag using export product similarity as a 
weighting matrix and product of openness’ 
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3. Are Donors Sheep? – Spatial Dependence in Bi- and 
Multilateral Aid Giving Patterns 
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3.1. Introduction 
Does aid allocation depend on the aid allocation decisions of other donors? So far, this 
question has been answered only unsatisfactorily in the literature. Not only would an 
answer to this question complete our understanding of the determinants of aid giving and of 
international power relations; it would also enable us to assess the degree to which aid is 
used for achieving strategic goals. There are theoretical reasons for both positive and 
negative spatial dependence. Negative spatial dependence means that a given donor reduces 
its aid effort in a recipient country if other donors allocate more funds to this beneficiary. If 
such a pattern is found, it could indicate a donor specialisation over time, where each donor 
concentrates its activities on a set of partner countries in development cooperation. In 
contrast, positive spatial occurs if changes in aid allocation by various donors are in the 
same direction, i.e. a given donor allocates more aid to a recipient if other donors do so. 
Potential causes for such behaviour could be herding or group solidarity, reduction of 
uncertainty about the effectiveness of aid projects or strategic interaction between donors. 
The latter argument applies because aid is at least partly given for strategic reasons either 
by establishing commitment on part of the donor or through dependency on part of the 
recipient (McKinlay and Little 1977). Furthermore, an important donor is able to influence 
the behaviour of a beneficiary in its own interest. If foreign aid is used to pursue national 
interests and to secure the donor’s sphere of influence, a donor also has to observe aid 
allocation decisions by other donors and take changes in their aid giving into account when 
allocating its own aid. National interest can be widely defined in terms of economic, 
military or political interest. Economic interest encompasses access to raw materials or 
market access, military interest include counter-terrorism and securing the loyalty of allies 
in conflicts, while an example for political interest is gaining a beneficiary’s support in 
international bodies such as the UN general assembly.  
 
If spatial dependence between donors is found, it would complement the two traditional 
rationales to provide ODA, first distinguished in the often cited work by McKinlay and 
Little (1977): donor interest and recipient need.62 This distinction captures the idea that 
donors neither behave entirely selfish nor completely altruistic when allocating aid, i.e. that 
they pursue their national interests while also taking the need for aid in the beneficiary 
country into account. The humanitarian view identifies economic assistance as the primary 
reason for aid whereas in the foreign policy view aid is regarded as a mean to satisfy the 
                                                 
62 See, for instance Maizels and Nissanke (1984), Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) and Berthélemy (2006) for 
empirical studies on the relative importance of these two factors for various donors.  
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interest of the donor (McKinlay and Little 1977). Recipient need, on the one hand, means 
that more aid should go to countries with the greatest need for poverty alleviation. 
Furthermore, natural disasters and political or ethnic conflicts can trigger need for 
(additional) foreign assistance. On the other hand, donor interests encompass a wide range 
of geopolitical, economic, military-strategic, or cultural interest.  
 
This study examines empirically whether such spatial dependence exists in bi- and 
multilateral aid giving. Even though there are a few studies that include aid by other donors 
as an explanatory variable, these are implicitly based on the oversimplifying assumption 
that each donor reacts to the aid allocation of every other donor in the same way, i.e. that a 
given donor is influenced by any other donor identically. For instance, there is no reason to 
believe that bilateral donors are as much influenced by multilateral organisations as by 
other bilateral donors. In addition, no previous study has so far addressed the issue of 
strategic interaction among donors. 
 
The contribution of this analysis is threefold: First, exploiting the previously unpublished 
PLAID dataset (Nielson et al. 2010) and covering 26 country donors as well as multilateral 
institutions, 139 recipient countries and 35 years, the empirical work is based on a larger 
database than any previous study. Second, the assumption of identical influence of all 
donors is abandoned. Third, the interaction of strategic motives by different donors is 
modelled explicitly. The results show that there is evidence for positive spatial contagion, 
that is, a donor is influenced by other donors in its aid allocation decisions. ODA transfers 
by different donors consequently act as complements rather than as substitutes. It is shown 
that donors are in fact not influenced in the same way by every other donor, but that rather 
the largest players in international development aid giving act as leaders whereas smaller 
donors take the role of followers. Little evidence is found for strategic interaction 
concerning economic and political interest, whereas tentative evidence suggest that military 
alliances of different donors with the same recipient matter. Generally, smaller donors 
depend more strongly on others than larger donors.   
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, potential causes of spatial 
dependence and its consequences are discussed, while Section 3 briefly reviews the 
relevant literature. Section 4 describes the estimation methodology, the construction of the 
spatial lags and the dataset used for estimation. Section 5 provides the main results both on 
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an aggregate level as well as for individual donors while the analysis is extended to 
conditional spatial dependence in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
3.2. Origin and consequences of spatial dependence 
Causes of spatial dependence 
There are theoretical reasons both for positive and negative spatial dependence. In the 
former case, a given donor will increase (decrease) its aid share to a given recipient if other 
donors give more (less) aid to the same recipient. Negative spatial dependence is found if a 
donor reduces (raises) the aid budget to a recipient country if other donors allocate more 
(less) aid to this recipient. Aid allocation by different donors act as complements with 
positive spatial dependence, whereas they are substitutes with negative spatial dependence.    
 
The first source of positive spatial dependence is the potentially great uncertainty involved 
in aid projects. Even though donors might attach conditions to their aid and support, they 
do not have full information on how the money will be used in the recipient country. 
Uncertainty occurs at different levels: (1) it is not always guaranteed that the funds will 
actually reach the beneficiary development organisation or project, (2) the donor cannot 
fully influence how the money is spent by the implementing organisation and (3) there is 
uncertainty whether the envisaged positive development effects will materialise. A certain 
degree of this uncertainty might be reduced by intensive preparatory work and close 
monitoring of the projects; however donors often lack the administrative capacity to 
scrutinise the use of granted funds. At the same time, donors are accountable to the national 
taxpayers for spending their money responsibly. This is why some donors might follow the 
example of other donors and give funds to the same countries as this might be a signal for 
good aid projects (Vázquez 2008).63 Doing the same as others reduces search costs for 
profitable aid projects on the one hand and it alleviates the risk of allegations by the 
taxpayer on the other hand. This undifferentiated movement by various donors in the same 
direction has been labelled “herding” (Frot and Santiso 2011) or “bandwagon effect” 
(Vázquez 2008) by other authors.  
  
The second cause of positive spatial dependence is strategic interaction among donors. As 
argued by McKinlay and Little (1977), aid can be used to establish commitment on part of 
                                                 
63 Reinhardt (2006) provides a micro-level study that supports this argument. 
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the donor and dependency on the part of the recipient country which can be used to realise 
different policy utilities. Commitment could either reduce the risk of intervention of a 
hostile state, incentivise a recipient to stay within the sphere of influence of the donor, or be 
used to discourage a particular country to move into a rival’s sphere of influence 
(McKinlay and Little 1977). In addition, dependency increases the potential of the donor to 
control the recipient and influence its behaviour in its own interest.64 This is true not only 
for political and military, but also for economic interests. If a country seeks to protect its 
own national interests through foreign policy, it also has to observe the actions of other 
countries and their ambitions to secure influence closely. Since ODA is one mean to exert 
and secure power, donors should therefore monitor other donors’ aid allocation decisions 
and react correspondingly. As Frot and Sanitiso (2011: 65) put it, donors that do not 
“participate in the aid splurge” may fear to be left out and miss investment and diplomatic 
opportunities in the future.  
 
Finally, negative spatial dependence can be a sign for increasing donor specialisation over 
time: Starting from a situation with a very wide-spread diffusion of ODA donors begin to 
concentrate their aid efforts on a certain set of recipient countries. As a consequence, these 
countries on the recipient-shortlist will receive a higher share of the total aid budget of a 
donor, while the aid share of non-partner countries will decrease over time. If this 
behaviour can be observed for a large number of donors – and their set of recipient 
countries is not identical – this leads to negative spatial dependence. Such a donor 
specialisation would be in line with the long history of political pledges to improve donor 
coordination, such as the Monterrey Consensus in 2002, the Rome Declaration on 
Harmonisation in 2003, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 and the Accra 
Agenda for Action in 2008.65  These political agreements were negotiated against the 
background of the plethora of negative effects of excessive donor fragmentation and project 
proliferation as well as of problems associated with a lack of coordination.66 At the EU 
level, the Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development 
Policy stipulates that each EU donor shall not grant aid to more than three sectors in a given 
country. Furthermore, it explicitly defines different donor roles, with one of them being the 
                                                 
64 For example, Dreher et al (2007) show empirically that the U.S. uses aid to buy voting compliance in the 
UN General Assembly. 
65 Even though donor coordination and donor specialisation generally are non-conflicting goals, Aldasoro et 
al. (2010) stress that these are two different concepts. Woods (2011) differentiates aid cooperation and aid 
coordination. The former concept entails that donors work together to plan, deliver and achieve common 
objectives, whereas aid coordination means that different activities are organised in a way that they do not 
impact negatively upon each other. 
66 See the following subsection for a detailed discussion. 
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‘withdrawing donor’ that will phase out its engagement in a sector (European Commission 
2009).67 The main purpose of such a specialisation is to improve aid effectiveness not only 
by mitigating the negative side effects of uncoordinated and fragmented aid by numerous 
donors but also by exploiting the respective comparative advantages of each donor in a 
country or sector (OECD 2011). The question is however, whether donors have an 
incentive to specialise on a certain set of partner countries, or whether they put less weight 
on aid effectiveness than on securing their global presence (Bigsten 2006). In fact, any 
specialisation (and also coordination among donors) effectively curtails their possibilities to 
pursue their commercial and political self-interest (Aldasoro et al. 2010).68 
 
Even if a donor does not pursue its national interests when giving aid, negative spatial 
dependence might occur due to free-riding if poverty alleviation is seen as a public good. 
Economic development in a recipient country can be beneficial for all donors as it might 
improve international security by reducing the risk of terrorism or civil conflicts, but also as 
it creates potential export markets.69 Since no donor can be excluded from these benefits, a 
single donor has an incentive to free-ride, i.e. to reduce its efforts in a recipient country if 
other donors provide aid.70 
 
 
Consequences of spatial dependence 
On the one hand, donor specialisation is not necessarily appropriate or a superior strategy 
under all circumstances. Especially after emergencies, such as the Tsunami hitting several 
Asian countries in 2004 or the recent earthquake in Haiti, great amounts of humanitarian 
aid are required that cannot be provided by a single country. Also, collective debt relief 
gives leeway to highly indebted countries and reduces the problem of free riding if debt 
relief by some creditors makes repayment of debt to other non-participating countries more 
likely. On the other hand, a lack of donor specialisation often goes hand in hand with a lack 
                                                 
67 The EU Code of Conduct focuses on sectoral activities, but the argumentation easily extends to a country 
level.  
68 Using sector level data Aldasoro et al. (2010) show that most donors have not concentrated their aid and 
that the lack of coordination among donors is still prevalent. They conclude that “the gap between the words 
and the deeds of major donors appears to be as wide as ever” (Aldasoro et al. 2010: 936). Dollar and Levin 
(2006) find that aid became more selective in terms of democracy and economic governance over time, in a 
sense that donors specialise unilaterally to collaborate with a subgroup of potential partner countries. Yet, if 
this set is the same for all donors, this would lead to positive rather than negative spatial dependence. 
69 Most importantly, the public-good character leads to underprovision of foreign aid if donors do not take the 
positive externality into account (Torsvik 2005). 
70 Of course, this argumentation does not apply if a donor uses aid to secure its national interest since in this 
case a given donor has an incentive to increase its aid efforts to avoid losing influence. 
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of donor coordination in the recipient country. This is particularly true for herding 
behaviour where a donor simply copies the actions of other donors. Also, if ODA is 
allocated as a result of strategic interaction among donors, a tight coordination of the 
resulting aid projects is unlikely. Uncoordinated donor behaviour can have adverse effects 
on aid effectiveness. These can broadly be subsumed under two main arguments: the origin 
of aid darlings and increased aid volatility. While these are closely interrelated as the latter 
is partly a consequence of the former, both aspects have their own negative implications. 
The first set of problems is concerned with the fact that large amounts of aid are allocated 
to a certain country (or sector) which is accompanied by some negative effects, whereas 
other countries as much in need (or sectors as underdeveloped) are marginalised and do not 
receive sufficient financial resources. Cassen (1994) already notes that donors reveal some 
type of herding behaviour, which might be seen as evidence of ‘aid fashion’ in ODA 
allocation. On a country level, this leads to aid darlings and orphans, where the former 
receive much more aid than their economic and political situation would suggest, whereas 
the latter group receives substantially less. On a sector level, the focus on a few key areas, 
such as education or democratisation, detracts funding from others both across and within 
countries.71 This jeopardises sustainable development progress in the neglected areas and 
potentially leads to an administrative overload in the favoured nations or sectors due to the 
mere amount of aid or increased donor fragmentation. One concern regarding the total 
amount of ODA inflow is decreasing returns on aid (Dudley and Montmarquette 1976, 
Lensink and White 2001). Limited absorptive capacities in the beneficiary country will also 
curtail the potential positive impact of financial transfers if local administrations are 
overstrained and if they lack the ability to manage aid flows efficiently (Berg 1997). 
 
If other bilateral donors and multilateral aid organisations follow the allocation decisions of 
a given donor rather than specialising on a small group of partner countries, proliferation in 
the number of donors that are active in a country occurs as a consequence. This increased 
donor fragmentation might negatively affect the effectiveness of aid projects:72 First, 
dealing with a large number of donors increases transaction costs as each donor has its own 
rules, procedures and reporting requirements.73 Second, many foreign aid projects are 
characterised by large fixed costs and high returns to scale. These remain unexploited if 
                                                 
71 Anecdotally, a financial director of an NGO interviewed by Reinhardt (2006) stated: “Kids are hot right 
now. Political dissidence isn’t. That makes things very complicated for us.” 
72 This is not to say that donor monopolies in a recipient country are a more favourable solution. This could 
also negatively affect aid effectiveness and would increase dependency of the recipient country. 
73 In Tanzania, for instance, the government has to write about 2,000 reports to numerous donors and to deal 
with more than 1,000 delegations per year (World Bank 2003).  
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each donor works on its own projects (Svensson 2008). Third, donor fragmentation impairs 
the recipient’s financial ability and administrative capacity to govern. This is particularly 
true for project aid, where the donor works directly with or funds service providers such as 
schools or medical facilities. Furthermore, donors tend to support only investments and 
expect the recipient country to supply complementary inputs such as staff or maintenance 
(Svensson 2008). In addition donors poach for the most talented local experts and are able 
to attract them by paying salary supplements, which then will no longer be available to the 
domestic public or private sector (Arndt 2000). Redundancies in the bureaucracies of 
multiple donors aggravate this problem. Knack and Rahman (2008) find that larger donor 
fragmentation is associated with worse performance in terms of bureaucratic quality 
improvements. This is corroborated by Djankov et al. (2009) who find that recipients with 
highly fragmented donors grow slower than recipient collaborating with fewer donors. 
They argue that this can be partly explained by the increased corruption in the recipient 
country which is positively associated with the degree of donor fragmentation. Finally, if 
the number of donors in a recipient country is large and no single donor has a large share in 
the aid market, the accountability of each donor will be reduced and they might be less 
concerned that recurrent expenses caused by today’s investment are secured or whether the 
projects are mutually consistent (Knack and Rahman 2008). Taken together, increased aid 
inflows and donor fragmentation caused by spatial contagion in aid allocation might lead to 
a situation, in which the “whole of aid in some sense [is] smaller than the sum of the parts” 
(Cassen 1994: 175).  
 
The second major problem caused by herding in ODA granting is the increased volatility of 
aid flows if a change in aid allocation by one donor triggers changes in the same direction 
by other donors.74 The beneficial potentials of aid can be neutralised by high volatility and 
unpredictability, which impedes planning and effective fiscal and monetary policy (Bulíř 
and Hamann 2003). Lensink and Morrisey (2000) and Arellano et al. (2009) find significant 
negative effects of aid volatility on aggregate growth and consumption. Several studies 
have identified macroeconomic determinants of growth that exhibit an increased volatility 
as a consequence of greater aid fluctuations, for instance inflation (Fielding and Mavrotas 
2005), fiscal policy (Fatas and Mihov 2008), or real exchange rates (Edwards and 
Wijnbergen 1989). Agénor and Aizenman (2007) show that aid recipients may fall into a 
                                                 
74 Bulíř and Hamann (2008) find that aid volatility has increased over time. This finding is supported by 
Kharas (2008) who argues that the costs of volatility are large and that herding behaviour aggravates 
collective volatility. Negative spatial dependence, on the other hand, has the potential to reduce volatility.  
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poverty trap if unstable sources of funding inhibit governments to invest in projects that 
require a steady flow of financial resources. 
 
 
3.3. Literature review 
The determinants of aid allocation have been a popular topic in empirical research on ODA. 
McGillivray and White (1993) provide an early literature review, a more recent overview 
can be found in Neumayer (2003). Contrary to the plethora of studies focussing on the 
different political and economic determinants of aid allocation, work on spatial dependency 
in ODA allocation is by far more limited. Even though there are a few studies which 
include aid by other donors in the regression models, the authors do not talk about spatial 
dependence – and it might be well assumed that they are not even aware that they are in 
fact analysing spatial dependence among donors. As a consequence, none of them has 
explicitly modelled this spatial contagion by using theoretically justified and more 
elaborated weighting matrices. More precisely, all existing studies solely include other 
donors’ aggregate commitments as an explanatory variable, i.e. they implicitly use a non-
row-standardised weighting matrix (or a row-standardised weighting matrix if the average 
ODA from other donors were used) that contains only ones for all donor-pairs, i.e. each 
donor gives the same attention to any other donor.75 Furthermore, the definition of the 
dependent variable often differs from the definition of the aid transfers by other donors. In 
this sense, the models estimated are not purely spatial lag models which further corroborate 
the assumption that the authors do not consciously analyse spatial dependence. 
 
Donors have a limited aid budget which needs to be distributed to recipients. This decision 
procedure can be modelled either as a one-step or a two-step process. A two-step process 
distinguishes the eligibility stage and the allocation stage, where the list of recipients is set 
up in the former stage whereas the actual amount of aid is determined in the latter stage. 
Since donors usually do not give assistance to every potential recipient country but only to 
a selected set of partner countries, the first step may contain a large number of countries 
that do not receive any aid, which leads to problems in the empirical analysis.76 In contrast, 
both stages are combined and estimated simultaneously in a one-step procedure. Existing 
studies cannot only be classified according to how the decision process is modelled, but 
                                                 
75 The ODA flows from other donors are usually net of the ODA of a particular donor. This is equivalent to 
setting all diagonal elements of the weighting matrix to zero. 
76 See the methodology part in Section 4 for a discussion and the statistical model generally used. 
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also whether they focus on a single donor country or whether the analysis encompasses a 
larger number of donors.   
 
Looking at donor-specific studies first, McGillivray and Oczkowski (1992) estimate 
determinants of British ODA commitments. Their analysis, which uses a two-part model 
for estimation, is based on eight independent cross-sectional estimations for the years 1980 
to 1987 and covers 93 developing countries. They find a positive effect of other DAC 
members’ gross disbursements to the same recipient in year t-1 in the allocation stage, but 
not in the eligibility stage. The elasticities in the second stage range from 0.25 to very high 
1.36 for individual years, the pooled cross-sectional analysis over all years yields a 
coefficient estimate of 0.88. This indicates that a one percent increase in the gross aid 
disbursements of other donors is associated with a 0.88 percent increase in British aid 
commitments. Tarp et al. (1998) analyse determinants of Danish aid allocation decisions. 
Their dataset spans from 1960 to 1995 and covers 132 recipient countries. To control for 
aid given by other donors, the aggregate ODA disbursements from other bilateral and 
multilateral donors to a specific recipient country is included as a control variable and 
normalised by recipient population. Estimating a Heckman 2SLS model with a random-
effects model in the second step, they find a positive and highly significant degree of 
spatial dependence both in the selection as well as in the allocation stage. In the latter, the 
effect size is 0.55, indicating that if the aggregate ODA disbursement by other donors to a 
recipient rises by one dollar per capita, Denmark increases its aid commitment to the same 
recipient by 55 cent. Differences between countries with and without former colonial ties in 
the factors that determine Spanish aid allocation are the focus of Vázquez’s (2008) 
analysis, which covers the years from 1993 to 2005. The sample includes 104 partner 
countries in the eligibility stage and 25 nations without colonial ties and 20 with post-
colonial links in the allocation stage. The variable included to capture spatial dependency is 
share of each recipient country at the global ODA (i.e. total aid disbursed by multilateral 
and bilateral donors), excluding Spanish aid. He finds evidence that countries that receive 
more aid from other sources are more likely to be on Spain’s recipient list, and that in the 
allocation of the aid budget there is a focus on countries with a higher aid-dependency, but 
no spatial dependence effect in either group. In the eligibility stage, an increment of one 
percent in the share of global aid of a given country increases the odds for this nation of 
being on Spain’s recipient list by nearly 41 percent. The author interprets the positive effect 
in the eligibility stage as a lack of donor coordination. Lastly, in a study on Italian foreign 
aid, Maurini and Settimo (2009) exploit the OECD DAC database and analyse absolute net 
 133
disbursements from Italy to 156 recipients from 1983 to 2006. To test for the influence of 
other donors’ aid, the aggregate disbursements of multilateral DAC members and other 
bilateral DAC member countries are included separately. A Tobit estimation reveals a 
positive and highly significant effect of other aid to the same recipient for all periods. 
Depending on model specification and time-period, the elasticities for other bilateral 
donors’ aid disbursements are between 0.58 and 1.39. The coefficient of aid disbursements 
by multilateral donors is only significant in the period from 1991 to 1998 and from 1999 to 
2006, with elasticity estimates of 0.40 and 0.44, respectively.  
 
In contrast, to the best of my knowledge, only three studies have used a dyadic dataset 
encompassing various donors and recipients. Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) use a dataset 
covering 22 DAC donors and 137 recipient countries from 1980 to 1999. The total aid 
commitments per capita by other bilateral donors are included as a control variable. The 
estimation approach is a one-step random-effects Tobit model. Over the whole period and 
sample, there is no conclusive evidence that aid by other donors matters. The coefficient is 
positive and highly significant, unless controls for primary schooling enrolment and infant 
mortality are included. However, the effect size is negligible: if other donors on average 
increase their aid commitment to a given beneficiary by 100 USD, a given donor reacts 
with an increase in the range of 62 cent to one USD. Dividing the sample into three decadal 
subsets, the authors find a negative and statistically significant effect during the 1980s 
(coefficient -0.0129) and no effect during the 1990s. The difference between both periods, 
however, is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level, providing tentative 
evidence that dependence on other donors has increased. An analysis of differences 
between donors reveals a positive and highly significant effect of other bilateral donors’ aid 
for the UK, the United States, Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands and a negative and 
significant impact on Belgian, Irish and Italian ODA.  
 
Berthélemy (2006) examines donor-specific determinants of aid allocation using the same 
dataset. While the main focus of his analysis is to find differences in the importance of 
donor interest vis-à-vis recipient needs, aid per capita committed by other donors is also 
included as a control variable. For all donors, it is found that more assistance from other 
bilateral and multilateral donors increases the probability that a given recipient receives a 
positive amount of aid in the selection stage.77 In the allocation equation, the effect of other 
                                                 
77 The significant effect for other bilateral aid disappears if a random-effect Probit model rather than a 
standard Probit model is estimated. 
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donors’ ODA is positive and significant in OLS and a Heckman 2SLS estimation indicating 
a complementary relationship between aid commitments from different donors. On 
average, a one percent increase in the per capita commitment of other bilateral donors is 
associated with a 0.28 percent increase in the commitment of a given donor. For 
multilateral assistance, this effect is 0.23 percent. However, once fixed effects are 
introduced, the effect of bilateral commitments becomes negative and significant and a one 
percent increase is accompanied by a 0.14 percent reduction in the commitment for a given 
dyad. Turning to donor-specific determinants, Berthélemy classifies donors into ‘altruistic’, 
‘moderately egoistic’ and ‘egoistic’ donors according to effect size of trade relations 
between a donor and a recipient. In the cluster of moderately egoistic donors, he finds 
evidence that Germany, Canada, Belgium and Finland regard their assistance as 
complements to other bilateral donors’ ODA, whereas Japan, United Kingdom and United 
States react with an aid reduction if other donors increase their aid commitments to a 
specific donor. Finally, all egoistic donors, i.e. Australia, France and Italy, regard their 
ODA commitments as substitutes for other donors’ assistance. These results are partly in 
contrast to the ones of the previous study by Berthélemy and Tichit (2004), which indicates 
that results are sensitive to the estimation method chosen. The main difference between 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) and Berthélemy (2006) is that estimation in the latter study is 
based on fixed effects while the former analysis uses a random-effects Tobit model. Since 
the allocation of bilateral aid might be influenced by unobservable factors which can well 
be correlated with the explanatory variables, using fixed effects at least mitigates the 
resulting omitted variable bias. As will be discussed below, the introduction of fixed effects 
is even more crucial when analysing spatial dependence. 
 
In a recent study, Claessens et al. (2009) exploit the OECD DAC dataset to analyse how aid 
allocation criteria changed over time. Unlike previous studies, they use net aid transfers 
rather than aid commitment or disbursements as the dependent variable. Using a dyadic 
panel dataset covering 22 donors and 147 recipients from 1970 to 2004, they estimate 
determinants of ODA disbursements for three sub-periods (1970-1989, 1990-1998, and 
1999-2004). They include net aid transfers by other donors as a control variable; however it 
is not reported how this effect changes over time. Compared with other variables, they find 
very high effects for the aid transfers by other donors, but they are estimated very 
imprecisely, rendering them statistically insignificant in the main specification. Generally, 
some evidence for positive spatial dependence is found, but the effect is sensitive to sample 
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selection. Table 17 summarises the main results for studies with a comparable econometric 
approach.  
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Table 17:  Results of previous studies 
Study Donor(s) Recipients Study Period 
Dependent 
variable 
Methodology Weighting Matrix 
Variable measuring 
other donors' behaviour
Main Findings 
McGillivray and 
Oczkowski (1992)  
United 
Kingdom 
93 1980-1987 ODA 
commitments 
Two part model Unitary (non row-
standardised) 
ODA disbursements of 
other DAC donors 
no evidence for spatial 
dependence in eligibility 
stage; positive effect in 
allocation stage 
Tarp et al. (1998)  Denmark 132 1960-1995 ODA 
commitments 
Heckman 2SLS Unitary (non row-
standardised) 
ODA disbursements of 
other donors 
positive spatial dependence 
in both stages 
Vázquez (2008)  Spain 104 (first 
stage)/ 45 
(second stage) 
1993-2005 ODA gross 
disbursements 
Two part model  Share of recipient at 
global aid 
disbursements of other 
donors 
positive spatial dependence 
in eligibility stage, but not 
in allocation stage 
Maurini and Settimo 
(2009)  
Italy 156 1983-2006 ODA net 
disbursements 
Tobit Unitary (non row-
standardised) 
ODA from other DAC 
donors 
comprehensive evidence 
for positive spatial 
dependence  
Berthélemy and Tichit 
(2004)  
22 137 1980-1999 ODA 
commitments 
per capita 
Tobit Unitary (non row-
standardised) 
Aggregate ODA 
commitments of other 
donors per capita 
some evidence for positive 
spatial dependence in full 
model, negative spatial 
dependence during 1980s, 
positive for Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden, UK 
and USA, negative effect 
for Belgium, Ireland and 
Italy 
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Table 17:     Results of previous studies (continued) 
Study Donor(s) Recipients Study Period 
Dependent 
variable 
Methodology Weighting Matrix 
Variable measuring 
other donors' behaviour
Main Findings 
Berthélemy (2006)  22 137 1980-1999 ODA 
commitments 
Two part model Unitary (non row-
standardised) 
Aggregate ODA 
commitments of other 
bilateral donors per 
capita & multilateral 
ODA per capita 
negative effect of ODA 
from other bilateral donors 
in fixed effects model; 
positive effect for 
multilateral ODA; positive 
effect for Germany, 
Canada, Belgium and 
Finland, negative effect for 
Australia, France, Italy, 
Japan, UK and USA 
Claessens et al. (2009) 22 147 1970-2004 Net aid transfer OLS, FE Unitary (non row-
standardised) 
Aggregate net aid 
transfers by other 
donors per capita 
some evidence for positive 
spatial dependence  
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A very different approach is taken by Frot and Santiso (2011) and this is also the only study 
that addresses spatial dependence explicitly. Departing from the observation that traders in 
bonds and equities show considerable herding behaviour, they apply methods developed in 
the finance literature to aid allocation decisions of bilateral donors. Basically, their herding 
measure is based on the share of donors that increase their aid to a particular recipient in a 
year and it is assumed that in the absence of herding, increases and decreases should be 
randomly distributed. Uniquely, the decision process is modelled in a way that donors first 
decide which recipients get more and which get less aid than in the previous period and 
then allocate aid in a second step. This is in contrast with all other two-step empirical 
studies in which the first step represents the decision whether or not a country receives aid 
at all and the actual amount is determined in the second step. In the empirical analysis by 
Frot and Santiso (2011), only the first step is examined. The data is taken from the OECD 
DAC dataset, which covers 48 years from 1960 to 2007. The dataset includes up to 5,171 
recipient-years and encompasses activities of 60 different donors. Based on three year 
averages, they find a herding size of about 10 percent, indicating that if half of the 
allocation changes are increases and half are decreases, an average recipient experiences 
that 60 percent of its donors increase (or decrease) their allocations. Stated differently, this 
means that 50 percent of the beneficiaries see 60 percent of their donors decrease their aid 
compared to the previous period, while 50 percent see 60 percent of their donors increase 
their aid allocation. Differentiating between bilateral and multilateral organisations, the 
study finds no evidence for herding among multilateral donors; however, it is left open 
whether they react to allocation decisions taken by bilateral givers. An analysis of the 
determinants of herding reveals that a new policy adopted in the recipient country 
positively affects herding – after such a transition, a country receives funds from 20 percent 
more donors than the average beneficiary. A positive effect is also found for the occurrence 
of natural disasters, whereas a transition towards a more authoritarian regime is punished 
through a higher-than-average proportion of donors reducing their aid during the transition 
period. While the analysis explicitly models herding behaviour, the limitation on decreases 
and increases neglects differences in the size of the change, i.e. a 50 percent increase is 
treated as the same as a 0.5 percent increase. Even though they show that dropping small 
changes does not significantly affect the size of the herding measure, the absolute size of 
the change should play an important role when measuring the presence of spatial 
dependence.  
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Summing up, there is some evidence that the aid allocation of a particular donor is affected 
by allocation decisions of other donors, as most of the existing studies find a positive 
relationship between aggregate or average ODA allocated by other donors to a recipient 
and a given donor’s aid to the same beneficiary. However, each of these studies, including 
the work by Frot and Santiso (2011), is based on the extremely simplifying assumption that 
every donor reacts to aid allocation of any other donor in the same way. This implies that, 
for instance, multilateral donors are influenced by bilateral donors in the same way as by 
other multilateral institutions. Furthermore, and even more severe, it means that important 
donors like the United States are affected in the same way by aid allocation decisions of 
small donors such as Luxembourg as small donors are influenced by important players in 
the global aid landscape. This assumption is not adequate if a particular donor observes the 
aid allocation of some other donors more closely than the actions of others. As will be 
shown in the empirical part below, this assumption does not hold true – smaller donors are 
more influenced by larger donors than vice versa. Furthermore, all existing studies imply 
that the strength of this spatial dependence does not depend on the strength of the relations 
between a donor and recipient. The present analysis is the first to model the donor-recipient 
relationship explicitly. This also allows testing for strategic interaction among donors, i.e. if 
a donor is likely to increase its aid allocation to an important partner country, if other 
donors with also close ties with the same recipient increase their aid efforts in this country. 
This is particularly important as beneficiaries differ with respect to their geo-strategic 
position, but also with respect to their market potential or their endowment with natural 
resources. If donors use aid strategically to gain influence in the recipient country, these 
potential benefits in the receiving country should impact the strength of spatial dependence 
and therefore should be modelled directly. 
 
  
3.4. Methodology and Data Description 
The following section first describes the dataset used and defines all variables employed in 
some detail. Then, the rationale behind the specific operationalisation of the spatial lags and 
their calculation is discussed, while the last subsection is concerned with the model 
specification and the estimation technique. 
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Data description 
The OECD defines official development assistance (ODA) as grants or loans to developing 
countries that are undertaken by the official sector. These funds are given mainly to 
promote economic development and welfare, and contain a grant element of at least 25 
percent in the case of loans (OECD 2008).78 This definition includes administrative 
expenses in the donor countries, technical assistance and financial flows. For the present 
analysis, the aid definition is further restricted to country programmable aid (CPA). CPA is 
defined as total gross ODA net of aid that is (1) unpredictable by nature (2) entails no 
cross-border flows, and (3) is not part of co-operation agreements between governments 
(OECD 2009). As a consequence, all projects classified as humanitarian aid, debt relief, 
food aid and administrative costs in the donor country are dropped from the sample. This 
leaves core aid that finances development in a medium to long term perspective and is 
closer than ODA to representing aid flows that are relevant to the decision-making at donor 
level (OECD 2009). Furthermore, high debt levels, famines as a consequence of crop 
failure or the need for humanitarian aid after natural disasters in a certain country may 
trigger increased aid allocation by several donors to this recipient. This behaviour does not 
need to reflect spatial dependence, but it could be purely driven by a phenomenon called 
spatial clustering.79 Therefore, excluding aid projects that are particularly prone to spatial 
clustering facilitates interpretation as spatial dependence. 
 
Data on aid is taken from the Project Level Aid (PLAID) database provided by the College 
of William and Marry, Brigham University, and Development Gateway (Nielson et al. 
2010). The PLAID contains information on aid projects not only by members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), but adds activities by non-DAC multilateral 
organisations. Furthermore, it provides more detailed project descriptions, which allows a 
                                                 
78 To restrict the sample to ODA, several steps are undertaken: First, all observations with missing 
information on both the flow type and the grant element are deleted. Then all projects classified as loans at 
market rates, equity investment, unknown loan type or other official flows are excluded. Finally, all 
observations with a grant element of less than 25 percent are dropped. Unfortunately, several multilateral 
organisations, among them the World Bank, do not report the grant element of their commitments and are 
therefore excluded.  
79 Spatial clustering refers to the fact that close units are more similar than distant units due to observed 
characteristics, while unobserved determinants of spatial patterns are denoted unobserved spatial 
heterogeneity (Plümper and Neumayer 2010). In the context of aid allocation, increased aid by several donors 
due to natural disasters is an example of spatial clustering, whereas less aid due to a general bad reputation of 
a recipient country is unobserved spatial heterogeneity. The problem of separating the influence of spatial 
clustering and unobserved spatial heterogeneity and identifying spatial dependence is commonly referred to as 
Galton’s Problem (Galton 1889).  
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more precise allocation of projects to sectors.80 The dataset encompasses information both 
on commitments and disbursements from 1945 to 2009; however, with the exception of a 
few donors such as the World Bank, the vast majority of donors start reporting in 1974 or 
later. Since the purpose of this study is to examine how different donors depend on each 
other, information on a large number of donors is crucial in order to avoid biased results. 
Therefore, the study period is restricted to 1974 to 2008, which contains over 99 percent of 
all observations. In order to keep the sample at a manageable size, several alterations are 
made: On the donor side, multilateral organisations are replaced by their umbrella 
organisation and minor organisations with few projects or a very constrained field of 
activity are deleted. In addition, smaller donors with less than 1,000 projects over the whole 
study period are neglected.81 Regarding the recipient-sample, projects with missing 
information in this variable are dropped, as are observations for which no specific country 
is listed as a recipient. This concerns particularly multilateral organisations and regionally 
unspecified flows. Additionally, OECD members as recipients are deleted as they are not 
the main target for aid. All recipients with fewer than 100 projects and/or a population of 
less than 100,000 people are disregarded. Finally, ten recipients are dropped due to missing 
data on the control variables. This leaves a sample of 23 country donors and three 
multilateral institutions on the one hand and 139 recipient countries on the other. Tables 27 
and 28 in the Appendix list all countries and institutions included.  
 
ODA commitments rather than the actual disbursements are taken as the dependent 
variable.82 As argued by Dudley and Montmarquette (1976), these provide a more accurate 
measure of donor supply than the actual money transfers, which partly depend on the 
administrative capacity and willingness to accept the funds in the recipient countries 
(Berthélemy 2006).83 After dropping a very few number of projects with commitments of 
zero or less, the data are collapsed to form a donor-recipient-year dataset. Assuming full 
reporting, all gaps in the dataset were set to zero, but replaced by missings for all donor-
years in which a particular donor does not report any figures. Also, for recipients that 
became independent only after 1974 (mainly members of the former USSR), all 
                                                 
80 The PLAID dataset also extends coverage to bilateral non-DAC members; however, these are not included 
it this analysis due to their small number of projects or due to missing information on the loan type or grant 
element. 
81 16 donors are affected, which are mainly developing or small countries such as Monaco, Iceland, and 
Liechtenstein.  
82 The OECD defines commitments as “a firm obligation expressed in writing”, while disbursements are “the 
actual transfer of financial resources” (OECD 2002: 292). 
83 Besides this theoretical reasoning, with 50 percent missings information on disbursement is far less 
complete in the PLAID dataset. 
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observations before the independence year are set to missing.84 After cleaning up the 
dataset, it contains information from 600,376 projects and covers commitments of 1.14 
trillion USD (in constant 2000 USD).85 There is no reason to assume that the necessary 
sample reductions are non-random and cause any sample-selection-bias. 
 
Most existing studies use either total amount of aid or aid per capita as left-hand variable; 
advocates of the former argue that the allocation on a per-capita basis “is both a difficult 
and cumbersome task” for donors (McGillivray and Oczkowski 1992: 1314). On the other 
hand, econometricians using per capita aid stress that it automatically controls for country 
size and allows testing for a small-country-bias (Berthélemy and Tichit 2004). However, a 
donor usually has a fixed aid budget, which is divided among potential recipients. This 
decision is best approximated if the aid to a particular recipient is expressed as a share of 
the total aid allocated by a donor in a given year (Neumayer 2003). This definition has two 
other virtues (Vázquez 2008): First, it eliminates any bias caused by comparing figures 
over different years, for instance caused by measurement errors due to fluctuations in 
domestic exchange rates to the USD. Furthermore, it allows the use of nominal 
commitments and renders the choice of the correct deflation factor unnecessary. Second, as 
shares are normalised to one per donor and year, it is insensitive to trends in the size of the 
aid budget over time, e.g. the widespread reduction of aid budgets in the 1990s.  
  
The set of explanatory variables can broadly be divided into three subsets: the spatial lags, 
which are employed to test for the existence of spatial dependence and are described in 
more detail in the following subsection, variables that measure donor interest and controls 
for recipient need. The set of variables that control for recipient need encompasses: 
 The GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD taken from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2010) is included as an approximation for different aspects 
of development of the recipient country. It is expected that less aid is allocated to 
richer countries. 
 To control for the size of a recipient, its Population is taken from the World Bank 
(2010). All else being equal, larger countries should receive a larger share of the aid 
budget of a donor.  
                                                 
84 In some cases, aid flows are reported to dependent countries. Here, all years prior to the first positive ODA 
flow are set to missing. 
85 This analysis is based on the 1.9.2 version of the dataset.  
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 The number of fatalities caused by natural disasters (Disaster deaths) is taken from 
by the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT 2010) and is expressed as number of 
deaths per 1,000 people of population to assess the impact on a country. Even 
though humanitarian aid is excluded in the aid definition used, Frot and Santiso 
(2011) argue that natural disasters draw attention to the affected country and trigger 
aid flows from several donors not necessarily only in form of disaster relief but also 
in form of other long term investments. Accordingly, it is expected that a greater 
share of ODA is directed to countries that are hit by natural catastrophes.  
 As a proxy for democratisation and good governance (Democracy), a measure 
provided by the Freedom House (2009) is included. As argued in the introductory 
section, a higher degree of democracy should raise the effectiveness of aid and send 
a positive signal to donors, thus a positive sign of the coefficient is anticipated.  
 
With regard to donor interest, the following set of variables is taken: 
 To account for economic interest, the variable Bilateral trade measures the trade 
between the donor and the recipient, where trade is defined as the sum of imports 
and export. Bilateral trade is divided by donor’s GDP to reflect the importance of 
the trade relations for the donor. Trade (and particularly exports) exhibits the risk 
for a potential degree of simultaneity, in case tied aid increases the bilateral 
movement of goods. However, since commitments rather than disbursements are 
used in this context, and as the latter lag behind the former, the risk should be 
limited (Berthélemy 2006). 
 As a measure for the strategic importance of the recipient, its share in the total US 
military grants is taken (US military grant share). Data is provided by USAID 
(2010). Unfortunately, this information is not sufficiently available for other 
donors. The underlying rationale is that countries that receive a large share of US 
military grants are strategically important to Western donors. It is expected that also 
more aid resources are directed to these countries. 
 As an approximation for the bilateral political relations, a dummy that takes the 
value of one if either of the dyad member has dispatched an ambassador to the other 
member dyad (Diplomatic representation). As more assistance should be allocated 
to countries with which the donor has close political ties, a positive effect is 
anticipated. 
 To account for similarity of state preferences between donor and recipient, the 
variable UN voting similarity is included. It measures the similarity of the voting 
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positions of donor and recipient in the United Nations General Assembly and is 
taken from Gartzke (2010). The variable is recoded to run from 0 (complete 
different voting positions) to 2 (always the same voting position). Again, a positive 
sign is anticipated.  
 A dummy for the existence of a Military alliance is included. This variable takes 
the value of one if the donor and the recipient have signed a defence or an offence 
pact. The data is provided by Leeds et al. (2002). One argument for giving foreign 
aid is provided by strategic rationales; therefore, a positive coefficient is 
anticipated. 
 Even though the dependent variable is the share of aid of a given recipient at the 
total aid budget of a donor and this measure is independent from the overall size of 
the aid budget, a t-1 set of year dummies is included in order to capture any general 
time trend in aid allocation decisions which is induced by changes in the set of 
potential recipient countries due to data availability or political transformation. 
Most importantly, the members of the former Soviet Union emerged on the list in 
1990, but also country splits affect the sample.  
 
To include bilateral as well as multilateral organisations in the sample, the voting shares of 
the member states are used as weights to determine bilateral relations between a 
multilateral organisation and the recipients for the variables for donor interest and variables 
that link a donor with a recipient (e.g., distance and colonial ties).86 This reflects the 
assumption that in multinational donor institutions the power of a single member state to 
assert its national interest is determined by its relative influence in votes.87 With the 
exception of disaster fatalities, all time variant variables are lagged by one year to mirror 
the situation allocators of aid faced at the time of decision-making and to reduce the 
potential risk of endogeneity.  
 
There are several reasons to assume that aid commitments are time dependent, i.e. that the 
amount of the aid committed in a year depends on the assistance given in the year before. 
One of them is bureaucratic inertia: aid allocation decisions are the result of bureaucratic 
procedures, which allow only incremental change as long as there is no pivotal intervention 
(Allison 1971). Giving aid to a constant set of recipients also minimises administrative 
                                                 
86 Due to restricted data availability, all voting share information is taken as time invariant. 
87 This is also true for dummy variables (e.g., diplomatic representation, military alliance). Thus, they are not 
dummies any more in the final dataset. However, interpretation is not affected. 
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costs and efforts, as adding new partner countries involves additional expenses to 
implement new bilateral mechanisms. Furthermore, administrative efficiency might be 
increased if learning economies can be realised based on previous experiences in a recipient 
country (Vázquez 2008). As a donor is likely to be better informed about the economic and 
political situation as well as the need in a particular country in case this country is already a 
recipient of bilateral aid, new aid commitments to this country exhibit less risk than aid to a 
new beneficiary. By the same token, experiences with the effectiveness of previous aid 
render it easier for a donor to assess ex-ante the outcome of a potential aid project. 
Particular dyad specific characteristics, for instance between Spain and many Latin 
American countries, may also lead to a cooperation which exhibits an increased stability 
over time. Lastly, sustainable development is a long-term process so that a donor might 
provide stable assistance over time to a partner as long as the terms of the cooperation are 
fulfilled. To account for this time dependency and to reduce a potential bias due to 
temporal dynamics, a one-year lag of aid commitments is included as a control variable. 
 
 
Calculation of spatial lags 
To analyse the potential influence of aid allocated to the same recipient by other donors, a 
spatial lag model is used. In such a model, for each observation the dependent variable of 
all other observations is included as a right-hand side variable. This variable is weighted 
using a weighting matrix. These matrices are an integral part of spatial modelling and 
formally delineate the spatial dependence between a given observation and all other 
observations (Anselin 1988). Aid flows from a donor to a recipient, either bilateral or 
multilateral, are an example of a directed dyad, in which there is a clear source and a target 
and the action originates at the former and is directed towards the latter. As outlined by 
Neumayer and Plümper (2010), there are various options to model spatial dependence in 
such a setting. In the present context, spatial dependence is assumed to take the form of 
‘specific source contagion’ (Neumayer and Plümper 2010: 154), in which the aid flow (or 
the probability of a positive amount of aid in the first stage) between a donor i and a 
recipient j depends on the aid flows (and the existence of a positive amount of aid, 
respectively) of other donors k with the very same recipient j. For example, the amount of 
aid the United Kingdom gives to Ghana depends on the assistance that other donors (e.g., 
France and Germany) allocate to Ghana. There are other forms of spatial contagion, such as 
aggregate source or aggregate target contagion, and specific target contagion (Neumayer 
and Plümper 2010). The aggregate forms of contagion assume that aid flows between all 
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other dyads, and not only those including recipient j, influence the aid from i to j. Against 
the background of donor interests in the recipient country it is not reasonable to presume 
that aid flows by other donors to other recipients influence aid allocation to recipient j. 
Specific target contagion assumes that the amount of aid a recipient j receives from a donor 
i spatially depends on the amount of aid this donor i gives to other recipients m. Given the 
fixed aid budget, aid has to be allocated between all potential recipients. This automatically 
introduces dependency between the amount of aid given to recipient j and other recipients 
m. In the present analysis, this is captured by expressing aid to recipient j as a share of total 
aid by donor i. Other than the fixed aid budget that needs to be allocated, there are further 
arguments why such a specific target contagion might exist also in absolute aid flows. For 
instance, one recipient might successfully combat corruption and thereby improve its 
relative governance-performance among all potential recipients. If a donor rewards this 
improvement with more aid to this country, there would be spatial dependence between 
recipients. Since the focus of this work is spatial dependence among donors, however, 
specific target contagion is not modelled explicitly. 
 
The spatial lags are the product of the dependent variable of all other dyadskj and the 
weighting matrix, which expressed the connectivity between dyadij and dyadkj. Abstracting 
from all other explanatory variables, the model reads as follows (Neumayer and Plümper 
2010): 
ij ik kj ij
k i
Y w Y 

          (11)  
 
where Yij is the foreign aid of donor i to recipient j, Ykj the aid of other donors except donor 
i  to the same recipient j and wik is the weighting matrix which measures the connectivity 
between donor i and donor k.88 The parameter ρ is the spatial lag coefficient to be 
estimated. The modelling of the strength of spatial dependence between two donors 
deserves closer attention. As argued in section 2, it is assumed that donors take the aid 
decisions of other donors into account when allocating their aid. The basic questions are (1) 
whether all other donors k have the same influence on donor i or whether there are some 
donors that exert more influence than others, and if so, (2) which donors are more 
influential. To test this, six different weighting matrices are used to construct the spatial 
lags, which can be grouped into two categories: the first group encompasses global 
                                                 
88 For illustrative purposes, time indices not included. 
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weighting matrices that are not recipient specific,89 whereas weights in the second group 
depend both on the link between donor i and recipient j as well as donor k and recipient j. 
The first three weighting matrices, which do not depend on the recipient, are used to test for 
the existence of a general herding behaviour among donors, while the latter three weighting 
matrices model strategic interaction among donors. 
 
Specifically, the three global weighting matrices in the first group are: 
 All donors: This is a very basic unit matrix, which consists of only ones for all non-
diagonal elements.90 This implies that all donors exert the same degree of influence. 
For instance the impact of the dyad Germany-Ghana on UK-Ghana is the same as 
the impact of the dyad France-Ghana. Such a weighing matrix simply measures the 
aggregate share of a given recipient country at the aid from other donors (if matrix 
is not row-standardised) and the average share of aid, respectively, with a row-
standardised matrix. 
 Global aid share: In this weighting matrix, the cells contain the total amount of 
CPA of a donor in a given year. As in the first weighting matrix, all rows of the 
matrix contain the same values (with the exception of diagonal elements which are 
set to zero), because the total amount of CPA of one donor does not depend on who 
the corresponding other donor in the matrix is. After row-standardisation, each cell 
contains the share of a given donor (except donor i) at the total amount of CPA 
given by all donors (except donor i) in a year and measures the relative importance 
of a donor. This matrix reflects the assumption that a given donor does not follow 
each other donor in the same way, but that it gives more weight to the aid allocation 
decisions of important donors. For example, UK’s aid allocation is assumed to be 
more affected by the aid giving of the United States than by Luxembourg’s aid 
allocation.  
 Same subgroup: Here, donors are classified into four groups and donors are 
assumed to be impacted only by other donors in the same subgroup. The 
classification of donors is according to Neumayer (2003): The group of Big 
Western donors encompasses six traditional donors with large (absolute) aid 
budgets that account for 60.3 percent of all CPA in 2008. The like-minded countries 
are a group of bilateral donors who have the reputation that the promotion of 
                                                 
89 For these, the weighting matrix wik is equal to wki. 
90 The diagonal elements of all weighting matrices are set to zero since a donor cannot spatially depend 
on itself. 
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democracy and good governance plays a particularly important role in their aid 
allocation decisions and that their aid is more directed towards poverty alleviation 
(Stokke 1989). Finally, other bilateral donors are all remaining country donors in 
the sample who are not part of the former two groups and multilateral donors are 
multilateral institutions (see Table 27 for a classification of donors).  
 
In the second set of weighting matrices, the influence of donor k on donor i regarding aid to 
recipient j depends on the link between the donor k and recipient j on the one hand and the 
link between donor i and recipient j on the other hand. These links can be modelled as 
substitutes or as complements. The former assumes that the strength of connectivity 
between dyadij and dyadkj is positive even if only one of the links (i.e. between i and j or 
between k and j) is non-zero, whereas for a complementary relationship both links must be 
positive. Mathematically, substitutes are expressed by the sum of the two links, and 
complements by their product. In the present analysis, a complementary relationship is 
assumed, that is, dyadij is influenced by dyadkj if, and only if, both the linkij and the linkkj are 
non-zero: 
  ( )( )ik ij kj ij kjw w link link         (12) 
   
The weighting matrix, which determines the influence of aid flows from donor k to 
recipient j on the aid flow from donor i to recipient j is the product of the link between 
donor i and recipient j and donor k and recipient j. This reflects the assumption that aid to a 
given recipient is only influenced by aid from other donors to the same recipient if this 
recipient is of importance for both donors: e.g., for economic considerations that determine 
aid allocation, aid by donor i to recipient j is the stronger influenced by aid from donor k to 
the same recipient j the more economically important recipient j is for donor i and the more 
economically important recipient j is for donor k. Economic importance is here measured 
by a recipient’s share of the total trade of a donor.  
 
To represent the different aspects of donor interest discussed above, three different 
measurements are taken as a link: 
 Bilateral trade: To account for economic interest, the product of the two absolute 
trade values (sum of bilateral imports and exports) is taken. linkij is the total trade 
value of recipient j with donor i, whereas linkkj is the value of trade between 
recipient j and donor k. The value in the respective cell of the weighting matrix is 
the higher, the more both donor i and donor k trade with recipient j. For instance, 
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China is a relatively important trade partner of Japan and South Korea. Therefore, it 
is assumed that the aid allocation decision of Japan with regard to China is 
relatively strongly influenced by the aid from South Korea to China.  
 Military alliance: This weighting matrix is used to test the hypothesis that a donor 
is more heavily influenced by other donors if a particular recipient is strategically 
important for both donors. As described above, the variable is coded as one if both 
countries of a dyad formed a military alliance and zero otherwise. The weighting 
matrix contains the value of one, if and only if, both donor i and donor k have a 
military alliance with recipient j. 
 UN voting similarity: This measure is a proxy for close political relations. As with 
bilateral trade, the weighting matrix is the product of the two links between donor i 
and recipient k and between donor j and recipient k. The link is similarity of the 
voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly (see the variable description for 
details).  
 
For ease of interpretation, all weighting matrices are row-standardised, i.e. each cell of the 
matrix is divided by its row sum. This results in a new row-standardised weighting matrix 
in which the weights in each row add up to one. The spatial lag is now the weighted 
average of the spatially lagged dependent variable in other dyads rather than its weighted 
sum. Even though row-standardisation is standard in the spatial econometric literature, 
Plümper and Neumayer (2010) argue that it must be well justified as it changes the relative 
influence of other units and may thereby alter estimation results. Here, the spatially lagged 
variable is the share of aid of another donor to the same recipient rather than the total 
amount of aid given by this donor to the same recipient. Since the sum of shares has no 
particularly meaningful interpretation in any case, row-standardisation is adequate from this 
perspective. However, for the three global weighting matrices, row-standardisation does not 
affect the results: since the rows of the weighting matrix Global aid share by definition 
already sum up to one, the matrix is implicitly row-standardised. For the weighting 
matrices All donors and Same subgroup, which give equal weight to either all or a subset of 
other donors, the coefficients will change depending on whether the weighting matrix is 
row-standardised or not, but the significance levels are not affected.91 For the three 
recipient-specific weighting matrices, row-standardisation does affect the results. The 
                                                 
91 These weighting matrices contain a fixed number of ones in each row: For the weighting matrix All donors, 
the number of ones is 25 for the 25 other donors in the sample. For the spatial lag with the All donors 
weighting matrix, the effect of the spatial lag with a non row-standardised weighting matrix is simply the 
effect of the spatial lag using a row-standardised matrix times 25. 
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argument for doing so is that one is not interested in the absolute values of the elements in 
the weighting. Rather, the elements in the weighting matrix determine the relative impact of 
other donors. The row-standardised Bilateral trade weighting matrix allocates weights 
according to the relative importance of a recipient country for the two donors i and k and 
should not be driven by the fact that larger countries generally trade more than smaller 
countries. The products of the bilateral trade volumes between donor i and recipient j and 
donor k and recipient j are summed up for each donor i. If the weighting matrix is not row-
standardised this would assign a stronger influence to countries with higher absolute trade 
values as for these countries the links are higher.92 If the weighting-matrix Military alliance 
is not row-standardised, the effect of an increased number of military alliances would also 
be captured in the spatial lag. However, the focus is not on the number of such alliances 
concluded. Similarly, one is neither interested in the aggregate similarity in the UN general 
assembly. Besides this theoretical reasoning, row-standardisation provides two other virtues 
as noted by Ward and Gleditsch (2008). First, the spatial lag has the same unit as the 
dependent variable (here percent of aid allocated to a given recipient), which facilitates 
interpretation. Second, row-standardisation allows for directly comparing the effect of a 
temporally lagged and a spatially lagged dependent variable. Since all estimations include a 
one-year lag of the dependent variable, this provides a further reason for row-standardising 
the weighting matrices.  
 
Table 18 presents the summary statistics. While in the whole sample, 51.6 percent of all 
dyads have a positive amount of aid, in the sample used for the fixed effects first stage 
estimation, the share is 54.5 percent.93 In the total sample, the average share of a recipient 
at the total amount of aid of a donor in a year is one percent. If the sample is confined to the 
30,396 dyads with a positive amount of foreign aid, this mean increases to 1.92 percent. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
92 Furthermore, since the elements in the weighting matrix are the product of the trade volumes of donor i and 
donor k, the values of the spatially lagged dependent variable would be higher for a donor with high trade 
values. There is no reason to assume that countries which trade a lot are generally subject to a higher degree 
of spatial dependence. The same argument applies to the other two recipient-specific weighting matrices.  
93 As discussed below, the reason for this is that under a fixed-effects approach, all dyads with either a 
positive amount of aid for all years or no aid in any year are dropped due to a lack of overtime-variation. The 
fact that the share of dyads with a positive amount of aid is higher in the fixed effects sample than in the total 
sample indicates that there are more dyads with no positive amount of aid in any year than dyads with a 
positive amount of aid throughout. 
 151
Table 18:  Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.    Min. Max.
Dependent variables   
CPA share 59,030 0.990 3.638 0 100
CPA dummy 45,691 0.545 0.498 0 1
   
Control variables   
Disaster deaths 59,030 0.020 0.234 0 8.044
Democracy (t-1) 59,030 6.855 3.334 2 14
US military grant share (t-1) 59,030 0.864 4.889 0 59.476
Bilateral trade ( t-1) 59,030 0.079 0.209 0 5.293
GDP per capita (ln, t-1) 59,030 6.830 1.330 4.131 10.806
Population (ln, t-1) 59,030 15.914 1.727 10.600 21.000
Military alliance (t-1) 59,030 0.058 0.220 0 1
Diplomatic representation (t-1) 59,030 0.650 0.445 0 1
UN voting similarity (t-1) 59,030 1.345 0.286 0 2
   
Spatial lags   
W: All donors (t-1) 59,030 0.786 1.149 0 9.082
W: Global aid share (t-1) 59,030 0.968 1.640 0 15.627
W: Same subgroup of donors (t-1) 59,030 0.833 1.803 0 42.824
W: Bilateral trade link (t-1) 59,030 1.731 3.291 0 46.721
W: Military alliance link (t-1) 59,030 0.081 0.792 0 42.663
W: UN voting similarity link (t-1) 59,030 0.843 1.229 0 12.005
Notes: W: denotes the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; with exception of the variable 
CPA dummy, values of all other variables relate to the second stage sample without the restriction to positive 
values of the dependent variable. 
 
 
Model specification and estimation methodology 
As noted by Plümper and Neumayer (2010), model specification in the analysis of spatial 
dependence needs to take into account several specific issues. This is to avoid biased results 
and to draw causal inference rather than simply catching spurious effects. First, the one-
period time lag of the dependent variable that is included on the right hand side controls for 
temporal dynamics. The effect of a common trend in the size of the aid budget, e.g., all 
donors give more or less aid, is removed by normalising the aid commitments per donor-
year to one, i.e. by expressing aid in shares rather than in absolute values. A t-1 set of year 
dummies controls for a change in the number of recipients for a given aid budget which 
would lead to higher or lower average shares for all recipient countries. Furthermore, the 
existence of spatial clustering and unobserved spatial heterogeneity, i.e. factors which 
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influence aid allocation decisions of several donors in the same direction but which cannot 
be controlled for can lead to biased spatial effects. To mitigate the impact of the former, the 
model specification is as broad as possible to control for a wide range of observable factors 
that might influence donor decision.94 To address the problem of unobserved spatial 
heterogeneity, all models are estimated with dyad fixed effects. This removes all variation 
between dyads and the estimation is solely based on the with-in variation of each dyad. 
While this automatically controls for any time-invariant dyad specific effect, such as 
cultural and geographic proximity or bilateral relations (for example the United States’ 
large aid to Israel and Egypt), it also removes unobserved spatial heterogeneity and spatial 
clustering in aid levels (Plümper and Neumayer 2010). The inclusion of fixed effects also 
changes the tested hypothesis: instead of examining spatial dependence in the amount of 
aid, now spatial dependence in the changes in aid shares over time is analysed. In the 
present context, this is reasonable and more in line with Frot and Santiso (2011). Spatially 
lagged dependent variables exhibit a certain degree of endogeneity as an external shock that 
cannot be controlled for in a given dyad affects other dyads via the spatial lag and is 
reflected back to the original dyad on the same way. However, this bias should be less 
pronounced in aid shares than in aid levels. More importantly, the spatial lags are lagged by 
one year which further mitigates the problem. 
 
The process of aid allocation can be modelled as a two-step decision: In the first step, a 
donor country decides to which of all potential recipients it will allocate any positive 
amount of aid (eligibility stage, gate-keeping state). In case of a positive answer, the actual 
amount of aid is determined in a second step (level stage).95 Since many donors give some 
foreign aid to selected countries and nothing to others, the dependent variable is zero in 
many cases. Major donors thereby tend to disburse their aid more widespread, whereas 
smaller donors tend to concentrate their aid on a few beneficiaries (Isopi and Mavrotas 
2006). Thus, the dependent variable is only partly continuous and has a positive probability 
mass at the value of zero, which violates the OLS assumption that the expected value of the 
dependent variable is linear in the explanatory variables. Neumayer (2003) provides an 
overview over the three most commonly used econometric approaches to deal with this 
                                                 
94 However, there is a clear trade-off between the comprehensiveness of the model specification on the one 
hand, and the problem of data availability and multi-collinearity on the other. 
95 Vázquez (2008) proposes a three-step model, in which the first step is the decision of a government on the 
size of the ODA budget. Also this stage can be subject to spatial contagion if the amount dedicated to ODA in 
one country depends on the aid budget in other donor countries. However, as this decision is affected by a 
completely different set of determinants, it is ignored in this analysis. See e.g. Hopkins (2000) and Round and 
Odedokun (2004) for studies.  
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situation: the Tobit model, the Heckman sample selection model, and the two-part model. 
The Tobit model, on the one hand, is a one step estimator. Therefore, it assumes that the set 
of variables that determines whether a country receives any aid (eligibility stage) is the 
same as the set influencing the decision how much aid is allocated in the second stage. It is 
also constrained in the sense that it does not allow for the fact that a certain factor increases 
the probability of a country to be eligible, but decreases the actual amount of aid allocated 
(i.e. the sign of the coefficient is the same in both stages). While these assumptions are 
possibly plausible, they are quite restrictive and stipulate effects which should be tested 
rather than be taken as given. In the Heckman sample selection model, on the other hand, 
the eligibility stage is estimated as a Probit model, in which a binary dependent variable 
takes the value of one if a recipient receives any positive amount of aid in a given year and 
zero otherwise. To correct for the sample selection bias due to the endogeneity in the 
selection process, the inverse Mills-ratio obtained in the first step is then included as an 
explanatory variable in the second step (Berthélemy 2006). The most important caveat of 
this approach is that one needs to find a so called exclusion restriction for reliable results, 
that is a variable that only affects aid eligibility, but has no influence on the actual amount 
of assistance given (Neumayer 2003). Such a variable is usually hard to find since factors 
influencing the probability that a country is a recipient of aid (e.g., poverty, population or 
strategic importance) also affect how much aid is given. Against this background, the third 
alternative, namely the two-part model, is the preferred estimation technique in this 
analysis. It was first introduced by Cragg (1971) and has been widely applied in the context 
of aid allocation. It resembles the Heckman sample selection model in also estimating two 
separate equations for both stages, but is based on the assumption that the two stages are 
independent of each other, i.e. that there is no correlation in the error terms of both 
regressions.96 When analysing aid allocation, this might be a reasonable supposition, since 
the first step, i.e. the decision which countries will be partner countries, is more political 
and regularly influenced by the government (as pointed out by Tarp et al. (1998) for the 
Danish aid policy), whereas the second step, the actual allocation is determined by the aid 
                                                 
96 A test on the significance of the correlation parameter in the Heckman sample selection estimations can 
reveal whether this assumption is appropriate. However, as shown by Manning et al. (1979), the potential bias 
of the two-part model is likely to be minor in typical situations. In the context of ODA allocation, Alesina and 
Dollar (2000) and Berthélemy (2006) do not find much correlation between the residuals of the selection 
equation in the first step and of the allocation equation in the second step. They conclude that the linear 
estimation in the second step is as good as the Heckman estimation. 
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administration. Eventually, the model estimating the eligibility stage reads as follows and is 
estimated with a conditional fixed-effects Logit model:97 
  0 1 ( 1)Pr( 1) ( ' ' ' )ijt ij t ijt ijt tY F Y X W T             (13) 
         
where Yijt is a dummy taking the value of one if recipient j receives any positive amount 
from donor i in period t.98 Yij(t-1) is the one-year lag and indicates whether the same recipient 
received aid from the same donor in the prior period. The spatial lags described above are 
included in Xijt. Wijt contains the control variables. Finally, T is a t-1 set of period dummies 
to capture aggregate effects such as the total amount of aid allocated. F stands for the 
cumulative standard normal distribution. The parameters α, β, ρ, π, and δ are to be 
estimated. The estimation equation for the second stage is as follows: 
*
0 1 ( 1) ' '    ijt ij t ijt ijt ijtZ Z X W         (14) 
    
where ijtZ  is the share of recipient j at the total CPA of donor i in period t.
99 Since in the 
allocation stage the actual amount of aid given is estimated, only observations with Z*ijt = 
Zijt > 0 are included in the analysis, while dyads with no positive aid commitment in year t 
are dropped. Zij(t-1) again is the one-year lag of the dependent variable and εijt is the error 
term. In both stages, the main interest of the analysis lies in the coefficient of the spatial 
lags ρ. Estimating the dynamic model in equation (4) with a fixed effects model introduces 
a Nickell (1981) bias; however this bias diminishes as the number of periods T gets large 
and the dataset covers the period from 1974 to 2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 This deviates from other studies which use a Probit model to estimate the first stage (e.g., Dudley and 
Montmarquette (1976), Svensson (1999), Neumayer (2003)). While the results of a Logit and a Probit 
estimation are very similar in general, a conditional fixed-effects model is not available for the Probit 
estimator. However, as argued above, dyad fixed effects are necessary to remove spatial clustering in levels 
and render the interpretation as causal effects more likely. Katz (2001) shows that there is no bias in the 
conditional fixed-effects Logit model even if T is smaller than 20.  
98 Some others, such as McGillivray and Oczkowski (1992) and Vázquez (2008) define a country as an aid 
recipient only if the aid received exceeds a given threshold, e.g. one percent of  Spanish ODA in Vázquez 
(2008). However, the choice of this cut-off point is arbitrary as there is no guiding theory.  
99 Formally, this can be expressed as ( ) 100ijtijt
itj
CPA
Z
CPA
  , [0;100]ijtZ  . 
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3.5. Main Results 
The presentation of the results is organised as follows: First, the estimations for the 
eligibility stage are shown and discussed for all donors and the whole study period, 
followed by the results for the allocation stage for the same sample. Since the donor 
landscape is heterogeneous as donors can be either bilateral or multilateral and differ in size 
and in their priorities, spatial dependence in aid allocation is tested for four donor groups. 
Since the degree of spatial dependence might vary with another factor, the spatial lags are 
finally conditioned on a donor’s importance to test whether minor donors are more likely to 
be spatially dependent on other donors than large donors. 
 
 
Full sample analysis 
Table 19 displays the results of the eligibility stage, estimated by a conditional fixed-effects 
Logit model. Because this estimation is only based on variation over time, dyads with no 
change in their allocation status cannot be included in the sample. As a consequence, 659 
dyads are lost, 343 because the two members never had a donor-recipient relationship over 
the whole sample period, and 316 because the donor allocated some positive amount of aid 
to the recipient in every year the dyad would otherwise be in the sample.100 Briefly looking 
at the control variables first, it can be seen that the probability that a certain country 
receives aid from a given donor is higher if the same donor allocated ODA to this recipient 
in the last year. As expected, richer countries are less likely to get aid, while the population 
size of the recipient seems not to influence the probability of receiving aid from a given 
donor. Nations with a better performance in terms of good governance and countries that 
receive a higher share of US military grants are more likely to be rewarded with aid. The 
overall size of the aid budget of a donor increases the probability that a certain recipient 
receives aid, indicating that bigger donors tend to support a larger number of recipients. 
There is no evidence that natural disasters increase the probability of receiving aid. A 
military alliance with the donor seems to reduce the probability to be on a donor’s 
recipients list. This result is at odds with expectation, as there is no theoretical reason for 
this. First however, a dummy variable is a very crude measure for the military ties between 
two countries. Second and more importantly, given that the estimation is based on dyad 
level fixed effects, the estimation of the coefficients is based on variation over time only. 
                                                 
100 This does not necessarily mean that a donor gives a positive amount of aid to a recipient in all 36 years in 
the sample (this is true for 64 dyads). For the remaining 252 dyads, the sample period is restricted due to 
availability the dependent variable or of control variables and there is a positive amount of aid in all years that 
enter the sample.  
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Variation in the Military alliance variable occurs only if a dyad newly enters or determines 
such an alliance, which is a rare event: Out of the 1,836 dyads in the sample, only 181 
military alliances were forged and 20 terminated, while for 1,636 dyads there is no 
variation over time.101 No statistically significant positive effect can be established for 
bilateral trade. 
 
Turning to the spatial lags, it can be seen that the effects of the spatial lags are in line with 
expectation and statistically significant at the one percent level throughout if estimated 
individually. A country is more probable to get aid if other donors give aid to the same 
recipient (Model I). The same positive effect is found if the other donors are weighted 
according to their importance (Model II) and if spatial dependence is only allowed between 
bilateral donors on the one hand and multilateral donors on the other hand (Model III). As 
expected, all three coefficients become somewhat smaller if all three spatial lags are 
combined into one model (Model IV). This indicates that even after controlling for a 
general orientation on other donors, a given donor is more likely to give aid to a certain 
country if other important donors or similar donors give aid to this recipient.  
 
In Model V to VII, the spatial lags with the recipient specific weighting matrices are 
estimated individually: The coefficients of the spatial lags using the Bilateral trade link 
(Model V) is very small, but still statistically significant, while the effect sizes of the spatial 
lag using the Military alliance link (Model VI) and the spatial lag using the UN voting 
similarity link (Model VII) are considerably larger. In Model VII, all three spatial lags with 
the recipient specific weighting matrices are combined into one model. Whereas the spatial 
lag using the bilateral trade link becomes insignificant, the other two remain significant, 
even though the effect size of the spatial lag using the Military alliance link is more than 
halved. Since general spatial dependence captured by the first set of spatial lags and 
strategic interaction measured by the spatial lags with the recipient-specific weighting 
matrices are not mutually exclusive, all spatial lags are estimated together in Model IX. 
While effect sizes and significance levels of the general spatial lags are hardly affected, 
only the spatial lag using the Military alliance link stays significant in this model.102 It 
seems that even after controlling for a general herding behaviour among donors, a given 
                                                 
101 This includes multilateral donors for which the weighted average of military alliances of their members 
changes over time. One military alliance, namely between the US and Israel, was entered and cancelled 
during the study period. 
102 Contrary to the Military alliance variable, over time variation in the spatial lag using the Military alliance 
link weighting matrix comes both from changes in the aid allocation of other donors and from changes in the 
weighting matrix.  
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donor is still more likely to give aid to a country with which it has a military alliance if 
other donors also with military ties with the this country decide to allocate some aid to this 
recipient. 
 
One has to be careful, however, when interpreting these results as causal evidence for 
spatial contagion. In fact, the estimation procedure automatically controls for all time-
invariant factors that influence aid allocation and uses only information on changes in the 
donor-recipient relation, i.e. whether a donor is more likely to start (or stop) giving aid to a 
recipient if other donors start (or stop) giving aid to this recipient. Furthermore, the model 
controls for a number of important factors that might trigger a change in such an allocation 
decision, such as GDP per capita, good governance, or the overall aid budget of a donor. 
Yet, the list of recipient countries in the sample encompasses only 139 potential candidates 
and most donors, especially important ones, give aid to a large number of recipients. Given 
that each donor faces 139 yes-or-no decisions, it could be that several donors 
simultaneously but independently change the composition of their set of aid partner 
countries in the same direction.103 In such a case, the spatial lags would capture spurious 
effects rather than provide evidence for spatial contagion. These spurious effects are by far 
less likely to occur in the second stage, where each donor allocates CPA only to those 
recipients that were selected as partner countries in the first stage. Since the process is not 
of the yes-or-no decision type, but on the distribution of an aid budget among a (pre-
selected) set of recipients, this process entails a much broader range of possible decisions. 
                                                 
103 In fact, the actual number of decisions included in the sample is lower due to missing information on 
control variables or the dependent variable. 
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Table 19:  Eligibility stage (first stage) fixed-effects Logit results for all donors 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
CPA dummy (t-1) 1.354*** 1.392*** 1.395*** 1.337*** 1.483*** 1.472*** 1.382*** 1.378*** 1.335*** 
 (44.79) (46.30) (46.40) (44.10) (50.06) (49.57) (45.90) (45.72) (44.01) 
W: All donors (t-1) 3.669***   2.454***     2.418*** 
 (23.97)   (10.58)     (6.02) 
W: Global aid share (t-1)  1.698***  0.371**     0.356** 
  (20.43)  (3.08)     (2.91) 
W: Same subgroup of donors (t-1)   1.615*** 0.718***     0.720*** 
   (20.28) (7.42)     (7.42) 
W: Bilateral trade link (t-1)     0.0352***   0.00581 -0.00236 
     (4.53)   (0.77) (-0.32) 
W: Military alliance link (t-1)      1.470***  0.575** 0.432* 
      (7.56)  (2.96) (2.19) 
W: UN voting similarity link (t-1)       2.848*** 2.757*** -0.00197 
       (21.67) (20.27) (-0.01) 
GDP per capita (ln, t-1) -0.202** -0.231*** -0.182** -0.216** -0.147* -0.118 -0.188** -0.180** -0.209** 
 (-2.94) (-3.36) (-2.64) (-3.14) (-2.13) (-1.72) (-2.72) (-2.61) (-3.04) 
Population (ln, t-1) 0.17 0.18 0.141 0.176 0.159 0.13 0.268 0.292 0.192 
 (0.79) (0.82) (0.65) (0.81) (0.74) (0.60) (1.24) (1.349 (0.88) 
Disaster deaths 0.0621 0.0533 0.0368 0.0646 0.0236 0.0154 0.0456 0.0458 0.0632 
 (1.22) (1.03) (0.70) (1.25) (0.47) (0.31) (0.90) (0.91) (1.22) 
Democracy (t-1) 0.0502*** 0.0493*** 0.0601*** 0.0477*** 0.0678*** 0.0733*** 0.0566*** 0.0567*** 0.0486*** 
 (5.69) (5.59) (6.86) (5.38) (7.79) (8.46) (6.45) (6.44) (5.46) 
Bilateral trade (t-1) -0.295 -0.207 -0.273 -0.265 -0.288* -0.323* -0.319* -0.327* -0.275 
 (-1.91) (-1.41) (-1.92) (-1.72) (-2.15) (-2.41) (-2.15) (-2.21) (-1.79) 
US military grant share (t-1) 0.0149 0.0216** 0.0261** 0.0148 0.0315*** 0.0359*** 0.0185* 0.0188* 0.0155 
 (1.74) (2.59) (3.09) (1.74) (3.72) (4.25) (2.15) (2.19) (1.82) 
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Table 19:       Eligibility stage (first stage) fixed-effects Logit results for all donors (continued) 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
Diplomatic representation (t-1) 0.275*** 0.321*** 0.311*** 0.265*** 0.389*** 0.388*** 0.296*** 0.295*** 0.265*** 
 (3.92) (4.59) (4.47) (3.76) (5.67) (5.69) (4.23) (4.22) (3.76) 
UN voting similarity (t-1) 0.031 -0.104 0.101 -0.00116 0.142 0.172 0.0445 0.0604 0.0127 
 (0.24) (-0.79) (0.77) (-0.01) (1.10) (1.32) (0.34) (0.46) (0.10) 
Military alliance (t-1) -0.869*** -1.089*** -1.105*** -0.891*** -1.317*** -1.843*** -0.884*** -1.112*** -1.067*** 
 (-7.16) (-9.19) (-9.43) (-7.33) (-11.55) (-13.56) (-7.32) (-7.72) (-7.26) 
Total CPA of donor (ln) 0.952*** 0.948*** 0.950*** 0.955*** 0.933*** 0.936*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.955*** 
  (30.44) (30.42) (30.44) (30.49) (30.13) (30.19) (30.53) (30.52) (30.48) 
Observations 45,691 45,691 45,691 45,691 45,691 45,691 45,691 45,691 45,691 
Number of dyads 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 
Notes: Dependent variable: dummy taking the value of unity if a donor allocates any positive amount of aid to a recipient; Coefficients displayed; Coefficients on t-1 year dummies not 
shown; Includes dyad-level fixed effects; Z-values in parenthesis; W: denotes the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; * statistically significant at 0.05, ** 0.01, or *** 
0.001 level. 
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In these second stage estimation models, the dependent variable is recipient j’s share of the 
total CPA commitments of donor i in year t. Since the estimated model includes a time-lag 
of the dependent variable, the coefficients displayed are merely the short-run effects. The 
long-term effects need to take into account the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. 
Results are presented in Table 20. Again a brief look at the control variables first: Since the 
temporal lag of the dependent variable is statistically significant in every model, present aid 
allocation decisions are not independent of aid given to a beneficiary in the last year. The 
coefficients indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in last year’s share is associated 
with a 2.2 percentage point increase in the contemporary share. A one percent increase in 
GDP pc reduces the CPA share by 0.56 percentage points (Model I). A change in 
Democracy as well as changes in Military alliance is rewarded with a higher share of 
assistance; however, the size of the first effect is not substantial: a one point increase in the 
democracy measure (ranging from 2 to 14) leads to a mere 0.06 percentage point higher aid 
share, whereas the establishment of a military alliance increases the aid share of the 
respective recipient by more than one percentage point, which equals nearly half of the 
mean CPA share in the sample (1.92 percentage points). No significant effect is found for 
Population, Disaster deaths, Bilateral trade, Diplomatic representation and UN voting 
similarity. The effect of the US military grant share variable is negative, yet small and not 
statistically significant in all specifications. As noted by McGillivray and Oczkowski 
(1992), the lack of an effect of natural disaster fatalities on the share allocated to the 
affected country could be because aid commitments rather than aid disbursements are used 
as the dependent variable. Contrary to the latter, which represents the actual amount of 
funds transferred, aid commitments are future obligations which are less likely to be 
affected in case of an emergency. 
 
Turning to the spatial lags, there is comprehensive evidence of spatial dependence for the 
non-recipient specific weighting matrices. As can be seen from Model I, if other donors on 
average increased the share to a recipient by one percentage point in the previous year, a 
given donor raises its share by 0.28 percentage points in the short-run and by 0.35 
percentage points in the long-run.104 An increase of one-standard deviation in the spatial lag 
with which weights all other donors equally (1.19) is associated with a 0.33 percentage 
point increase in the dependent variable. This represents a 17.2 percent increase from the 
mean value of the dependent variable (1.92). If instead the impact of other donors is 
                                                 
104 The long-run effect is calculated as the coefficient of the variable of interest divided by one minus the 
coefficient of the one-year time lag of the dependent variable (Egger and Merlo 2007). 
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weighted according to their overall importance in the aid landscape (W: Global aid share, 
Model II), the effect becomes slightly smaller but remains significant at the one percent 
level. Examining spatial dependence within the groups of bilateral donors and multilateral 
donors separately, the results show a comparably low effect of 0.08 (Model III). 
Interestingly, if all three spatial lags measuring herding behaviour among donors are 
estimated together (Model IV), only the spatial lag which weights other donors according 
to their importance remains statistically significant. This indicates that donors orientate 
themselves by the aid allocation decisions of big donors rather than following the example 
of all other donors equally.  
 
For the spatial lags using recipient-specific weighting matrices, the same pattern can be 
observed: estimated individually, all three spatial lags are highly significant at least at the 
one percent level. The effect sizes vary considerably, however. For the spatial lag with the 
Bilateral trade link function, a weighted increase of one percentage point by other donors 
to a recipient is associated with a 0.04 percentage point increase from an average other 
donor to the same recipient (Model V). For the spatial lags with the Military alliance link 
und the UN voting similarity link, the respective effects are 0.14 percentage points (Model 
VI) and 0.23 percentage points (Model VII). If all three spatial lags with a recipient-
specific weighting matrix are estimated together (Model VIII), the spatial lag with the 
Bilateral trade link loses its significance, whereas the other two are hardly affected.  
 
Finally all six spatial lags are tested simultaneously in Model IX. Only the spatial lags with 
the Global aid share weighting matrix and the Military alliance link remain statistically 
significant and are hardly affected in their coefficient size. A one standard deviation 
increase in the former variable (1.8 percentage points) has an effect of 0.38 percentage 
points, while an increase by one standard deviation increase in the latter variable (0.73) is 
associated with an increase of 0.07 percentage points in the dependent variable. This 
corroborates the finding from the first stage analysis, namely that spatial dependence in aid 
allocation pattern is mostly due to an orientation towards major donors rather than due to 
strategic interaction with other donors. If anything, military considerations matter. 
Summing up, there is some evidence for positive spatial dependence between donors – and 
at least no signal for negative spatial dependence which would indicate some kind of donor 
specialisation on specific countries.  
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Table 20:  Allocation stage (second stage) fixed effects estimation results for all donors 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
CPA share(t-1) 0.223*** 0.221*** 0.227*** 0.220*** 0.227*** 0.229*** 0.223*** 0.223*** 0.220*** 
 (3.57) (3.52) (3.69) (3.49) (3.71) (3.77) (3.59) (3.59) (3.49) 
W: All donors (t-1) 0.275***   0.0966     0.0785 
 (3.68)   (1.18)     (0.40) 
W: Global aid share (t-1)  0.251***  0.209*     0.211** 
  (3.79)  (2.57)     (2.63) 
W: Same subgroup of donors (t-1)   0.0783* -0.0034     -0.00347 
   (2.24) (-0.09)     (-0.09) 
W: Bilateral trade link (t-1)     0.0448**   -0.00491 -0.022 
     (2.80)   (-0.32) (-1.38) 
W: Military alliance link (t-1)      0.138**  0.106* 0.0914* 
      (2.81)  (2.33) (2.07) 
W: UN voting similarity link (t-1)       0.233*** 0.235*** 0.0505 
       (3.74) (3.36) (0.34) 
GDP per capita (ln, t-1) -0.556** -0.481* -0.526* -0.496* -0.537* -0.538* -0.549** -0.543** -0.494* 
 (-2.62) (-2.36) (-2.50) (-2.42) (-2.55) (-2.54) (-2.59) (-2.58) (-2.41) 
Population (ln, t-1) 0.0468 -0.0373 0.0518 -0.0282 0.132 0.0867 0.0177 0.017 -0.0612 
 (0.12) (-0.09) (0.13) (-0.07) (0.32) (0.21) (0.04) (0.04) (-0.16) 
Disaster deaths -0.0233 -0.0447 -0.0489 -0.036 -0.0417 -0.051 -0.0222 -0.0227 -0.0359 
 (-0.31) (-0.59) (-0.65) (-0.48) (-0.55) (-0.67) (-0.29) (-0.30) (-0.48) 
Democracy (t-1) 0.0615*** 0.0648*** 0.0721*** 0.0617*** 0.0690*** 0.0753*** 0.0625*** 0.0625*** 0.0626*** 
 (3.35) (3.57) (3.98) (3.40) (3.67) (4.15) (3.43) (3.36) (3.39) 
Bilateral trade (t-1) -0.604 -0.635 -0.672 -0.618 -0.643 -0.672 -0.613 -0.617 -0.624 
 (-1.28) (-1.35) (-1.44) (-1.31) (-1.38) (-1.45) (-1.30) (-1.31) (-1.32) 
US military grant share (t-1) -0.0561* -0.0416 -0.0575* -0.0438 -0.0588* -0.0582* -0.0556* -0.0564* -0.0434 
 (-2.02) (-1.55) (-2.10) (-1.67) (-2.14) (-2.13) (-2.00) (-2.02) (-1.66) 
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Table 20:      Allocation stage (second stage) fixed effects estimation results for all donors (continued) 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
Diplomatic representation (t-1) 0.221 0.226 0.231 0.222 0.23 0.238 0.227 0.228 0.224 
 (1.57) (1.62) (1.65) (1.58) (1.64) (1.70) (1.61) (1.62) (1.61) 
UN voting similarity (t-1) 0.369 0.386 0.366 0.382 0.375 0.389 0.371 0.383 0.392 
 (1.42) (1.48) (1.40) (1.47) (1.43) (1.49) (1.42) (1.47) (1.50) 
Military alliance (t-1) 1.141*** 1.111*** 1.157*** 1.110*** 1.174*** 1.103*** 1.146*** 1.088*** 1.057*** 
 (6.47) (6.28) (6.50) (6.28) (6.63) (6.04) (6.49) (6.02) (5.82) 
Constant 5.431 6.112 5.316 6.053 4.11 4.886 5.858 5.817 6.552 
  (0.81) (0.92) (0.79) (0.91) (0.61) (0.72) (0.87) (0.88) (1.00) 
Observations 30,396 30,396 30,396 30,396 30,396 30,396 30,396 30,396 30,396 
Number of dyads 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 
R-squared 0.089 0.090 0.087 0.090 0.087 0.087 0.089 0.089 0.091 
Notes: Dependent variable: Recipient j’s share at donor i’s total CPA in year t; W: denotes the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; Robust standard errors clustered on 
dyads used; t-values shown in parentheses; Includes dyad-level fixed effects; Coefficients on (t-1) year dummies not displayed; * statistically significant at 0.05, ** 0.01, or *** 0.001 
level. 
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Results of a donor-group specific analysis 
So far, only average values for all donors have been analysed. Such a pooled analysis might 
veil important results if donors react differently to aid allocation decisions of other donors. 
This is particularly relevant as there are theoretical arguments both for negative and positive 
spatial dependence among donors. No clear-cut results in an aggregate estimation might be due 
to the possibility that some donors react with less aid to a recipient if other donors allocate 
more, while other donors give a higher share of their aid to this recipient. Such varying 
dependencies could neutralise if all donors are estimated together and only net-effects remain 
visible. Not only can bilateral and multilateral donors be distinguished, but donors also differ 
with respect to their aid allocation agenda. Apart from the traditional big Western donors, 
especially the group of like-minded countries deserves closer attention as these countries enjoy 
the reputation of being less focussed on donor interest and of giving aid more strongly 
according to recipient needs. In the following, the extent of spatial dependence is scrutinised 
for donor groups. In order to allow all coefficients to differ for each donor group, the 
estimation is run for each subsample separately rather than interacting the spatial lags with 
donor group specific dummies.  
 
Table 21 shows the effects of different spatial lags for bilateral donors. Due to space 
restrictions, the complete estimation results are not shown. The set of control variables is  as in 
the estimations shown in Table 20. The overall pattern of this subsample is the same as for the 
whole sample – estimated individually, with the exception of the spatial lag with the same 
subgroup weighting matrix, all other spatial lags are statistically significant at least at the five 
percent level. If all three spatial lags are estimated simultaneously (Model IV), only the spatial 
lag in which ODA of other donors is weighted according to their relative importance remains 
significant. This spatial lag is still significant if all six spatial lags are estimated together in 
Model IX. The only other variable with a significant effect is the spatial lag with the Military 
alliance link. The effect size, however, is only one fourth of the spatial lag with the Global aid 
share weighting matrix. Turning to the results for multilateral organisations (Table 22), it can 
be seen that aid allocation decisions of these donors are time-dependent, but there is no 
evidence that multilateral donors are influenced by the aid allocation decisions of neither other 
multilaterals nor bilateral donors. Since estimations are based on fewer observations the 
detection of a statistical significant effect is less likely. The striking result is that the spatial 
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lags fail to reach conventional significance levels even if estimated individually. This indicates 
that multilateral organisations are fully independent in their aid allocation decisions.   
 
Table 21:  Allocation stage (second stage) fixed effects estimation results for bilateral 
donors 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
CPA share(t-1) 0.226** 0.224** 0.229** 0.223** 0.230*** 0.232*** 0.226** 0.226** 0.223** 
 (3.19) (3.16) (3.28) (3.14) (3.32) (3.37) (3.21) (3.21) (3.13) 
W: All donors (t-1) 0.267**   0.0949     0.0386 
 (3.23)   (1.06)     (0.17) 
W: Global aid share  
(t-1) 
 0.251***  0.218*     0.223* 
  (3.46)  (2.41)     (2.50) 
W: Same subgroup of 
donors (t-1) 
  0.0835 -0.0174     -0.0174 
   (1.84) (-0.36)     (-0.35) 
W: Bilateral trade link 
(t-1) 
    0.0436*   -0.00645 -0.0227 
     (2.47)   (-0.37) (-1.26) 
W: Military alliance 
link (t-1) 
     0.0993***  0.0676* 0.0550* 
      (3.96)  (2.51) (2.07) 
W: UN voting 
similarity link (t-1) 
      0.230** 0.237** 0.0862 
       (3.29) (2.98) (0.48) 
Observations 25,831 25,831 25,831 25,831 25,831 25,831 25,831 25,831 25,831 
Number of dyads 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 
R-squared 0.087 0.089 0.085 0.089 0.085 0.085 0.087 0.087 0.089 
Notes: To save space, results for control variables (as in Table 20) are not shown; Dependent variable: Recipient 
j’s share at donor i’s total CPA in year t; W: denotes the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads used; t-values shown in parentheses; Includes dyad-level fixed effects; 
Coefficients on (t-1) year dummies not displayed; * statistically significant at 0.05, ** 0.01, or *** 0.001 level. 
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Table 22:  Allocation stage (second stage) fixed effects estimation results for multilateral 
donors 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
CPA share(t-1) 0.191*** 0.188*** 0.198*** 0.188*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.193*** 0.191*** 0.187*** 
 (3.74) (3.73) (3.80) (3.80) (3.74) (3.74) (3.75) (3.71) (3.78) 
W: All donors (t-1) 0.316   0.176     0.353 
 (1.86)   (1.26)     (1.35) 
W: Global aid share (t-1)  0.232  0.146     0.118 
  (1.73)  (1.25)     (1.06) 
W: Same subgroup of 
donors (t-1) 
  0.0516 0.0162     0.0139 
   (1.31) (0.34)     (0.29) 
W: Bilateral trade link  
(t-1) 
    0.0506   0.00522 -0.0165 
     (1.51)   (0.20) (-0.54) 
W: Military alliance link  
(t-1) 
     0.294  0.262 0.252 
      (1.83)  (1.61) (1.55) 
W: UN voting similarity 
link (t-1) 
      0.235 0.205 -0.126 
       (1.80) (1.57) (-0.79) 
Observations 4,565 4,565 4,565 4,565 4,565 4,565 4,565 4,565 4,565 
Number of dyads 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 
R-squared 0.142 0.142 0.138 0.143 0.139 0.14 0.141 0.143 0.145 
Notes: To save space, results for control variables (as in Table 20) are not shown; Dependent variable: Recipient 
j’s share at donor i’s total CPA in year t; W: denotes the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads used; t-values shown in parentheses; Includes dyad-level fixed effects; 
Coefficients on (t-1) year dummies not displayed; * statistically significant at 0.05, ** 0.01, or *** 0.001 level. 
 
The group of bilateral donors can be further split up into big Western donors, such as France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, and into the group of like-minded 
countries, which encompasses the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Canada, 
whereas other bilateral donors are smaller European donors, Australia and New Zealand as 
well as the Republic of Korea. The results for all three groups are shown in Tables 23 to 25. 
The spatial lags with the global spatial lags are individually statistically significant for the first 
two subgroups, but the effects are generally larger for the group of like-minded countries. If 
these three spatial lags are combined into one Model (IV), some differences are revealed. 
While for the big Western donors the spatial lag with the importance-weighted ODA of other 
donors remains significant, for like-minded donors, the spatial lag with the Same subgroup 
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weighting matrix survives. Since the big Western donors are also the most important players in 
the global aid landscape, the spatial lag with the Global aid share weighting matrix is quite 
similar to the weighting matrix with the Same subgroup weighting matrix for these donors. 
Interestingly, like-minded donors seem not to follow the example of the big Western donors 
but rather react to changes in aid allocation by other like-minded donors. Regarding the 
recipient specific-weighting matrices, another difference becomes apparent: while the spatial 
lag with the Military alliance link is significant for the group of big Western donors, it has no 
effect for like-minded donors (Model VI). If all six spatial lags are incorporated into one 
Model (IX), the spatial lags with the Global aid share weighting matrix and with the Military 
alliance link weighting matrix remain significant in the Big Western donors sample, whereas 
for like-minded countries, this is true for the spatial lag that weights all other donors equally 
and for the spatial lag with the Same subgroup weighting matrix. Finally, for the group of other 
bilateral donors, there is no evidence for herding behaviour as all three spatial lags with global 
weighting matrices are insignificant. Only the spatial lag with the Military alliance link 
weighting matrix is significant if estimated individually (Model VI) or together with the other 
two spatial lags with a recipient-specific weighting matrix (Model VIII). The effect however 
does not remain significant in the most comprehensive model IX. This shows that donors of 
this group pay little attention to aid allocation decisions of other donors, but there is some 
evidence that they possibly use aid strategically to secure their influence in recipients with 
whom they have a military alliance.  
 
Taken together, the results provide considerable evidence for herding behaviour in aid 
allocation, but little evidence for strategic interaction among donors when giving aid. The 
general pattern is that donors follow the example of other large donors when allocating their 
aid to different recipient countries. However, this result is driven by big Western donors as 
there is no spatial dependence for multilateral organisations and like-minded donors’ allocation 
decision seem to be only geared to ODA commitments of other donors of the same group. If 
anything, strategic interaction among donors takes place with regard to military strategic 
targets: a donor allocates a larger share of its aid to a recipient with which it has a signed a 
military alliance if another donor with such an alliance gives more aid to this recipient.  
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Table 23:  Allocation stage (second stage) fixed effects estimation results for big Western 
donors 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
CPA share(t-1) 0.125* 0.128* 0.134* 0.124* 0.137* 0.140* 0.127* 0.127* 0.124* 
 (2.06) (2.11) (2.25) (2.04) (2.27) (2.33) (2.08) (2.08) (2.02) 
W: All donors (t-1) 0.332***   0.23     0.13 
 (3.37)   (1.82)     (0.33) 
W: Global aid share (t-1)  0.240**  0.193*     0.194* 
  (3.16)  (1.97)     (1.98) 
W: Same subgroup of 
donors (t-1) 
  0.101* -0.0689     -0.0632 
   (2.47) (-1.31)     (-1.21) 
W: Bilateral trade link 
 (t-1) 
    0.0490*   -0.0117 -0.0241 
     (2.11)   (-0.49) (-0.83) 
W: Military alliance link 
(t-1) 
     0.113***  0.0809** 0.0736** 
      (4.42)  (2.76) (2.56) 
W: UN voting similarity 
link (t-1) 
      0.289*** 0.300** 0.124 
       (3.65) (3.30) (0.51) 
Observations 10,256 10,256 10,256 10,256 10,256 10,256 10,256 10,256 10,256 
Number of dyads 576 576 576 576 576 576 576 576 576 
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.055 0.061 0.055 0.054 0.059 0.06 0.062 
Notes: To save space, results for control variables (as in Table 20) are not shown; Dependent variable: Recipient 
j’s share at donor i’s total CPA in year t; W: denotes the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads used; t-values shown in parentheses; Includes dyad-level fixed effects; 
Coefficients on (t-1) year dummies not displayed; * statistically significant at 0.05, ** 0.01, or *** 0.001 level. 
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Table 24:  Allocation stage (second stage) fixed effects estimation results for like-minded 
donors 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
CPA share(t-1) 0.119*** 0.124*** 0.105*** 0.0996*** 0.135*** 0.140*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.0992***
 (4.51) (4.49) (4.34) (4.11) (4.94) (5.00) (4.57) (4.55) (4.11) 
W: All donors (t-1) 0.418***   0.157     0.437* 
 (5.50)   (1.82)     (2.33) 
W: Global aid share (t-1)  0.252***  0.0662     0.0638 
  (4.47)  (1.04)     (1.00) 
W: Same subgroup of 
donors (t-1) 
  0.273*** 0.221***     0.216*** 
   (5.49) (3.86)     (3.68) 
W: Bilateral trade link 
 (t-1) 
    0.0629**   -0.0213 -0.014 
     (2.76)   (-0.91) (-0.57) 
W: Military alliance link 
(t-1) 
     0.00695  -0.0966 -0.0234 
      (0.13)  (-1.31) (-0.35) 
W: UN voting similarity 
link (t-1) 
      0.330*** 0.365*** -0.226 
        (5.09) (4.61) (-1.59) 
Observations 7,836 7,836 7,836 7,836 7,836 7,836 7,836 7,836 7,836 
Number of dyads 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 
R-squared 0.079 0.074 0.088 0.091 0.068 0.065 0.076 0.076 0.091 
Notes: To save space, results for control variables (as in Table 20) are not shown; Dependent variable: Recipient 
j’s share at donor i’s total CPA in year t; W: denotes the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads used; t-values shown in parentheses; Includes dyad-level fixed effects; 
Coefficients on (t-1) year dummies not displayed; * statistically significant at 0.05, ** 0.01, or *** 0.001 level. 
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Table 25: Allocation stage (second stage) fixed effects estimation results for other 
bilateral donors 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
CPA share (t-1) 0.266** 0.262* 0.267** 0.263* 0.266** 0.267** 0.265** 0.265** 0.262** 
 (2.64) (2.56) (2.68) (2.58) (2.66) (2.68) (2.64) (2.64) (2.58) 
W: All donors (t-1) 0.121   -0.297     -0.52 
 (0.61)   (-0.82)     (-0.92) 
W: Global aid share (t-1)  0.318  0.44     0.439 
  (1.85)  (1.84)     (1.86) 
W: Same subgroup of 
donors (t-1) 
  -0.0342 0.0197     0.0204 
   (-0.28) (0.13)     (0.12) 
W: Bilateral trade link 
 (t-1) 
    0.0321   0.0139 0.0048 
     (0.90)   (0.30) (0.10) 
W: Military alliance link 
(t-1) 
     0.697***  0.587* 0.377 
      (3.43)  (2.15) (1.29) 
W: UN voting similarity 
link (t-1) 
      0.119 0.087 0.196 
        (0.63) (0.36) (0.38) 
Observations 7,739 7,739 7,739 7,739 7,739 7,739 7,739 7,739 7,739 
Number of dyads 819 819 819 819 819 819 819 819 819 
R-squared 0.153 0.155 0.153 0.156 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.156 
Notes: To save space, results for control variables (as in Table 20) are not shown; Dependent variable: Recipient 
j’s share at donor i’s total CPA in year t; W: denotes the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads used; t-values shown in parentheses; Includes dyad-level fixed effects; 
Coefficients on (t-1) year dummies not displayed; * statistically significant at 0.05, ** 0.01, or *** 0.001 level. 
 
 
Conditional effects of spatial dependence 
The donor-group specific analysis provided a first indication that the degree of spatial 
dependence is not the same for all donors; however, it does not show whether the effect varies 
systematically across individual donors. One argument for positive spatial dependence is the 
reduction of uncertainty necessarily involved in aid projects. Since larger donors implement a 
higher number of aid projects and can employ a larger administrative workforce to assess the 
potential effectiveness of projects, they could face a lower risk of not reaching the aspired 
project goals than smaller donors. The same is true if these donors are able to influence the 
recipient’s behaviour due to their financial clout more strongly. Therefore, donors with a 
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smaller absolute aid budget might follow the example of larger donors but to a lesser extent 
vice versa. The positive and significant spatial lag Global aid share in the previous subsections 
already points into that direction, but it does not show whether spatial dependence 
systematically differs with a donor’s importance. As a measure of importance, the share of 
donor i at the total global CPA budget in year t is taken. This measure is time-variant to reflect 
the changing importance of a donor over time. As can be seen form Figure 23, the relative 
importance of a donor fluctuates considerably over time. Germany’s share peaked in 1979 with 
22 percent of the total global aid commitment in that year, but decreased to 8 percent in 1983 
and remained at that level since then. The relative importance of the United States reached its 
height in 1985 with nearly 39 percent followed by a descent to 12.8 percent in 1988 and a new 
increase to almost 30 percent in 2004. 
 
Figure 23: Share of a donor’s aid at the total global aid budget 
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All spatial lags are interacted with this measure for the importance of a donor. As outlined 
above, at least for the three spatial lags measuring herding behaviour, a negative coefficient for 
the interaction effect is anticipated. For the remaining three spatial lags with the recipient-
specific weighting matrices, which capture strategic interaction among donors, the effect is not 
clear. If one is willed to assume that larger donors use their aid more strongly to pursue their 
strategic goals, a positive interaction effect would be expected. The results of the conditional 
spatial lags are presented in Table 26. The basic effect of the variable Aid share donor is 
negative and significant in seven out of nine estimation models, indicating that on average 
larger donors give a lower share of their aid to a single recipient. This is in line with the 
expectation that smaller donors tend to focus their assistance on a smaller subset of countries, 
thereby giving a higher average share to each recipient. As in previous estimations, the non-
interacted effects are positive and statistically significant at least at the five percent level and 
the inclusion of the interaction effects inflates the coefficients of the non-interacted spatial lags 
slightly. Looking at the three spatial lags that measure herding behaviour (Model I to III), it 
can be seen that all interaction effects are negative as expected, but only statistically 
significantly for the spatial lag using the Global aid share and the Same subgroup weighting 
matrix. This provides evidence that smaller donors gear their aid allocation decisions to larger 
donors, but not the other way round: the larger a donor, the less strongly it is influenced by 
others. Turning to the spatial lag measuring strategic interaction (Model IV to VI), the same 
pattern can be observed. Again, smaller donors are more spatially dependent on others than 
large donors. While this is at odds with the possible theoretical argument provided above, one 
has to bear in mind that the interaction variable measures a donor’s importance in the global 
aid landscape rather than the importance of aid for a given donor. This would be measured by 
aid as a share of GDP and will be analysed further below. If all spatial lags and their interaction 
effects are estimated simultaneously, only the spatial lag with the Global aid share weighting 
matrix and its interaction effect remain significant. 
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Table 26:  Conditional spatial lag effects (interacted with aid share donor, allocation stage 
fixed effects estimation results for all donors) 
 Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
CPA share(t-1) 0.223*** 0.220*** 0.226*** 0.219*** 0.227*** 0.229*** 0.223*** 0.223*** 0.219*** 
 (3.57) (3.51) (3.68) (3.47) (3.71) (3.77) (3.59) (3.59) (3.47) 
W: All donors (t-1) 0.325***   -0.0347     -0.131 
 (3.71)   (-0.29)     (-0.47) 
W: All donors (t-1) x Aid 
share donor 
-0.00903   0.0213*     0.0326 
 (-1.73)   (2.28)     (1.80) 
W: Global aid share (t-1)  0.344***  0.346**     0.349** 
  (4.01)  (2.81)     (2.86) 
W: Global aid share (t-1) x 
Aid share donor 
 -0.0169**  -0.0253*     -0.0256* 
  (-2.97)  (-2.37)     (-2.39) 
W: Same subgroup of 
donors (t-1) 
  0.125** 0.038     0.0386 
   (2.77) (0.72)     (0.73) 
W: Same subgroup of 
donors (t-1) x Aid share 
donor 
  -0.00806** -0.00421     -0.00421 
   (-2.79) (-0.99)     (-0.98) 
W: Bilateral trade link (t-1)     0.0622**   0.00654 -0.0139 
     (2.85)   (0.28) (-0.63) 
W: Bilateral trade link (t-1) 
x Aid share donor 
    -0.00318*   -0.00216 -0.000831
     (-2.07)   (-1.32) (-0.58) 
W: Military alliance link  
(t-1) 
     0.165*  0.117 0.0719 
      (2.09)  (1.48) (0.91) 
W: Military alliance link (t-
1) x Aid share donor 
     -0.00198  -0.00032 0.00219 
      (-0.80)  (-0.12) (0.80) 
W: UN voting similarity 
link (t-1) 
      0.277*** 0.264** 0.112 
       (3.60) (2.99) (0.51) 
W: UN voting similarity 
link (t-1) x Aid share donor 
      -0.00774 -0.00506 -0.00983 
       (-1.61) (-0.95) (-0.72) 
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Table 26:      Conditional fixed effects (continued) 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
Aid share donor -0.0189* -0.0079 -0.0188* -0.014 -0.0215** -0.0278*** -0.0200* -0.0182* -0.0131 
  (-2.12) (-0.82) (-2.41) (-1.58) (-2.81) (-3.88) (-2.29) (-2.09) (-1.48) 
Observations 30,396 30,396 30,396 30,396 30,396 30,396 30,396 30,396 30,396 
Number of dyads 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 
R-squared 0.089 0.092 0.088 0.093 0.088 0.087 0.089 0.090 0.093 
Notes: To save space, results for control variables (as in Table 20) are not shown; Dependent variable: Recipient 
j’s share at donor i’s total CPA in year t; W: denotes the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; 
Robust standard errors clustered on dyads used; t-values shown in parentheses; Includes dyad-level fixed effects; 
Coefficients on (t-1) year dummies not displayed; * statistically significant at 0.05, ** 0.01, or *** 0.001 level. 
 
 
Discussion of results and contrasting them with previous studies 
As mentioned above, all previous empirical studies which examined spatial dependence did so 
using a unitary weighting matrix. This is the first analysis that not only used more elaborated 
global weighting matrices, but also introduced recipient-specific weighting matrices to test for 
strategic interaction among donor countries and multilateral organisations. As a consequence, 
only the results of the spatial lag using the All donors weighting matrix can be contrasted with 
the findings of previous studies. As shown in the literature overview in Table 17, most studies 
find at least some evidence for spatial dependence. While in the analysis for British aid 
allocation by  McGillivray and Oczkowski (1992) spatial dependence was found only in the 
allocation stage but not the eligibility stage, in the present analysis the spatial lag with the All 
donors weighting matrix is positive and highly significant in both stages if only British aid 
commitments are regarded. However, this difference could be easily explained by the longer 
time series used in our sample and the larger set of recipient countries.105 Tarp et al. (1998) 
find that Danish aid spatially depends on other donors in both stages. This result is confirmed 
in the new dataset used here. Vázquez (2008) examines the determinants of Spanish aid 
allocation decisions and concludes that the selection of recipient countries is affected by 
decisions of other countries, but that the aid allocation is independent. Again, both results can 
                                                 
105 In fact, if the sample is restricted to 1980 to 1987, the effect in the first stage becomes insignificant while the 
effect in the second stage remains significant. 
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be reproduced. The last donor-specific study is by Maurini and Settimo (2009) for Italy who 
find positive spatial dependence in both stages. While the positive effect in the first stage can 
be detected in the first stage, the spatially lagged dependent variable is not significant in the 
second stage. However, the analysis of Maurini and Settimo uses a Tobit model whereas the 
empirical approach applied here is a fixed-effects OLS. If both stages are estimated 
simultaneously by a random-effects Tobit model, the spatial lag using the All donors weighting 
matrix becomes positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. Yet, as argued 
above, including dyad level fixed effects is crucial when analysing spatial dependence. 
 
Turning to the studies that also use a larger dataset with various donors and recipients, 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) also find positive spatial dependence in their full model, but 
negative spatial dependence during the 1980s. The latter result cannot be replicated, as the 
spatial lag is positive and significant even with a Tobit model. Also, using a Tobit model, no 
negative spatial dependence is found neither for the group of Belgium, Ireland and Italy 
together nor for any donor individually. This might be explained by differences in the 
definition of both the dependent variable and the measure of spatial dependence. While 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) analyse the determinants of aid per capita, here the share of aid 
to a recipient at the total aid budget of a donor is used. Furthermore, Berthélemy and Tichit 
include aggregate ODA per capita by other donors to capture other donors’ behaviour. Hence, 
they implicitly use a non row-standardised weighting matrix, whereas here the average aid 
share of other donors is used. Finally, Berthélemy and Tichit use all ODA commitments, but 
for this analysis, these amounts are adjusted by commitments related to emergency and food 
aid as well as to debt relief. Berthélemy (2006) finds a negative spatial dependence for aid 
from other bilateral donors in a two-part model with fixed effects. Since his sample only covers 
bilateral donors, this is conceptionally equivalent to the spatial lag with the Same subgroup 
weighting matrix for a sample of bilateral donors only, which is presented in Model III of 
Table 21 above. This spatial lag, however, is not negative, but positive yet insignificant. The 
same is true if the analysis is restricted to the group of donors for which Berthélemy finds 
negative spatial dependence (Australia, France, Italy, Japan, UK and USA). Potential reasons 
are the same as for the previous study by Berthélemy and Tichit (2004). Finally, Claessens et 
al. (2009) find evidence for positive spatial dependence in their dynamic panel analysis 
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estimated via GMM, which is in line with the findings provided above. Taken together, the 
results obtained in this study generally confirm previous studies, but also provide a 
considerable extension. 
 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to analyse how aid allocation by one donor is influenced by the aid 
distribution of other donors. There are several reasons why this might be the case: Positive 
spatial dependence can occur if a donor uses foreign aid allocation decisions by other donors as 
a guiding line for its own decision to reduce uncertainty necessarily involved in aid projects.  
Another explanation for positive spatial dependence can be provided by strategic interaction 
among donors, since ODA is at least partly given for strategic reasons. If competing donors use 
their aid to secure national interests, every donor should respond to the behaviour of its peers 
by adapting its own aid allocation to the allocation decisions of other donors. Negative spatial 
dependence, i.e. if one donor reduces the relative importance of a given recipient after other 
donors allocated a larger share of their aid budget to this recipient, can indicate a certain degree 
of donor specialisation over time.    
 
The decision process is modelled as a two-step procedure, in which a donor in the first step 
compiles the recipient list, i.e. the set of countries that will receive some positive amount of 
aid. In a second step, the aid budget is distributed to these countries. Spatial dependence is 
analysed in both stages. In the first stage, there is comprehensive evidence that the probability 
that a donor gives some positive amount to a certain recipient is higher if this recipient also 
receives aid from other donors. This result holds true after controlling for various aspects of 
recipient need. A positive and significant effect can be established both for the spatial lags 
using weighting matrices which measure herding behaviour as well as for the spatial lags using 
recipient-specific weighting matrices. The latter set of weighting matrices models strategic 
interaction between donors with respect to economic, military-strategic and political 
considerations. 
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The estimation results for the second stage suggest that the aid allocation of other donors 
matters in fact: if other donors increase (decrease) the relative aid budget for a recipient, a 
given donor is also likely to allocate relatively more (less) to the same recipient. A 
disaggregated analysis for donor groups shows that there is no evidence that multilateral 
organisations spatially depend on other donors. While the big Western donors seem to gear 
their aid allocation decisions to aid allocation of other important donors, like-minded donors 
are mainly influenced by other like-minded donors. Generally, the degree of spatial 
dependence decreases with the own importance, i.e. small donors are more responsive to past 
changes in aid allocation of others than large donors. Negative spatial dependence would 
indicate that aid flows by one donor are a substitute rather than a complement to foreign aid by 
other donors. No evidence, however, is found for such negative spatial dependence in any 
model or specification. While this clearly shows that there is no donor specialisation, one has 
to be careful to interpret this as evidence for a lack of donor coordination, since it does not 
provide insights in how aid flows by various donors to one recipient are dovetailed on a 
project-level. 
 
Yet, while comprehensive evidence for spatial dependence is found, it points into the direction 
of simple herding behaviour rather than strategic interaction among donors. At least for 
economic and political interest, the results suggest that a donor does not allocate more aid to an 
important trade partner (or to a country with a similar voting pattern in the UN general 
assembly), if another donor, that also has close trade-ties with (or a similar voting behaviour 
as) the same recipient, increases its aid share to this recipient. If anything, only for a military 
alliance between a donor and a recipient tentative evidence for such behaviour can be detected. 
However, the effect size for the spatial lag is less than half of the size for the herding measure. 
Summarising the evidence, it is clear that a donors aid giving is in fact influenced by others 
donors. Yet, donors do not pay the same attention to the actions of any other donor. The results 
clearly demonstrate that a donor’s behaviour is geared to the behaviour of important players in 
the aid game: Donors seem in fact to be sheep – following the bellwethers. 
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Appendix 
Table 27:  Donor classification 
Weighting matrix: Same subgroup 
France (1974-2008) 
Big Western donors 
Germany (1974-2008) 
Italy (1974-1977, 1980-2008) 
Japan (1974-2008) 
United Kingdom (1974-2008) 
United States (1974-2008) 
Canada (1974-2008) 
Like-minded countries 
Denmark (1974-2008) 
Netherlands (1974-2008) 
Norway (1974-2008) 
Sweden (1974-2008) 
Australia (1974-2008) 
Other bilateral donors 
Austria (1974, 1976-2008) 
Belgium (1974-2008) 
Finland (1974-2008) 
Greece (2002-2008) 
Ireland (2000-2008) 
Republic of Korea (1991-2008) 
Luxembourg (2001-2008) 
New Zealand (2002-2008) 
Portugal (1983-1985, 1987-2008) 
Spain (1988-2008) 
Switzerland (1974-2008) 
EC (European Community, 1974-2008) 
Multilateral donors ASDB (Asian Development Bank, 1974-2008) 
United Nations (1978-1986, 1988-2008) 
Notes: Years in brackets indicate data availability. 
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Table 28:  List of recipients 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, 
Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
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4. Spatial Dependence in Asylum Migration 
 189 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Even though the number of asylum applications in industrialised countries has declined 
steadily since the early 1990s and reached with slightly over 300,000 in 2009 only roughly one 
third of their former peak values, there is a strong political rhetoric against asylum seekers. 
Polls in industrialised nations show that there are strong resentments against immigrants, and 
albeit voters are better disposed towards genuine refugees, a strong majority supports stronger 
measures to exclude illegal migrants (ISSP 1995, 2003). This fuels an ever more restrictive 
asylum policy in many popular destination countries, which is at least rhetorically aimed at 
bogus refugees, to reduce the number of applicants and to even the highly unequal distribution 
of the asylum burden across host nations. Asylum migration is widely regarded as a zero sum 
phenomenon with a fixed number of migrants – if one country deters refugees by curtailing 
welfare benefits, a tighter visa regime or lower acceptance rates, higher application numbers in 
other host nations are the consequence.106 This negative externality has led to political tensions 
in the past, e.g. the stressed relations between Denmark and Sweden after the introduction of 
highly restrictive asylum measures by the new conservative government in Denmark as well as 
the controversy about the Sangatte refugee camp which strained the French-British relations 
(Thielemann 2006a). More recent examples encompass the controversies about the 
responsibility for refugees within the European Union after the mass landings in Spain and 
Italy as an outcome of the political turmoil in Northern Africa and the Middle East or the 
political huff after the re-introduction of border controls by Denmark.  
 
The standard determinants of asylum migration are well understood after several country case 
studies and empirical analyses in large scale monadic and dyadic datasets. Many factors such 
as historical, geographic, economic or partly reputational factors lie beyond the scope of policy 
makers and leaves asylum policy as one of the main lever.107 Against the background that 
many political measures in host countries are taken to detering asylum seekers rather than 
                                                 
106 Even though asylum seekers constitute only for a small subset of all migrants, both terms are used 
interchangeably. If not stated otherwise, “migrant” therefore refers to “asylum seeker”. By the same token, the 
terms “country of origin” and “source country” as well as “host country”, “target country” and “destination 
country” are synonymous in this text. 
107 However, national asylum policy is constrained by international agreements such as the Geneva Convention on 
the Status of Refugees.  
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reducing the causes of asylum migration at the root,108 policy makers are apparently more 
interested in lowering the number of applications filed with domestic authorities rather than 
reducing the number of asylum seekers globally. These deterrence measures together with the 
same global level of asylum seekers should lead to negative spatial dependence between host 
countries which are regarded as substitutes from a migrant’s point of view. However, 
theoretical arguments not only suggest spatial dependence between the targets of asylum 
migration, but also between different source countries. One the one hand, positive spatial 
dependence between geographically and culturally close source countries could be explained 
by cross-country network effects which lower the risk and costs of migration. On the other 
hand, also the organisation of human trafficking can cause positive spatial dependence if 
asylum seekers from the same region use common people smuggling networks and if minor 
source countries gain access to these transnational migration routes. 
 
Apart from some anecdotal evidence in qualitative research, this potential spatial dependence 
in the number of asylum seekers has been fully neglected in the existing literature so far.  This 
work tries to fill this gap and basically seeks to answer two questions: (1) Is the number of 
asylum seekers from one source country to one destination country influenced by the number 
of asylum seekers from other source countries to the same destination (specific source 
contagion)? And (2), does the number of asylum seekers in one target country depend on the 
number of asylum seekers in other target countries (target contagion)? Hence, the contribution 
of this paper is twofold: First, it is the first to model the potential spatial dependence both 
between source countries as well as between target nations. This allows not only checking the 
robustness of standard determinants of asylum migration which have been established in 
previous studies to allowing spatial dependence. If such spatial dependence is found, it also has 
several important policy implications. Second, it is a dyadic study which is based on a larger 
sample of both source and target countries in the cross-section and that covers a longer time 
period than any previous work. While the broad country basis minimises the risk of a potential 
sample selection bias, the long time series covers both the strong increase in the numbers of 
asylum applications as well as the steady decline since 2001.  
                                                 
108 This is probably at least partly due to the public good characteristics of refugee protection and the opportunity 
to free-ride (see Section 4). 
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides definitions as well as 
descriptive analyses of trends and distribution of asylum applications. In Section 3, the costs 
and benefits of asylum migration both for the origin as well as for the host countries are briefly 
discussed, followed by a brief overview over the main asylum policy levers. Furthermore, the 
theoretical arguments causing target and specific source contagion are presented. Section 4 
reviews the relevant literature, while the dataset in general and the definition of the spatial lags 
in particular are introduced in Section 5. The main results and some robustness checks are 
presented in Section 6. Finally, the last section concludes. 
 
 
4.2. Definition and descriptive analysis of asylum seekers 
Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as a 
person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country.’’109 The signatories, which encompass all developed and numerous 
developing countries, obligate themselves to consider any credible application, no matter 
whether the applicant entered the country illegally or not (Article 31). Refugees enjoy the right 
of non-refoulement, i.e. the right not to be deported to their country of origin where she or he 
might be at risk of prosecution (Article 33). The refugee definition of the convention does not 
directly cover other threats to one’s life and wellbeing, such as famine, natural catastrophes, 
war, and general political violence (Neumayer 2005a). Industrialised countries have always 
been reluctant to expand the formal definition, mainly because this would entail the duty to 
provide asylum to migrants affected by these causes (Roberts 1998). An asylum seeker is a 
person who has filed an application for asylum, but who has not yet received a final decision 
on his or her application (UNHCR 2011). Asylum seekers can be distinguished from internally 
displaced persons, who involuntarily have to leave their homes and places of habitual residence 
due to wars, violence or human- or natural-made disasters without crossing an international 
                                                 
109 The 1951 Convention was limited to the protection of European refugees after World War II and covered only 
events occurring before 1951, but geographical and time limits were removed in a 1967 Protocol. 
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border (UNHCR 2011). As discussed in Section 3 below, there is a plethora of reasons why a 
person leaves his or her home country to seek their fortune abroad. Not for all forced migrants 
is one of the treats stated in Article 1 the main reason to leave. Instead, a certain proportion of 
asylum seekers try to enter the destination country under the guise of personal prosecution, 
even if the main objective is the sole hope for better living conditions. These bogus refugees 
are in fact voluntary migrants and the respective administrations in the host countries are 
anxious to refuse granting asylum to any migrant not in genuine need of protection. 
 
Figure 24 displays the annual number of asylum seekers in industrialised OECD countries 
since 1980. 110 All numbers refer to first instance applications filed in a given year, rather than 
to the stock of pending cases. In these countries, the number of applications increased steadily 
since 1983 and reached the all time high in 1992 with more than 800,000 applications. This 
surge is mostly due to a large number of refugees as a result of the war in former Yugoslavia, 
with most of them seeking asylum in Germany and Sweden. The numbers in industrialised 
countries since then have declined steadily and reached the 1988 level of around 300,000 
applications in the latest years.  
 
                                                 
110 The following countries are taken as industrialised OECD members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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Figure 24: Total number of asylum applications in industrialised OECD countries 1980-2009 
(in Thousands) 
 
Notes: Only industrialised countries are taken as OECD members; See Table 35 in the Appendix for a list of target 
countries in the estimation sample; Data source: UNHCR (2011). 
 
The annual number of applications in OECD countries is broken down by region of origin in 
Figure 25. Over the whole period, the largest proportion of asylum seekers in industrialised 
OECD countries originated from countries in Eastern and Central Asia with the countries of 
former Yugoslavia and Turkey leading the list of major source countries. With the exception of 
East Asia and the Pacific, the other regions do not differ considerably in terms of their 
importance as regions of origin over time. The declining number of asylum seekers classified 
as stateless or with various nationalities is due to better data availability. Some major 
destinations, such as the United States, do not report the numbers of asylum seekers split up by 
country of origin for earlier years. The predominance of origin countries in Eastern and Central 
Asia can at least partly be explained by their geographical proximity to Western Europe, which 
encompasses 18 out of 23 destination countries in the sample. 
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Figure 25: Total number of applications in OECD countries by region of origin (in 
Thousands) 
 
Notes: Only industrialised countries are taken as OECD members; Data source: UNHCR (2011). 
 
Yet, the relative importance of source regions differs greatly across destination countries as can 
be seen from Figures 26 to 30, which illustrate the share of asylum seekers from the top three 
source regions at the total number of asylum applications in different target countries. Nearly 
half of all applications in Australia are made by migrants that come from countries in the East 
Asia and Pacific region, followed by around 20 percent of applications filed by people coming 
from South Asian countries (Figure 26).   
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Figure 26: Asylum applications in Australia by region of origin  
 
 
For France, most applications derive from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, even though 
Eastern and Central Asia gained relative importance since the end of the cold war (Figure 27). 
The share of source countries in East Asia and the Pacific, which accounted for 50 percent of 
all applications in the early 1980s, has decreased considerably to only less than five percent in 
recent years. The main countries of origin from the Asia Pacific region are Cambodia, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic and Vietnam, all of which share former colonial ties with 
France. Not surprisingly, most asylum seekers from Sub-Saharan Africa come from 
francophone countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali and Algeria. 
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Figure 27: Asylum applications in France by region of origin 
 
 
For Germany, countries in Eastern and Central Asia have always been the most important 
sources of asylum seekers (Figure 28), even though Middle Eastern and Northern African 
source countries and particularly Iraq gained relative importance in recent years. Over the 
whole period, Serbia followed by Turkey, Romania, and Poland top the list of most important 
sender countries. In the United Kingdom, the proportion of asylum seekers from Sub-Saharan 
Africa varies between ten and 40 percent of all applications (Figure 29). In the region, most 
migrants originate from the former colonies Somalia and Zimbabwe. The second important 
region in recent years is South Asia with Sri Lanka and Pakistan being the most important 
sender countries. Both are members of the Commonwealth of Nation. The large share of 
applicants from the Middle East and Northern Africa in the early 1980s is because of a 
considerable influx of asylum seekers from Iran, who made up around 60 percent of all 
applications between 1980 and 1982. 
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Figure 28: Asylum applications in Germany by region of origin 
 
 
Figure 29: Asylum applications in the United Kingdom by region of origin 
 
 
For the United States, country of origin specific data of asylum applications is only available 
since 1990. Over the last two decades, there is a clear dominance of migrants from Latin 
America and the Caribbean, even if their share decreased in the mid 1990s due to a higher 
number of applications from East Asia and the Pacific Islands as well as from Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Figure 30). In the regions, the most important countries of origin are El Salvador and 
Guatemala, China and the Philippines, and Ethiopia and Somalia. 
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Figure 30: Asylum applications in the United States by region of origin 
 
 
These country examples provide two important insights: First and foremost, apparently certain 
characteristics of the source region – host nation relationship have a great influence on the 
number of asylum seekers from a region in a destination country. One of these factors is 
geographical distance which directly influences travel costs. But also other determinants such 
as a common colonial history, cultural similarity or a common language seem to matter. 
Second, even though there are some shifts in the relative importance of the source regions, the 
overall picture is relatively constant over time. On the one hand, this further corroborates the 
importance of time invariant factors such as distance and common language. On the other 
hand, this could also be explained by network effects which make asylum migration into a 
certain country more likely if there is large stock of asylum seekers or migrants from the 
source region. As discussed in Section 3, the presence of fellow countrymen in the host country 
reduces the risk of migrating for an individual. The positive impact of such migrant-networks 
is well documented in the literature (Section 4), but so far it is assumed that these network 
effects are specific for one country of origin. The constant relative importance of source 
regions, however, points into the direction that these effects could also operate across borders, 
i.e. that not only a large number of migrants from a specific country of origin facilitates asylum 
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seeking in the target country, but also that the presence of asylum seekers from neighbouring 
source countries increases the attractiveness of a host country.111 
 
But destination countries differ not only with respect to the main source region of asylum 
migrants, but also considerably with respect to the total number of applications they receive. 
Any reasonable comparison across destination countries has to take the large differences in size 
of various target countries into account. Ceteris paribus, a larger country will attract more 
asylum seekers than a smaller country. In Table 29, the population of the destination country is 
used to control for the size of the receiving country and the number of applications is expressed 
as applications per 1000 inhabitants of the host country. Population is by no means the only 
normalisation factor to make the number of applications comparable across countries, but 
others such as GDP yield a very similar ranking order. The table reveals considerable 
differences between countries as well as over time. The last column shows the average number 
of asylum applications per 1000 people over the whole period. On the top of the list are 
Switzerland, Sweden, Luxembourg and Austria, which are all in Western Europe and thereby 
geographically close to the major source regions of Eastern and Central Asia. Even though they 
differ considerably in population and territory size, they all share a high level of GDP per 
capita. Generally, lower levels of applications can be observed for island states as these are less 
accessible. At the bottom of the list are also countries with lower levels of GDP per capita, 
such as the Czech Republic, Poland or Hungary, but also Italy, Spain and Portugal appear to be 
relatively unattractive for asylum seekers. 
 
                                                 
111 In Section 4, it will be argued that the existence of human trafficking networks might also explain the presence 
of such spatial dependence in the number of asylum seekers from geographically close source countries. 
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Table 29:  Annual averages of applications per 1000 people in different destination 
countries 
Destination 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 average  1980-2009
Australia n/a 0.08 0.56 0.48 0.40 0.20 0.34 
Austria 1.67 1.70 1.96 1.34 3.58 1.84 2.01 
Belgium 0.29 0.65 1.73 1.84 2.30 1.29 1.35 
Canada 0.23 1.09 1.05 0.85 1.12 0.85 0.87 
Czech Republic n/a n/a 0.16 0.33 1.02 0.24 0.44 
Denmark 0.22 1.65 2.96 1.37 1.39 0.45 1.34 
Finland 0.00 0.01 0.45 0.27 0.59 0.65 0.33 
France 0.39 0.64 0.65 0.39 0.86 0.61 0.59 
Germany 0.64 1.17 3.32 1.62 0.79 0.29 1.30 
Greece 0.13 0.48 0.25 0.22 0.49 1.47 0.51 
Hungary n/a 0.00 0.14 0.41 0.55 0.30 0.28 
Iceland n/a 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.24 0.18 0.11 
Ireland n/a n/a 0.04 0.96 2.33 0.89 1.05 
Italy 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.16 
Japan < 0.00 < 0.00 < 0.00 < 0.00 < 0.00 0.01 < 0.00 
Luxembourg n/a n/a n/a 2.56 2.44 1.12 2.04 
Netherlands 0.12 0.63 1.99 2.23 1.47 0.76 1.20 
New Zealand n/a 0.05 0.19 0.37 0.28 0.07 0.19 
Norway 0.04 1.11 1.40 1.08 2.95 2.06 1.44 
Poland n/a n/a 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.21 0.11 
Portugal 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 
Spain 0.04 0.08 0.27 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.14 
Sweden 1.26 2.31 4.55 1.10 2.85 2.77 2.47 
Switzerland 0.93 2.14 3.99 4.12 2.73 1.68 2.60 
United Kingdom 0.06 0.10 0.52 0.76 1.14 0.48 0.51 
United States 0.15 0.18 0.40 0.28 0.16 0.12 0.22 
Total number of 
applications (m) 0.77 1.48 3.29 2.31 2.38 1.56  
Notes: n/a indicates that data is not available; Total number of applications in the last row shows the aggregate 
number of all applications in the 26 destination countries over each five year period. 
 
Over time, the number of applications generally varies in most countries in line with the total 
number of applications which are shown in the last row. However, there are also some notable 
deviations: For instance, while the total number peaks in 1990-1994, Finland saw a constant 
increase in applications over the whole period, whereas the number decreased in Sweden and 
Denmark after the high in 1990-1994. Austria faced a considerably higher number of 
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applications in 2000-2004 than in any other period. Also other countries such as Greece and 
Norway received more applications during the last 10 years than in the previous two decades 
despite a strong decline in the overall numbers of applications. One possible driver of such 
variations over time could be war or political unrest in the major source country. Another 
explanation could be that a stricter asylum policy and lower recognition rates in one destination 
country deters asylum seekers and motivates them to lodge their application in a more lenient 
country.   
 
 
4.3. Costs and benefits of asylum migration for the migrant and the host country, 
trends in asylum policy and sources of spatial dependence 
This section discusses the factors which influence a migrant’s decision whether to flee or not 
and in which country to file the application if the migrant decides to leave the home country. 
This is done by addressing the costs and benefits of asylum migration from a migrant’s point of 
view. One important factor is the probability that the application in a host country will be 
successful and asylum be granted. This likelihood depends on the asylum policy in the target 
country which is in turn influenced by the perceived costs and benefits of asylum seekers from 
the host country’s point of view. Asylum migration can be explained by the fact that the 
benefits of migration outweigh the costs for some people. An ever more restrictive asylum 
policy, which can be observed in many industrialised countries and which is outlined in the 
third subsection indicates, however, that voters and policymakers in many host countries 
perceive that the costs of a larger inflow of asylum seekers exceed the benefits of hosting them. 
Based on these considerations, the identification and discussion of the sources of different 
kinds of spatial dependence is provided in the fourth subsection. The theoretical part forms the 
basis for the model specification in the econometric analysis.  
 
 
Costs and benefits for the migrant 
Following previous studies (e.g., Moore and Shellman 2003, Neumayer 2004, 2005a), the 
decision of an asylum seeker to migrate and to lodge his application in a given destination 
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country is modelled as the outcome of a utility maximising behaviour.112 An individual weighs 
the costs and benefits of staying in his or her home country against the costs and benefits of 
leaving and filing an application for asylum in the destination country. This decision is subject 
to given constraints such as limited financial resources for travelling. The net benefit of staying 
(leaving) is simply the difference between the costs of staying (leaving) and its benefits. A 
rational person decides to migrate if the net benefit of leaving exceeds the net benefit of 
staying, i.e. if migration maximises his or her utility.113 By the same token, target countries 
differ with respect to migration costs and potential benefits and therefore the decision where to 
seek asylum can be directly incorporated into the model of utility maximising behaviour. One 
has to be bear in mind that most asylum seekers make their decision under great pressure and 
might not be able to fully balance the costs and benefits of their migration decisions 
(Neumayer 2005a). However, finally such a decision is made if a person is not literally forced 
out of a country against his or her will, which is probably true only for a minority of all cases. 
Even though voluntary and forced migration is based on different main motivations, they share 
some important similarities. Therefore, some of the costs and benefits addressed below are 
derived from the literature on voluntary migration. 
 
Sketching the benefits of migration first, economic considerations play a crucial role in 
explaining migration in general. As argued in neoclassical economic theory, a difference in the 
rate of return to human capital and hence in the wage rate between the country of origin and the 
destination country fosters migration. By leaving his country and seeking his fortune abroad, 
the migrant is able to improve his economic situation. A person is more likely to migrate the 
poorer the economic prospects in his home country are and the higher the chances to find an 
adequately paid job in the host country. Low levels of development, little economic growth and 
                                                 
112 Even though the decision of an individual whether to migrate or not is not subject of this analysis, factors 
which increase or decrease the probability of an individual to leave his or her home country and ask for asylum in 
a host nation directly affect the total number of asylum applications from a source in a target country. 
113 As noted by Neumayer (2005), benefits of leaving represent the opportunity costs of staying and vice versa 
which makes the distinction between costs and benefits obsolete. For illustrative purposes, both the costs and 
benefits of staying and migrating are outlined separately. The concept is also fully compatible with the push-pull-
factor theory employed by some authors (e.g., Thielemann 2006), where negative influences in the home country 
(push factors) and positive aspects of the destination country (pull factors) foster migration. Since both costs and 
benefits might be subject to a great deal of uncertainty or materialise only in the future, all values should be taken 
as expected and discounted present values.   
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high rates of unemployment in the source country and high levels of GDP per capita and 
employment as well as a dynamic economy in the potential target country provide the 
opportunity to improve the livelihood of a migrant.114 Also, younger people in working age and 
better educated individuals are more likely to migrate since they are probably more capable of 
improving their living standard (Borjas 1994) and because for them the net present value of 
migration is higher (Hatton and Williamson 2005). The chance to escape threats to personal 
integrity is the second main benefit of migration. Threats stemming from political oppression 
in the home country are particularly relevant for asylum migration that can find its expression 
in restrictions on the freedom to assemble, to associate, to compete for a political office or to 
voice dissident political opinions (Neumayer 2005a). While these discriminatory activities 
impact all individuals, there are some restrictions which are directly targeted towards members 
of a specific ethnic or religious group or towards political dissidents. Also armed conflicts, 
either civil or interstate wars, pose a risk to the life and wellbeing of individuals. Finally, 
natural catastrophes such as earthquakes, floods, and famines as a consequence of droughts 
threaten a person’s safety. Migration to a safe, politically stable, democratic or less exposed 
country might be seen as the only way to evade these threats.  
 
Turning to the costs of migration, direct costs of transportation generally increase with the 
geographical distance between the source and the destination country, but they are also 
influenced by the availability of air or boat connections or the quality of road and railway 
infrastructure as well as the route taken, the transport mode and the services supplied by 
agents.115 The costs of travel tickets are not the only cost factor for forced migrants as these 
often have to rely on people smugglers, because they can only file an asylum application from 
within the host country and destination countries are keen to impede access for potential 
asylum seekers by imposing visa restrictions (Neumayer 2006). Reliable information on travel 
costs is generally scarce and estimates scatter widely. Petros (2005) provides estimates for the 
                                                 
114 Vogler and Rotte (2000) argue that the relative rather than the absolute income situation matters, i.e. a poor 
among poor has less incentives to migrate if he will end up as a poor among rich, even if the absolute income level 
would be higher. 
115 Agents basically provide three types of services to asylum seekers (Robinson and Segrott 2000): (1) Provision 
of travel documents, (2) facilitation of the journey, and (3) channeling the asylum seekers towards particular 
destination countries. The last point also involves advice about which destination country to chose. 
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mean costs for a journey from Asia to Europe of around 9,400 USD, from Africa to Europe of 
6,500 USD and from the Americas to Europe of 4,500 USD. A report by the UNODC (2011) 
estimates the costs for Asians taking the West Africa route to Europe at around 12,000 USD. 
The existence of people smuggling networks often enables asylum migration in the first place, 
or the costs of smuggling go down as the scope and efficiency of the network increases (Hatton 
2004). At least as important – though much harder to quantify – are however the social costs of 
migration, since one has to leave the familiar environment and relatives behind and adapt to an 
unknown surrounding. This might not only entail a new language, but also a different culture. 
In addition, immigrants might not be welcomed by the existing population. The size of these 
social costs depends on various factors. For example, cultural similarity and a common 
language between the country of origin and the destination country facilitate transition and 
lower thereby the costs of migrating. One factor that has been stressed in many scholarly 
papers (e.g., Rotte et al.1997, Neumayer 2004, 2005a, Thielemann 2004, 2006, Hatton 2009) is 
the existence of “migrant networks” (Massey 1990). As network theory suggests, a higher 
number of past migrants with a similar cultural background reduces information, assimilation 
and transaction costs for potential subsequent migrants and makes migration more likely (Rotte 
et al. 1997). These personal networks might help to gain a foothold in the host country by 
assisting the search for accommodation and employment. Individuals who migrated earlier 
could also be a role-model for potential migrants and their experience with selecting traffickers 
and obtaining visas might help to reduce the uncertainty necessarily involved in illegal 
migration (Neumayer 2005a). However, not only personal networks matter; other contacts 
between the source and the destination countries might also foster migration. Such contacts 
could be established through trade, tourism or bilateral development assistance (Bilsborrow 
and Zlotnik 1994). Social costs could additionally occur if asylum seekers are not welcomed in 
the host country due to xenophobia. This is particularly relevant if these resentments against 
foreigners express themselves in violent acts or public demonstrations (Neumayer 2004). 
Finally, also asylum policy and welfare provisions in the host countries influence the costs of 
migration (Robinson and Segrott 2002). While generous social benefits and work permits for 
asylum seekers lower the costs, restricted access to employment and to benefit entitlements and 
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dispersal to reception centres increase both the costs and the risk of seeking asylum.116 Low 
recognition rates for asylum seekers in the past indicate a tough stance in the host country and 
are associated with a higher risk of rejection which in turn increases the costs of migration.117 
 
 
Costs and benefits for the host country 
Hosting asylum seekers provides some benefits to the host country. First, countries have used 
asylum policy as a way to promote their own interest. During the cold war, particularly 
Western European countries welcomed refugees from communist regimes, and granting 
asylum to them served to “embarrass and discredit adversary nations” (Teitelbaum 1984: 430). 
As long as the numbers of people seeking asylum was small, the institution of asylum was little 
disputed and enjoyed the public’s sympathy (Neumayer 2005a).118 Second, humanitarian 
motives provide an incentive to help others who are in need of protection from threats to their 
personal integrity. Public opinion is generally favourable to accepting at least genuine refugees 
who have a well founded fear of prosecution. Granting asylum is therefore satisfying altruistic 
motives and provides a benefit to individuals of the host country (Hatton 2004). Finally, since 
asylum seekers are often in working age and tend to have larger families, they form an 
additional reservoir of workforce (Aldridge and Waddington 2001) and might help to mitigate 
the problem of an over-aging population that emerges in many industrialised countries.119 
However, since the number of asylum seekers is typically low in relation to the population of 
the host country (Table 29), these effects are presumably small.  
 
                                                 
116 There is a feedback-loop between xenophobia and tight asylum policy if right-wing populist parties which 
pledge an anti-immigration and anti-asylum policy in their campaigns gain a higher voting share (Neumayer 
2005). 
117 Regarding the relative importance of these factors, qualitative research suggests that the choice of a destination 
country is mainly determined by the presence of friends and relative, whereas policies are of secondary 
importance (Havinga and Böcker 1999, Robinson and Segrott 2002). 
118 As noted by Hansen and King (2000), the liberal stance changed when the numbers of arriving people soared, 
refugees increasingly originated from third world countries with a different cultural background than the host 
countries and when they entered host nations with the help of people smugglers and false documentation.  
119 For a small sample of refugees recognized in the UK in the 1990s, Carrey-Wood (1995) find that one-third held 
degrees or had postgraduate or professions qualifications and the majority of those had been in professional, 
managerial or business occupations. 
 206 
 
Turning to the costs for the receiving countries, first and foremost, there are the fiscal costs of 
hosting asylum seekers. A study by Thielemann et al. (2010) commissioned by the European 
Parliament contrasts the asylum related fiscal costs borne by the 25 EU member states in 2007. 
Their analysis covers a wide range of different costs factors, such as expenses related to the 
administration and examination of asylum claims, temporary housing, legal assistance to 
applicants and the removal of bogus applicants. While the EU-wide overall direct spending 
accounted for 4.16bn EUR in 2007, individual member states generally spent not more than 
one fourteenth of their international aid target of 0.7 percent of gross national income on 
asylum related activities (Thielemann et al. 2010: 17). However, the costs differ greatly across 
member states and depend not only on the total number of applicants, but also on the national 
characteristics of the asylum system, such as processing times and the level of benefits 
provided. Further costs, which are not necessarily asylum seeker specific, are caused by efforts 
to integrate and help assimilate accepted asylum seekers and other immigrants. Yet, asylum 
migrants can remain a burden for the social systems even after they have been accepted and 
granted work permits since their education and skills might not allow them full job market 
participation. This might be because the qualifications are not recognised, documentation is 
inadequate or a lacking command of the host country language (Hatton 2004) and has been 
documented in several country-studies. For example, Krahn et al. (2000) show for a sample of 
refugees accepted in Canada that the probability of un- or underemployment is higher for this 
group than for nationals. Also, even if many of these immigrants are well educated and worked 
in managerial positions prior to their flight, it is difficult to re-enter the job market in an 
adequate position. For the Netherlands, Hartog and Zorlu (2009) find that refugees have lower 
levels of education than other immigrants and even after five years, only one third was in 
employment. In Denmark, a gap in the employment rate of prime age male refugees and other 
immigrants is observed and even the difference diminishes over time, a wage penalty remains 
(Husted et al. 2000). Also in the UK, employment rates of refugees are considerably lower than 
of other members of ethnic minorities with similar education (Bloch 2002). However, not only 
monetary costs occur as a consequence of a large influx of asylum seeking migrants since 
xenophobia might foster anti-immigrant public opinion and support to populist right-wing 
political parties as citizens may worry that immigrants threaten their national, ethnic and 
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cultural identities (Leblang 2010).120 These resentments could result in tensions and threaten 
internal peace.121 
 
 
Policy measures to limit number of asylum applications 
Since the costs of hosting asylum seekers generally exceed its benefits at least in the point of 
view of voters and policymakers in destination countries, over the last three decades several 
adoptions to asylum policy were made, mostly with the aim of reducing the number of asylum 
applications.122 Besides unilateral policy changes, there are some multilateral approaches 
within the European Union to harmonise asylum policy regulation across Europe. A 
comprehensive review of these policies, however, is beyond the scope of this work. Instead, 
only the key developments and policy levers will be sketched. A more detailed discussion of 
asylum policies in industrialised countries is among many others provided by Hailbronner 
(2000), Schuster (2000), Zetter et al. (2003), Thielemann (2004), Gibney and Hansen (2005), 
and Hatton (2004, 2009). 
 
Hatton (2004, 2009) categorises unilateral asylum policy levers into three main types:123 (1) 
conditions relating to the access to the territory, (2) conditions relating to the processing of 
applications and the determination of status, and (3) conditions relating to the welfare of 
asylum seekers. Since the mid 1980s and particularly since the mass influx of asylum seekers 
into Western Europe in the early 1990s, asylum policy in most industrialised countries became 
more and more restrictive with the main aim of limiting the number of applications.124 The first 
                                                 
120 A cross-sectional study by Facchini and Mayda (2008) which covers up to 34 advanced economies shows that 
countries in which voters are critical towards immigration implement more restrictive immigration policies and 
hence experience less inward migration.  
121 In the US conflicts are predominantly between newcomers and other minorities, whereas they occur between 
newcomers and the majority population in Europe (Martin et al. 2005). 
122 As argued by Thielemann (2006a), the effectiveness of deterrence policies depends on the assumption that 
asylum seekers are well informed about the asylum regimes and the differences across destination countries as 
well as that asylum policy is a major determinant of their choice where to file an asylum application (in particular 
that refugees are attracted by countries with higher acceptance rates and more welfare provisions for asylum 
seekers).  
123 Gibney and Hansen (2005) further distinguish policy measures that deter arrivals and measures to limit the stay 
of asylum seekers. 
124 The question, whether asylum policies are subject to spatial contagion is an interesting one for itself. If the 
main objective of asylum policy is to deter asylum seekers to other host countries, governments have an incentive 
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group encompasses for example visa requirements, the possibility to apply for asylum from 
abroad, the strictness of border controls and the designation of airports as international zones. 
Also, penalties for agents who smuggle illegal migrants into the country and for carriers by 
land, sea and air of undocumented arrivals fall into this category. While tighter visa 
requirements affect not only refugees but all migrants, they are frequently used as a method to 
impede the inward migration of asylum seekers as they are often introduced for nationals of 
countries deemed to produce large numbers of asylum seekers (Gibney and Hansen 2005). For 
instance, the Austrian authorities raised the visa requirements for Poles in 1981, the French for 
Algerians in 1986, and Canada for Hungarians in 2001. Particularly after the implementation of 
the Schengen Agreement, which eliminated border controls between its signatory states in the 
European Union, visa restrictions were progressively tightened up (Hatton 2009). Carrier 
sanctions also have been introduced by a large number of potential host countries, such as 
Greece in 1992, Austria in 1997, and Ireland in 2003. By the same token, compliance with 
policies against human traffickers increased in many regions of the world over time (Cho et al. 
2011). In order to avoid the obligations to provide asylum seekers with the protections 
available to persons who are officially on state territory, some states (e.g., Switzerland, France, 
Germany, and Spain) declared parts of their airports international zones (Gibney and Hansen 
2005). The second group of policy measures includes the definition of a refugee, the speed of 
processing the application and the possibility to appeal against a decision. Another example of 
policy measures which influence the determination of status is the designation of countries as 
“safe third countries” or “safe countries of origin” (Neumayer 2004). This safe country concept 
was integral part of the Dublin Convention, which became effective in 1997 and was signed by 
many Western European countries. However, it already was widely applied before and asylum 
                                                                                                                                                    
to ever tighten policy measures in order to compensate their disadvantage of being a relatively more lenient 
destination which could lead to a higher number of asylum seekers. This strategic interaction between host 
governments could then lead to a race-to-the-bottom (Thielemann 2006). Due to its focus on a dyadic framework, 
this question is beyond the scope of this paper. The empirical confirmation of such a strategic interaction has yet 
to be tackled; however, two empirical studies analyse such spatial policy contagion in the broad field of 
international migration: Cho et al. (2011) look at spatial contagion in policies against human trafficking, while 
Brücker and Schröder (2010) analyse how immigration policy of a country is affected by policy choices of other 
countries. The former find that policies against human trafficking diffuse across neighbouring countries and main 
trading partners as well as among countries which share political and cultural similarities. The latter find that skill 
based immigration policies spatially depend on the immigration policies of neighbouring countries and of 
countries which might be regarded as a substitute form a migrant’s point of view, as defined as geographically 
close and countries with a common culture or language. 
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was denied for migrants who originated from or travelled through such a safe country. Finally, 
the welfare conditions of asylum seekers are determined by the extent to which they are 
allowed to work in the host country, whether the benefits are granted in cash or kind, whether 
they are free to choose their place of living or whether they are allocated to detention camps. In 
addition, the possibility of family reunification after a successful application and the chances of 
being deported after an unsuccessful application impact the welfare of asylum migrants. 
Limitations on employment are a frequently used tool to protect the domestic labour market 
and to discourage economic migrants trying to exploit the asylum system. For instance, France 
withdrew the permission to work for asylum seekers in 1991, Germany followed suit in 1997 
and the United Kingdom in 2002. While some countries, for example Germany and Belgium, 
provide benefits to asylum seekers in-kind rather than cash payments, others such as the United 
States, France, and Italy entitle asylum seekers to less welfare benefits than permanent 
residents or entitlement is subject to stricter conditions (Gibney and Hansen 2005). Also 
housing asylum applicants in detention centres is a measure to make a host country relatively 
less attractive. Often, these centres are located far away from major cities in outback areas. In 
Germany, asylum seekers are allocated to such detention centres and they are only allowed to 
move freely within the county (Landkreis) of their accommodation. The UK introduced a 
nation-wide dispersal system for asylum seekers in 2000 to work against the concentration of 
asylum seekers in certain metropolitan areas (Thielemann 2004). 
 
These unilateral policy measures are sometimes accompanied by bilateral treaties. Of particular 
importance are readmission agreements in which two countries agree to mutually readmit –
without any formality – their nationals who reside in the other contracting state without 
authorisation. This also covers asylum seekers whose application has been rejected on 
whatever grounds. Not surprisingly, these treaties are regularly concluded between important 
source countries and major destination countries. For example, the Netherlands signed 
repatriation treaties with Sri Lanka, Somalia, Ethiopia and Angola in 1997, Spain implemented 
such a program with Bulgaria in the same year and Sweden entered treaties with Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria, Poland, but also with Denmark and Germany, in 1998. While deportation of rejected 
asylum seekers is a rare phenomenon due to moral, practical and financial constraints, the 
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existence of a bilateral treaty of this kind should discourage asylum seekers with low chances 
of recognition to migrate and seek asylum.   
 
Multilateral approaches in asylum policy are concentrated in the European Union and emanate 
from the perception that asylum seekers are a burden for host countries which needs to be 
shared equally among members.125 Three concepts of burden-sharing can be distinguished: 
First, physical redistribution of asylum migrants. In 1992, Germany proposed a physical 
reallocation of asylum seekers to EU members according to a formula that gives equal weight 
to population, territory size and GDP. However, since this initiative found no support, 
movement of asylum seekers is based on double-voluntarism of both the applicant the 
receiving country (Thielemann 2004). The second approach is based on financial compensation 
and fiscal redistribution to member states which experience a disproportionately large number 
of asylum applications. The European Refugee Fund (ERF) was established in September 2000 
and supports projects for reception, integration and repatriation of refugees and displaced 
persons, but its impact is little due to limited financial endowment (Vink and Meijerink 
2003).126 The third pillar of burden-sharing is policy harmonisation. Since the 1980s, EU 
members have worked towards a convergence of national laws on forced migration. The 
Dublin Convention, signed in 1990 by twelve original signatories, establishes rules for the 
country which is responsible for dealing with the application of an asylum seeker, which is 
usually the state of first entry.127 This regulation tries to avoid asylum-shopping, where an 
asylum seeker lodges applications in several countries in order to exploit differences in the 
                                                 
125 Closely related to the concept of burden-sharing is the question whether the relative number of asylum seekers 
in EU member states has converged over time, i.e. whether the inequality in application numbers across countries 
decreased over time. The empirical evidence for Western Europe is ambiguous: Vink and Meijerink (2003) find a 
convergence over time, but this general trend is interrupted by peaks in disparities in certain years with large 
inflows. Thielemann (2004) finds the same spikes in crisis-driven disparities, but no overall trend; whereas 
Neumayer (2004) concludes that there is no sign of convergence over the period 1982-1999, but a weak tendency 
of decreasing inequality during the 1990s. This suggests that the results are somewhat sensitive to the method and 
sample. 
126 For the period 2008-2013, the fund has financial resources of 614 million Euro compared to an EU-wide direct 
spending for asylum related activities of more than 4bn Euro in 2007 alone (Thielemann et al. 2010: 17).   
127 This responsibility of the country of first entry means that asylum seekers who travel overland are not longer 
able to file the application in the destination country of their choice, but that the country through which they 
entered the European Union is in charge of their case (Thielemann 2004). At the same time, the burden is shifted 
from destination countries in the core of the EU to countries sharing a border with a non-member country, mainly 
to countries in Eastern and Central Europe (Noll 2000). 
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nation states’ welfare provisions. At a ministerial meeting in London in 1992, a consensus on 
three other issues was reached (Hatton 2005): The safe country of origin and safe third country 
concept discussed above as well as the concept of manifestly unfounded asylum applications, 
for which an expedited refugee status determination without the right to appeal was agreed. 
Other important steps were the 1995 Resolution on Minimum Guarantees for Asylum 
Procedures, the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty which established a common European Asylum 
System, the 2002 Agreement at the JHA Council in Brussels regarding a common definition 
for persons eligible for refugee and subsidiary protection, and the directive on common 
reception procedures in 2003 (Thielemann 2004). 
 
Critics of these efforts to converge and harmonise asylum policy argue that the main result is 
not shifting the burden between the member states but onto third countries and the home 
countries of asylum seekers (Roberts 1998). Rather than the alignment of principles, the 
outcome is that standards have been lowered in a concerted manner (Holzer and Schneider 
2002). While these political initiatives at least ostensibly try to equalise the burden between 
member states, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), founded in 2005, 
is a multilateral institution with one of the main objective being to secure the European 
Union’s external borders. This frequently involves protecting the fortress Western Europe 
against refugees, by tighter border controls, joint patrols and push-backs on sea. Especially the 
operations of FRONTEX in the Mediterranean Sea have been heavily criticized as blocking 
persons in need from seeking asylum, driving them onto even more dangerous routes and 
forcing them to resort to the services of dubious people smugglers (UNHCR 2010). 
 
Summing up, on the one hand the net benefit and the risk an individual faces by asylum 
migration is influenced by a multitude of factors. The large number of people who leave their 
home country and lodge an asylum application in a remote country indicates however that 
there is a perceived positive net benefit for many. On the other hand, an ever tighter asylum 
regime in Western countries and efforts to curtail the number of asylum applications suggests 
that these main destination countries weight the costs of hosting asylum seekers larger than the 
benefits. Both on the source and the target side there are theoretical reasons why one would 
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expect spatial dependence, i.e. why the number of asylum seekers from a given source country 
is not independent from the number of asylum applications from other countries, just as the 
number of applications in a target country is not independent of applications in other target 
countries. 
 
 
Sources of spatial dependence 
Asylum migration is a classical example of a dyadic phenomenon, which involves two 
countries. More specifically, a country-pair is an example for a directed dyad where the flow 
originates in the home country of the migrant i and is directed to the destination country j. 
Neumayer and Plümper (2010) provide a categorisation of all possible forms of spatial 
dependence in such dyadic data. Spatial dependence in undirected dyads notwithstanding, five 
different forms of spatial dependence can be distinguished: Under directed dyad contagion, the 
number of asylum migrants in dyadij depends on the level of asylum migration between other 
dyads km. This would simply measure whether there is a global trend in the number of asylum 
seekers. Aggregate source contagion exists, if the number of asylum seekers in dyadij depends 
on the aggregate number of applicants from other sources k (≠ i) to all other targets m, not just 
to target j. Similarly, the number of asylum seekers in dyadij depends on the aggregate number 
of applicants in other targets m from other sources k, not just the specific source i, under 
aggregate target contagion. The two remaining forms are specific source contagion and specific 
target contagion. Specific source contagion means that the number of asylum seekers from 
source i to target j depends on the weighted number of asylum seekers from other sources k to 
the very same destination country j, whereas specific target contagion exists if the number of 
applicants from source i to target j depends on the weighted sum of asylum seekers from the 
same source country i to other targets m. In the following, the theoretical reasons why one 
would expect the existence of specific source contagion as well as specific target contagion are 
discussed. For example, under specific source contagion, the number of asylum seekers from 
Ghana in the United Kingdom would depend on the number of asylum seekers from Nigeria in 
the UK. Under specific target contagion, the number of Ghanaian asylum seekers in the UK 
depends on the number of applications from Ghana in France. 
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Basically, there are two main theoretical arguments for the existence of positive specific source 
contagion, namely cross-border network effects and the design of international people 
smuggling networks. Migration networks, i.e. personal relationships with other migrants with a 
similar cultural background, ease transition and acclimatisation in the host country. Services 
provided by a personal network encompass lower search costs for accommodation and work, a 
sense of belonging and the chance to uphold the cultural habits within the diaspora community. 
The importance of these networks as a determinant of the size of bilateral asylum flows is well 
documented in the empirical literature (e.g., Rotte et al. 1997, Vogler and Rotte 2000, 
Neumayer 2004, Hatton 2004, 2009, Leblang 2010). However, all existing scholars assume 
that these network effects only exist for migrants from the very same country of origin as the 
asylum seeker himself, even though Beine et al. (2011: 10) note that “restricting the diaspora to 
people with the same nationality might be restrictive”. This is not necessarily the case if the 
presence of migrants with a similar cultural background facilitates asylum migration and this 
similarity is not limited to fellow countrymen as ethnic networks do not necessarily correspond 
to national borders (Beine et al. 2011). For instance, if there is not only a Ghanaian community 
but a West African community in the UK which supports individual asylum seekers from the 
region, more migrants from Togo and Cote d’Ivoire in the UK should reduce the risk and costs 
of migrating from Ghana and therefore foster asylum seeking by Ghanaians in the UK.128 One 
would expect however that these network effects decay relatively quickly with distance and are 
most pronounced among countries who share a common border. Network effects could also be 
based on a same language between immigrants, e.g. a francophone community. If it is only a 
common language with other immigrates which facilitates integration in the host country, the 
network effect should not decrease over distance between the source countries, i.e. migrants 
from Haiti in the UK provide the same benefit for asylum seekers from Senegal as do migrants 
from Guinea.129  
 
                                                 
128 Also, a negative effect is thinkable if there is a rivalry between compatriots of neighbouring countries. In this 
case, the presence of migrants from one country in a host country would deter asylum seekers from another 
country. This is reflected in a negative sign of the spatial lag. 
129 Of course, the effect of cultural similarity and common language cannot be disentangled. Hence, the benefit of 
other migrants from Guinea might be larger than the benefit provided by migrants from Haiti. 
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The use of services provided by agents is a wide-spread phenomenon among illegal migrants: 
According to van Moppes (2006), 97 percent of 5,836 irregular migrants of all origins in the 
Netherlands received assistance from professional people smugglers. The International Centre 
for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) estimates that Europe-wide around half of all 
illegal migrants rely on human traffickers (van Moppes 2006). The range of their services does 
not only encompass the provision of forged travel documents, such as passports and visas, but 
also transportation services. During the 1980s, the easiest way for a relatively small group of 
migrants in Europe was to obtain a visa, arrive by plane, make a false claim for political 
asylum and go underground if the application was rejected (UNODC 2011). However, this 
route was closed in the 1990s after the introduction of stricter visa regimes. As a consequence 
and due to an ever growing number of illegal migrants, overland people smuggle routes 
developed.  There are well-established main transport routes from Central and Northern Africa 
as well as the Middle East to Europe. These itineraries are increasingly being used by migrants 
from South Asia, too (UNODC 2011). There are also routes in place to enter the EU from the 
north trough Russia and the Balkan, from the east trough the new member states and from the 
south via Albania (International Organization for Migration 2000). While these people 
smuggling networks often enable illegal migration in the first place, increasing scope and 
efficiency lower the costs of migration (Hatton 2004). If such a route is established between a 
major sender country of illegal migrants and a host country due to high demand, it is cheaper 
for surrounding and transit countries to get connected to the network rather than setting up a 
bilateral route to the recipient country independently. This is particularly true for overland 
routes, but also for feeder routes to major airports and harbours from which carriers to 
industrialised countries leave. Since migration costs are influenced by the existence and 
capacity of the people trafficking networks, a highly frequented - and thereby more cost-
efficient and secure - route might attract migrants from minor source countries. Hence, the size 
of the asylum flow between close-by or transit source countries and a target country is 
positively influenced by the number of asylum seekers from a major source country. The 
assumption of a joint use of trafficking routes by migrants from different countries is 
corroborated by the presence of various nationalities on the refugee boats that frequently land 
at the shores of the Canary Islands, Lampedusa or Malta (The International Herald Tribune 
2011). 
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The main source of target contagion stems from the well-known problem of collective action 
(Olson 1965) where host countries opt for free-riding at the expense of other host nations in the 
case of providing asylum for refugees. As argued by Suhrke (1998), refugee protection has 
characteristics of an international public good, where increased security can be regarded as a 
non-excludable and non-rival benefit, since refugees alleviate the pressure from fuelling and 
spreading the conflict they are fleeing from (Thielemann 2006). As outlined above, Western 
policy makers use a multitude of policy levers to render their country less attractive for asylum 
seekers, such as restrictions on welfare benefits and employment opportunities, increasing the 
risk of being rejected due to low recognition rates, providing limited opportunities for 
appealing against a decision and the raising threat of forced removal. As a consequence of this 
free-riding behaviour, potential host countries’ governments have an incentive to engage in a 
race-to-the-bottom in asylum standards, both concerning welfare provisions and deterrence 
measures. If tighter asylum policy in one host country deters asylum seekers from filing their 
application in this country and leads to a higher number of applications in other countries, this 
is a classical example of a beggar-thy-neighbour policy (Rotte et al. 1997). At the same time, it 
results in the number of asylum applications in one country depending on the asylum 
applications in another country or as Böcker and Havinga (1998: 263) conclude: “[...] the 
introduction of measures to reduce the influx in one country may produce rising numbers in 
neighbouring countries”. To which country asylum flows are deflected depends on which 
countries are regarded as substitutes from an asylum seeker’s point of view. In general, asylum 
seekers could be incentivised to lodge their asylum application in any more lenient country. 
While this question has not been analysed empirically, anecdotal evidence suggests that close-
by and mostly adjacent countries are frequently seen as an alternative: According to 
Brochmann (1995) for example, the 1993 introduction of visa requirements for refugees from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sweden and Denmark led to a marked increase in the number of 
refugees to Norway. Schilling (1995) notes Denmark and Norway as well as Germany and the 
Netherlands as two other country pairs with a close substitutive relationship. Böcker and 
Havinga (1998) point out that the large drop in asylum applications in France in the early 
1990s was due to asylum seekers being directed at other countries, e.g., Turkish and 
Vietnamese asylum flows to Germany, the Angolan flow to the UK and the Peruvian flow at 
Spain. As a reason for this diversion, a number of policy changes and lower recognition rates 
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in France are adduced, such as the negative asylum decision for many Turkish and Angolan 
asylum seekers and the introduction of transit visas for Angolans. Holzer et al. (2000) argue 
that Germany and Switzerland are close substitutes for potential asylum seekers. Rotte et al. 
(1997: 109) analyse the impact of changes in the French asylum policy on the number of 
asylum seekers in Germany, as the former is “the major alternative to Germany in Europe for 
asylum seekers”. A successful diversion of asylum flows to other destination countries would 
lead to negative spatial dependence among target countries. However, also a successful 
burden-sharing between host nations is in line with a negative coefficient of the spatial lag.130 
 
If asylum seekers react to policy changes, the number of applications in a host country will 
decrease. And if refugees are not fully discouraged to leave their home country but to seek 
asylum in another industrialised country, this provides an argument for specific target 
contagion, where the total number of applications from source i in country j depends on the 
number of applications from country i in target m. This is the case if restrictions in asylum 
policy are targeted against refugees from a specific source country (e.g., visa restrictions or 
lower recognition rate). Such a targeting of deterrence measures is not uncommon as there are 
major source countries for certain host countries and natural or human crises can trigger a mass 
inflow from a specific country (Section 2).  
 
 
4.4. Literature review 
Work on the international flows of people has mostly focussed on migration in general or 
refugees in particular,131 but there are still few comprehensive empirical studies on the factors 
which determine the number of asylum seekers, even though this topic has gained popularity 
over the last decade. These studies can be broadly classified into monadic and dyadic studies: 
while the latter explicitly model asylum seekers from a source to a target country, monadic 
studies use aggregate number of asylum applications in (from) a country without distinguishing 
individual source (target) countries. However, with the notable exception of Rotte et al. (1997) 
                                                 
130 See Section 5 for the empirical operationalisation and the concept of spatial lags. 
131 See, for example, Vogler and Rotte (2000) for the determinants of international migration and Schmeidl 
(1997), Davenport et al (2003), Moore and Shellman (2004, 2006, 2007) on the determinants of the number of 
refugees and internally displaced persons. 
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and Hatton (2004) so far no study has explicitly addressed the potential spatial dependence in 
asylum migration outlined above and even these studies look at the effect of foreign asylum 
policy and foreign economic variables on domestic asylum applications rather than at spatial 
dependence in the flows itself. 
 
Monadic analyses can further be divided into cross-country studies, longitudinal country 
studies and panel studies on the one hand as well as into studies looking at source country 
determinants and host country characteristics on the other hand. Cross-country studies compare 
the number of asylum applications in various countries at one point in time and evaluate how 
differences across these destinations help to explain the distinct attractiveness of a country for 
asylum migrants.  In a simple correlation analysis with averaged data for 17 European 
countries over 1985 to 2000, Thielemann (2004) finds that GDP per capita in the host country, 
the share of foreign born population, the size of the ODA budget and a tight asylum policy are 
positively correlated with the number of asylum applications per 1000 people, while higher 
unemployment and higher distance to major source countries are associated with lower 
numbers of asylum seekers. The positive correlation between political deterrence measures and 
the number of applicants is at odds with expectations and is interpreted as a signal for the 
ineffectiveness of these policies to deter migrants from seeking asylum in a given destination 
country. However, the positive correlation could also be due to the potential reverse causality 
problem as these deterrence measures might also be a consequence of a strong influx of asylum 
seekers. A major drawback of this analysis is that each factor is analysed individually, which 
neglects the potential correlation among these determinants. 
 
From an empirical point of view, cross-sectional studies suffer from an important drawback, 
since it is usually impossible to fully control for all factors that influence the number of asylum 
seekers in a country. These unaccounted influences are subsumed in the error term. If these 
factors are correlated with one or more of the control variables, this leads to biased coefficient 
estimates of these control variables. Furthermore, such studies can only explain the asylum 
applications in one year, but not the changes over time and their causes. These limitations are 
overcome by longitudinal country-studies. Here, the inclusion of country-fixed effects allows 
controlling for all unobserved factors which do not vary over time. For the case of Switzerland, 
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Holzer et al. (2000) find that a tighter asylum policy deterred potential applicants to seek 
asylum in the Alpine state during 1986 to 1995. The same is true for lower recognition rates.  
 
While these studies overcome the limitations of cross-sectional empirical analyses, they are 
constrained to one destination (or source) country. This restriction is prone to a severe sample 
selection bias if the country under scrutiny is not representative for other potential hosts or 
sources. Panel-studies unite a larger country-sample in the cross-section with a time dimension 
and exploit the benefits of both approaches. Vink and Meijerink (2003) find a negative 
correlation between the recognition rate and the numbers of applicants in 10 out of 15 analysed 
EU member countries over 1982 to 2001. The same negative relationship is established over 
time, which is interpreted as a political reaction to increased burden. However, the study does 
not control for other important domestic policy and economic variables which might also 
influence the number of asylum seekers in a country. If these factors are correlated with the 
recognition rate, the estimates of the effects are biased.  
 
The first comprehensive monadic study encompassing a large number of source countries is by 
Neumayer (2005a) who analyses a large number of potential push factors.  The dataset covers 
the aggregate number of asylum seekers from 127 source countries to 15 Western European 
countries over the period from 1982 to 1999 – a time span marked by a tremendous increase in 
the number of asylum applications. Estimating both a fixed effects model and a random effects 
model, he finds that the number of asylum seekers is lower from countries with a higher level 
of GDP per capita and a faster growing economy. At odds with expectations, the same is true 
for countries which share a colonial history with any Western European country and for 
countries with a higher number of tourist arrivals. Both effects, though statistically significant, 
are negligible in size. The list of factors that increase the number of asylum seekers from a 
country includes the total population of the source country, the stock of past asylum seekers, 
economic discrimination and violation of human rights, the share of population aged between 
15 and 64, an autocratic regime, the occurrence of violent dissident political activity, as well as 
both domestic and external wars. Furthermore, a higher number of asylum seekers originates 
from countries which are closer to Western Europe. In contrast, no significant effect can be 
established for the numbers of deaths from genocide and politicide and of natural disaster 
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victims, the level of food production, the share of urban population, and cultural similarity as 
measured by the share of Christians in the source country. Furthermore, both aggregate aid and 
trade volume seem not to influence the number of asylum seekers. 
 
Focussing on target country characteristics in a large monadic dataset, Thielemann (2006a) 
seeks to explain the number of asylum applications per capita of the destination country. The 
sample covers 20 OECD destinations over the period 1985 to 1999. While low levels of 
unemployment seem to attract asylum seekers, no such effect is found for economic growth in 
the host country. Network effects, as measured by the stock of foreign population from the top 
five asylum source countries in a year, prove to be a highly significant determinant of the 
relative number of asylum applications.132 A larger ODA budget is also associated with a 
higher share of asylum seekers. This is interpreted as a sign for a more liberal reputation of the 
destination country which is appealing for asylum seekers. Generally, a deterring effect of a 
more restrictive asylum policy is established; however, not all deterrence policies seem to have 
the same negative impact: whereas not allowing asylum seekers to work while their application 
is pending and granting protection to a smaller number of asylum seekers discourages migrants 
to file an asylum application, the safe third country provision, restricted freedom of movement 
within the host country and providing benefits in kind rather than in cash seem to have no 
limiting effect. Thielemann (2006a) argues that this is because information about employment 
opportunities and status determination reaches asylum seekers through human traffickers, 
personal networks and agents, whereas details about single policy measures might not be 
available to potential asylum migrants or could be less relevant for the decision to seek asylum. 
 
Hatton (2009) examines asylum migration using both a monadic as well as a dyadic dataset. 
The monadic study focuses on source country characteristics and seeks to explain the number 
of asylum seekers per thousand of source country population. Both a country-level random 
effects and a fixed-effects model are tested. Depending on model specification, he finds that an 
additional thousand dollars in GDP per capita is associated with a 15 to 25 percent lower share 
                                                 
132 The inclusion of the stock of asylum seekers from more than one source country is consistent with the concept 
of specific source contagion. However, Thielemann (2006a) only includes the top five source countries without 
modeling the relationship between them. Furthermore, the stock of asylum seekers is not host country specific. 
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of asylum applications. Similarly, fewer applications come from countries with a democratic 
system and more political rights for its citizens, whereas a higher number of battle deaths 
increase the demand for asylum. However, controlling for political terror such as arbitrary 
imprisonment, torture and political murders weakens the coefficients on democracy and 
political rights and eliminates the effect of a war. The effect of political terror is substantial as 
well: a one point increase on a scale from 1 to 5 is associated with 50 to 69 percent more 
asylum seekers.   
 
The question whether official development assistance (ODA) reduces the demand for asylum is 
in the focus of a study by Leblang (2010), who also exploits both a monadic and a dyadic 
dataset. The monadic model explains the aggregate number of asylum seekers in 125 source 
countries over the period 1980 to 2007. In line with previous research, fewer asylum seekers 
originate from richer countries, whereas curtailed human rights, ethnical wars and natural 
disasters increase the number of asylum seeking emigrants from a country. Little support is 
found for the hypothesis that a lower level of democracy acts as a push factor. While the total 
overall development assistance (ODA) as a share of origin’s GDP is associated with lower 
asylum seekers from a given country, no significant results are obtained if humanitarian, 
governmental and post-conflict aid are estimated individually. However, as argued by the 
author, this does not necessarily represent a causal effect as aid is correlated with other factors 
that might mitigate the causes for asylum seeking or measure the impact of ODA on the direct 
causes for asylum.  
 
The empirical work by Hatton (2004) is based on a kind-of dyadic setting, in which the number 
of asylum applications from one of three regions (Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe) divided by 
the population of the source region is explained. A set of source region variables is added to 
control for regional push factors. In line with most monadic studies, the author finds that for 
the period 1981 to 1999, a higher GDP per capita difference, fewer political rights and lower 
civil liberties foster asylum migration. The same positive effect is found for the stock of source 
region nationals in the destination country and for the lagged cumulative numbers applications 
from the source region. By contrast, a more restrictive asylum policy in the destination country 
lowers the number of asylum applications. A dummy taking the value of one for asylum flows 
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from Africa and Asia to Italy from 1990 on has a negative and highly significant impact. This 
accounts for the fact that Italy acted as a transit country prior to 1990 for asylum seekers which 
were transferred onwards to other destinations, as Italy only recognised refugees from other 
European countries. This reservation was abandoned in 1990 and lead together with a sharp 
crackdown on asylum seekers to a considerable decrease in the number of applications. A 
second dummy for asylum applications from Eastern Europe after the end of the cold war in 
1989 is positive and accounts for the substantially increased number of asylum seekers in the 
aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The average of the asylum policy variable for all other 
destinations in the sample is positive, yet insignificant. This points into the direction that a 
more restrictive policy towards asylum seekers in other countries increases the number of 
applications in a given host country.   
 
The first real dyadic dataset is exploited by Rotte et al. (1997) who analyse source country 
determinants of asylum outflows in a sample covering 17 sources and Germany as the only 
destination over the period 1985 to 1994. In a pooled OLS and a random-effects estimation, 
they find that less political freedom and political terror increase the number of applications in 
Germany as does a higher living standard and a larger difference between domestic and 
German GDP per capita. The same is true for the number of nationals already residing in the 
host country and for German exports into the source country. Asylum reforms which generally 
result in a less lenient policy discourage asylum seekers to file their application in Germany. 
To test for a potential substitutability of Germany and France as targets from the point of view 
of asylum seekers, Rotte et al. include measures for French asylum policy, the relative 
economic situation between Germany and France and bilateral political relations of France 
with the source country. No evidence is found that a tighter asylum policy in France increases 
the number of asylum applications in Germany. Also, a relative higher unemployment in 
France than in Germany does not encourage asylum seekers to file for asylum in the latter 
country. However, if France has a strong cultural ties with a given source country, fewer 
applicants come to Germany from these nations. While this analysis is definitely insightful, it 
suffers from various limitations: First, only Germany as a target country and France as the only 
potential substitute is included. Second, unobserved country-specific effects are not controlled 
for. These effects are correlated if Germany and France share common cultural or reputational 
 222 
 
characteristics which make these countries more or less attractive for asylum seekers. The 
random-effects estimation, however, is based on the assumption that these effects are 
uncorrelated. Including country-fixed effects would be based on the much weaker assumption 
that the changes in these effects are uncorrelated, since correlation in the levels is removed 
(Plümper and Neumayer 2010). Third, to test whether France and Germany are regarded as 
substitutes by asylum seekers, this relationship could be modelled directly by estimating a 
spatial-lag model in which the asylum seekers in France are included as a control variable in 
the estimation model. 
 
The analysis by Rotte et al. (1997) is extended by Vogler and Rotte (2000), which 
encompasses 86 Asian and African source countries to Germany. As a methodological 
advancement, they use country level fixed effects which allow controlling for unobserved, 
country-specific and time-invariant determinants of asylum outflows. The dependent variable 
is the migration rate, defined as the number of asylum seekers divided by the population of the 
source country. Among the factors that enhance the asylum migration are a high income 
differential between Germany and the source country, a higher GDP per capita in the source 
country, the intensity of political terror and the share of urban population. At a given level of 
income difference, a higher development level is associated with more asylum applications and 
there is some evidence that this effect is decreasing with rising living standards. The authors 
argue that this might be due to the availability of financial resources which are necessary to 
migrate. People from countries with low levels of GDP simply lack funds to make the journey 
to Germany and file an application there. With growing income, seeking asylum becomes less 
attractive. The factors with a negative impact on asylum migration are economic growth in the 
source country and bilateral trade. Separate estimations for Asian and African countries reveal 
a negative relationship between trade and asylum migration for Africa and a positive 
association for Asian sources. Increasing contacts which facilitate migration are provided as an 
explanation for the positive effect, while the negative correlation of trade and the political 
situation and its positive correlation with the numbers of asylum seekers explain the negative 
effect for Africa. Finally, the introduction of more restrictive German immigration laws in 
1987 and 1993 deterred asylum seekers. 
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Exploiting a dyadic dataset which covers 20 source countries and 14 destination countries and 
spans the period from 1990 to 1999, Hatton (2004) estimates determinants of the share of 
asylum seekers in destination i at the total number of asylum applications from a source 
country j. In the focus of the analysis are potential spill-over effects from policy changes in 
other European destinations on the number of applicants in a given destination. Even though 
the author never names it, this is one of the very few works on spatial relationships in asylum 
migration. He finds that a higher GDP of a destination relative to the average of other potential 
destinations increases the share of applications in this destination. Again, a positive and highly 
significant effect of the past stock of nationals from the source in the host country is 
established. While a more restrictive asylum policy in a country reduces the share of asylum 
seekers in that country, no effect is found for the average asylum policy in other EU 
destinations. By adding the average of the asylum policy measure in other countries, Hatton 
(2004) implicitly estimates a so-called spatial-x model with a row-standardised unitary 
weighting matrix.133 This gives equal weight to all other destinations, which might not be 
reasonable if some countries are closer substitutes for a given destination than others. 
Assessing the relative impact of changes in policy, GDP per capita and a general trend on the 
share of asylum seekers in each of the 14 destinations, the author finds that the country specific 
trend has the greatest influence, followed by GDP per capita and asylum policy. He argues that 
this is because all countries adopted more restrictive policies rather than due to the 
ineffectiveness of these policy measures.  
 
The first comprehensive dyadic study is by Neumayer (2004) and examines what makes some 
Western European countries a more attractive destination for asylum seekers than others. 
Rather than explicitly controlling for source country characteristics, these effects are netted out 
by taking shares for each destination of applicants from each source as the dependent variable. 
The study covers 125 countries of origin, 17 destination countries and 18 years from 1982 to 
1999. He finds that more asylum applications are lodged in richer countries, but neither a 
deterring effect of a higher unemployment rate nor of less social welfare spending. Contrary to 
expectations, strong economic growth in the destination country is associated with fewer 
                                                 
133 In such a spatial-x model, one explanatory variable is spatially lagged and included in the estimation model. 
 224 
 
asylum seekers. Regarding the political landscape of the target country, countries in which a 
right populist party gained a higher share in general elections are less attractive for migrants, 
whereas more come to countries with left-wing dominated countries. A higher recognition rate 
in the past also seems to encourage the influx of asylum seekers. Also, relatively fewer 
applications are filed in full Schengen member countries as opposed to non-member countries. 
The same is true for a larger past share of asylum applications. As expected, a higher share of 
asylum seekers comes from countries that are former colonies, speak the same language and 
are geographically closer. The negative impact of a lower recognition rate in the past and the 
lower relative attractiveness of full Schengen members suggests that destination countries are 
somewhat able to shift the burden of asylum seekers to other countries by setting a more 
restrictive asylum policy.   
 
Working with a dyadic dataset that covers 40 source and 19 destination countries, Hatton 
(2009) analyses whether the widespread decline in the number of asylum applications since 
2001 can be explained by tighter asylum policy. He finds that an increase in the stock of 
migrants from a given country by one percent increases the number of asylum application from 
the same source country by 0.33 percent. A one-percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate in the destination country is associated with 10 percent fewer applications, 
while political terror as well as a more autocratic system in the source country increases the 
number of asylum seekers. Little evidence is found for a deterring effect of lower recognition 
rate. After 9/11, there were significantly fewer applications from Muslim countries; however, 
the effect disappears once an asylum policy measure is included. The recognition rate exhibits 
a certain degree of endogeneity if lower rates deter those most likely to be rejected. When 
instrumenting the recognition rate with changes in the policy towards manifestly unfounded 
claims and policy related to subsidiary status, the effect becomes positive and highly 
significant with a coefficient suggesting that a fall in the recognition rate by 10 percentage 
points is associated with 16 percent fewer applications. Adding controls for asylum policy, the 
effects of the policy components for access to the territory and processing of applications are 
negative as expected, but no evidence for a deterring effect of a tougher policy related to the 
welfare conditions of asylum seekers is found. The author finds that more restrictive policies 
concerning the access to the territory and the processing of applications account for 108,000 
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fewer asylum seekers per year or nearly one third of the overall decline in the application count 
from 2001 to 2006. 
 
The dyadic part of Leblang’s (2010) study covers asylum seeker flows from 125 sources to 20 
destinations over 1983 to 2006. As in previous study, the author finds a positive effect of the 
bilateral migrant stock on the bilateral number of asylum applications. Similarly, a higher 
recognition rate and a larger income differential between the country of origin and the target 
country are associated with more asylum seekers. In line with Neumayer (2004), the 
government expenditures as a share of GDP seem not to have an impact; however, contrary to 
Neumayer (2004), no deterring effect of right populist parties can be established. As in Hatton 
(2009), a more restrictive asylum policy in the target country apparently discourages migrants 
to seek asylum in such a country. Regarding circumstances in the source nation, a violation of 
human rights and curtailed political rights increase the number of asylum seekers, whereas no 
statistically significant effect is found for ethnic wars and environmental crises. As in the 
monadic study, ODA as a share of GDP is negatively correlated with the number of asylum 
seekers. A decomposition of aid into post conflict, governmental and humanitarian aid reveals 
that the negative relationship only holds for the latter two but shows no effect of post conflict 
aid.  
 
Summing up, while the effect of some variables is ambiguous and cross-study comparison is 
often hampered by different definition of variables, there is a clear pattern for several 
determinants whose influence is found in all or nearly all studies. Among these is the number 
of past asylum seekers or of official migrants, which indicates a network-effect among 
migrants as a higher number of fellow countrymen in the destination country reduces 
uncertainty and provides social amenities.134 Another implication of these network effects is 
that it is much harder for governments to curtail the flow of asylum seekers once these 
networks are established, as Hatton (2004: 51) concludes: “Had policy been more pre-emptive 
then the channels of asylum migration would have become less entrenched and the subsequent 
                                                 
134 This finding is corroborated by a non-quantitative analysis by Böcker and Havinga (1998) who find that over 
90 percent of the asylum seekers from many origin countries are concentrated on less than five destination 
countries. 
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flows would have been easier to control.” Other factors whose influence is unambiguous are 
political terror in the source country, which represents the original intent of granting asylum to 
refugees. Furthermore, a high GDP per capita differential between the source and the 
destination country fosters asylum migration, whereas most studies find a deterring effect of a 
more restrictive asylum policy in the host country. The same negative effect is found for 
geographical distance and high levels of unemployment in the target country. There is a 
plethora of other variables which have been tested, but these are either only included in one of 
the studies or the results are less consistent. 
 
As argued in Section 3, there are several theoretical arguments why one would expect the 
numbers of asylum seekers from (to) one country to depend on the number of asylum seekers 
from (to) other source (destination) countries. This potential spatial dependence in asylum 
migration flows has been fully neglected so far. As discussed above, Rotte et al. (1997) and 
Hatton (2004) add third-country control variables to their estimation models, but do not refer to 
it as spatial dependence, which points into the direction that both are not aware that they are 
analysing spatial dependence. Consequently, they do not justify the choice of the implicitly 
used unitary weighting matrix.135 Most importantly however, their approach does not provide 
insight on which countries are substitutes and complements from a migrant’s point of view and 
whether asylum seekers are in fact deterred to other destination countries or whether an ever 
tighter asylum policy lowers the number of applicants in industrialised countries as a whole. 
The following empirical study seeks to answer this question. Furthermore, it is explored 
whether personal or human trafficker networks work across borders. Finally, the robustness of 
standard determinants of asylum migration to the inclusion of this spatial dependence is 
checked.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
135 Rotte et al. (1997) only include France as a third country in their Germany-specific case study. In this case, the 
choice of a weighting matrix becomes obsolete. 
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4.5. Data and methodology 
Econometric techniques are used to test the theoretical predictions outlined above. Before the 
model and the estimation technique are addressed, the dependent variable and the control 
variables are presented and the calculation of the spatial lags is discussed in some detail. 
 
The dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the annual number of asylum applications lodged by nationals of 
source country i in target country j, i.e. the observational unit is a country-pair. Data is 
provided by UNHCR (2011), based on information reported by national governments of 
destination countries. The figures generally refer to the number of applicants or persons rather 
than the number of applications or families and only cover first-instance applications, i.e. they 
exclude repeat or appeal applications. Furthermore, only persons who officially lodged an 
application are considered. Hence, refugees who were not able or unwilled to apply for asylum 
are not covered (Neumayer 2005a).136 Missing information is set to zero. However, some 
countries do not report detailed statistics for the whole period, for these, observations are left as 
missings before they start reporting asylum applications by country of origin. Following the 
example of Hatton (2009) and Leblang (2010), to reduce the skewness of the data and to 
mitigate the influence of large values, the log of the annual number of asylum seekers is 
taken.137  
 
The dataset goes back until 1980 and covers the period including 2008, but the first two years 
are lost since some of the independent variables are lagged. The estimation data encompass 21 
sources countries and up to 138 destination countries.138 Tables 35 and 36 in the appendix 
provide a full list of source and target nations and also indicate the data availability for 
                                                 
136 For instance, before 1991, only Europeans could apply for asylum in Italy. In general, this focus on refugees 
who successfully filed an asylum application introduces a sample selection bias: Only individuals who decided to 
migrate and to apply for asylum are included, but not those who stayed or became internally displaced persons. If 
those who leave share certain characteristics, the estimation sample is not representative for whole relevant 
population at risk. As a consequence, the results might not be generalisable, but are only valid for actual asylum 
seekers. Yet, data on persons thinking about leaving or refugees who did not reach their destination country to 
lodge an application is not available. 
137 The value of one was added to all values before taking the logarithm. 
138 26 targets and 156 sources are used to calculate the spatial lags, but 5 and 18 are dropped because missing 
information for the control variables. 
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destination countries. The set of host countries comprises all major Western European 
countries, other large industrialised countries as well as three Eastern European countries 
which appeared on the destination list of asylum seekers only during the 1990s. Moore and 
Shellman (2007) criticise Neumayer (2004) for restricting the dataset to Western European 
destination countries as a source of severe sample selection bias and argue that all countries 
should be included as potential hosts. While this argument is certainly valid for their study on 
total refugees, the sample selection problem is less apparent for asylum seekers as these 
disproportionately often lodge their applications in industrialised countries.139 In addition, 
asylum migration appears to follow different patterns than general refugee migration as with 
the exception of the United States and Germany, none of the top ten destination countries for 
refuges over the period 1965 to 1995 indentified by Moore and Shellman is one of the ten most 
popular targets for asylum seekers in 2005 to 2009. Furthermore, one of the main objectives of 
this work is to analyse whether tighter asylum policy deters asylum seekers to more lenient 
destinations and developed countries are notoriously active in trying to restrict the influx of 
applicants.140 This is of particular interest, as developed countries do not only provide safety 
from political prosecution but also generally offer more social benefits which a are a burden to 
the taxpayer.  
 
 
The independent variables 
The set of source country characteristics encompasses: 
 Total population of source country is used to control for the size of the source country 
and the pool of potential asylum seekers. Ceteris paribus, more asylum seekers should 
originate from larger countries. 
 Since persons in working age are more likely to migrate, the share of people between 
15 and 64 at the total population is included as a control variable and a positive 
coefficient is expected.  
                                                 
139 Between 2005 and 2009, on average 49.3 percent of all applications in the UNHCR (2011) database were filed 
in the 26 target countries, even though this group accounts for only 16.1 percent of all targets in the database. In 
any case, comprehensive data on asylum applications in developing countries is only available from late 1990s 
which would limit the study period considerably.  
140 Above all, important control variables are only available for a constrained set of industrialised nations.  
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 The GDP per capita level in constant 2005 USD is taken as an approximation for the 
development level and the economic situation in the source country. Escaping poverty 
and bleak economic prospects is one motivation to leave the home country. Little 
economic opportunities reduce the benefits of staying and should therefore increase the 
number of asylum seekers. However, migration is not for free and richer people can 
more easily raise the necessary funds for transport and traffickers. Hence, higher GDP 
per capita levels make migration more feasible, but less desirable (Vogler and Rotte 
2000, Neumayer 2005a, Hatton 2009).141 
 Devastating natural disasters can destroy livelihoods and social ties and therefore 
trigger emigration. The annual aggregate number of fatalities after droughts, 
earthquakes, epidemics, extreme temperatures, floods, earth slides, storms, volcano 
eruptions and wildfires is included (natural disaster deaths). A positive impact is 
anticipated. 
 Also armed conflicts can cause individuals to flee their home county. As a measure for 
war intensity, the number of battle fatalities is included.142 Data is taken from Lecina 
and Gleditsch (2005). If available, the best estimate of the number of people killed is 
used, otherwise the average of the lowest and highest estimate is taken. If more than 
one country is involved, the fatalities are equally allocated to territories. A positive sign 
is expected. 
 The political terror scale index represents the scale of arbitrary imprisonment, torture, 
political murders and general violence. Data based on reports of the U.S. State 
department is used, but missing values replaced by the ratings based on Amnesty 
International reports. Further gaps are closed by inter- and extrapolation. The index 
ranges from 0 to 5 with higher values representing a worse situation. Since political 
repression is one of the original intents for providing asylum to refugees, a positive 
sign is expected.  
                                                 
141 Unfortunately, reliable time-series data on income inequality is not available for a large set of developing 
countries. This would allow testing the argument made by Vogler and Rotte (2000) that the relative income 
situation matters (see Footnote 9). 
142 Natural disaster deaths and battle deaths enter the estimation in logs. To keep the zeros in the dataset, the value 
of one is added to all values, as with the dependent variable. 
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 Democracy is measured by the Polity2 variable taken from the PolityIV dataset 
(Marshall et al. 2006). The variable ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full 
democracy). All else being equal, it is hypothesised that democratic systems impose 
less threat to the integrity of individuals and therefore cause lower numbers of 
refugees. 
 Urbanisation represents the share of population living in urban areas. Since 
information is likely to better diffuse in urban areas, a positive sign is anticipated. 
 
Controls for target country characteristics include: 
 The unemployment rate in the target country, measured as unemployed people as a 
share of civilian labour force. A country with lower levels of unemployment should 
provide better work prospects which act as a pull-factor for immigrants. Furthermore, 
host countries with low unemployment rates should generally be in a better economic 
situation which enables them to extend the welfare state. Therefore, a negative sign is 
expected. 
 The population of the target country rate is included as a measure for the size of the 
destination country. Larger countries have a higher absorptive capacity for immigrants 
and probably provide more entry points for unobserved illegal immigration. 
Furthermore, an asylum seeker is more likely to be aware of larger countries. Hence, a 
positive coefficient is expected.  
 The GDP per capita of the destination country measured in constant 2005 USD is 
taken to control for the wealth of the host nation. Since richer countries should 
generally provide better employment opportunities and are able to spend more money 
for social purposes, it is expected that more migrants file for asylum in countries with a 
higher GDP per capita level. 
 To control for changes in the domestic asylum policy, an index developed by Leblang 
(2010) is used. Starting from a value of zero in 1980 if no asylum policy is 
implemented in this year, the value of one is added for each year in which a policy is 
introduced that restricts asylum. In contrast, the value of one is deducted from the 
index in a given year for more liberal policy measures which makes asylum 
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immigration easier. The variable is lagged by one year to mitigate the apparent problem 
of endogeneity and to allow information to diffuse among potential asylum seekers. 
Since a tighter asylum policy should deter potential applicants, a negative sign is 
expected.143 
 
Finally, the following two dyad-specific variables are included: 
 As an additional measure for the generosity of a host country, the recognition rate is 
included in the estimation model. Data is provided by UNHCR (2011) broken down by 
country of origin and destination country. The theoretically correct measure, namely 
the percentage of recognised cases relative to the number of asylum claims lodged, is 
not available as many claims have not been decided in the period they were lodged and 
more detailed data is not available. Therefore, in line with UNHCR practice, the 
recognition rate is computed as the number of decisions recognising asylum claims in a 
given year as a share of the total number of claims decided upon.144 The data are not 
without problems, however: First, they are not fully comparable over time (Vink and 
Meijerink 2003, Neumayer 2005b), as for some destination countries the data cover 
both first-instance and appeal decisions whereas for others only first-instance decisions 
are included. Second,  in some host countries cases that are rejected on formal grounds 
enter the calculation, whereas they are excluded in other countries (Neumayer 2005b). 
Finally, as noted above, there is no information on when a decided application actually 
was lodged. It could be in current year, but also in any previous year and as a result, the 
recognition rate might not be a good proxy for the willingness to host asylum seekers 
of a destination country. For instance, this could be the case if there is a large backlog 
of cases after a mass influx of refugees as a consequence of a war in a major source 
country and these cases are rejected after several years because the political situation in 
                                                 
143 See footnote 122 for the prerequisites for an effectiveness of asylum policies. As discussed below, the 
estimations are based on dyad fixed effects, i.e. only variations over time are used to get estimates of the 
coefficients. Consequently, it is assumed that asylum seekers react to changes in asylum policy rather than the 
policy level. 
144 The main measure covers only refugees recognized under the 1951 Geneva Convention. The results are, 
however, fully robust if also asylum seekers who are allowed to stay for other, mainly humanitarian, reasons are 
included. 
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the country of origin has stabilised in the meantime (Neumayer 2005b). While the first 
two problems are dealt with dyad fixed effects where variation across countries is 
neglected, the last issue is pure measurement error which attenuates the coefficient and 
makes statistically significant results less likely. As with the asylum policy measure, 
this variable is lagged to lessen the potential endogeneity and to allow time for the 
information to reach potential migrants. 
 To test for the influence of official development assistance (ODA), the bilateral ODA 
commitments from the target to the source country are included. Since this is a mere 
control variable, contrary to Leblang (2010), different types of aid are not 
distinguished.  The sign of the coefficient is not clear ex ante: One the one hand, more 
ODA could mitigate the causes of asylum migration and therefore reduce the number 
of asylum seekers. On the other hand, generous donors could enjoy a humanitarian 
reputation which attracts additional applicants in the hope of high recognition rates. 
Depending on which effect predominates, a negative or a positive sign emerges. 
However, both effects could also offset each other, rendering the effect close to zero 
and insignificant. 
 
Unfortunately, time-invariant data on the stock of migrants from a source country in a given 
target country is not available to directly control for the personal migrant networks originating 
from other migrants from the same source country. As an approximation, the one-year lag of 
the dependent variable, i.e. the number of asylum seekers from source i in target j in year t-1, is 
added as a right-hand side variable. While this variable does not exactly cover the relevant 
measure, it has the advantage of not limiting the dataset apart from curtailing the time-
dimension by one period. Furthermore, recent asylum migrants are more likely to be personally 
known by potential migrants and to act as a role model. In addition, their up-to-date experience 
might reduce the risk of migrating and help to make contacts to trustworthy human traffickers. 
In addition, path-dependency could also stem from sunk costs from establishing migration 
routes and networks incurred which incurred to people smugglers and agents and which they 
are reluctant to give up (Pierson 2000).  
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Spatial lags 
To analyse whether the number of asylum seekers from (to) a given source (target) country, 
depends on the number of asylum seekers in other source (target) countries, a spatial-y model 
is estimated. In such a model, the dependent variable for other observations is included as a 
right-hand side variable (Anselin 1988). The connectivity between countries is represented by a 
weighting matrix, in which each cell indicates the relationship either between two source 
countries or two target countries. The dependent variable is then multiplied with the weighting 
matrix to obtain the spatially lagged variable. Such a spatial lag resembles a temporal lag, but 
rather than representing values of the dependent variable from a former period in time, it takes 
the values of the dependent variable from geographically remote observations.145 
 
The weighting matrices for specific source contagion are derived from the theoretical 
discussion in Section 3. Unfortunately, modelling human trafficking routes is not 
straightforward, as they are often unknown, complex and the popularity of single routes has 
risen and fallen over time, often in respond to new anti-smuggling measures taken by target 
country governments (UNODC 2011). However, since both theoretical arguments stipulate a 
positive spatial dependence in the number of asylum seekers between geographically close 
source countries, they are unlikely to offset each other. Hence, while a positive spatial lag is in 
line with both arguments, the two effects cannot be disentangled in the empirical 
operationalisation due to a lack of detailed data on the actual migrant routes between a source 
and a target country. Specifically, the following set of weighting matrices is tested: 
 Contiguity: The first weighting matrix is a simple binary matrix, in which a cell takes 
the value of one if two source countries share a common border and zero otherwise. In 
all weighting matrices, the cross-diagonal elements are set to missing as a source 
country cannot spatially depend on itself. This weighting matrix allocates the same 
weight to each neighbouring country and captures both the idea of transnational 
migration network effects and increased efficiency of human smuggling networks. 
                                                 
145 Most of the weighting matrices used here are based on some sort of geographical distance; however, the 
concept of distance is also transferable to other forms of similarity between different countries. 
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Since adjacent countries often share cultural similarities, a higher number of asylum 
seekers from neighbouring source countries in a specific target country could reduce 
the risk of migration for asylum seekers from a given source country and therefore 
increase their numbers. By the same token, asylum seekers from neighbouring 
countries could gain access to well established migration routes.  
 The first weighting matrix assumes that all adjacent countries exert influence on a 
specific source country, but no other country that does not share a border with this 
given source country. This assumption might be too restrictive if also asylum seekers 
from not-adjacent countries, but from the same region provide a positive network 
benefit or if migration routes connect a whole region to major destination countries. 
Therefore, the second weighting matrix for specific source contagion is Common 
region, which is again a binary matrix allocating equal weight to all other source 
countries from the same region. According to the World Bank classification, five 
regions are distinguished: Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub Saharan Africa, 
Northern Africa and the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia and the Pacific.  
 While the second weighting matrix is broader than the first, it still assumes that the 
influence of other countries of origin abruptly ends at a region’s border. The third 
weighting matrix, Inverse distance, allows every other source country in the sample to 
impact the number of asylum seekers from a given source nation. Since cultural 
similarity and access to migration networks are bound to decrease with distance, each 
cell contains the inverse of the distance between two source countries. It is unlikely, 
however, that both effects operate over a very large distance. Thus, inverse distance is 
calculated as 1/distance² to allow the effect to decay quickly with distance. The 
distance measure taken is the population weighted distance between two countries 
provided by CEPII and described in Mayer and Zignago (2006). 
 Finally, personal migration networks which facilitate transition to the host country 
might not be constrained to cultural similarity which stems from geographical 
proximity of the source country but also originate from a shared language. Hence, a 
larger community of migrants who speak the same language lowers the cost of asylum 
migration from source countries where this language is spoken. The weighting matrix 
Common language gives equal weight to all other source countries which share a 
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common language with a given source country. Since not the official tongue but the 
actually spoken language matters, a dyad is classified as sharing a common language if 
it is spoken by at least nine percent of the population in both countries.146 Data is taken 
from the same source as distance. 
 
In its most parsimonious cross-sectional form, abstracting from the temporally lagged 
dependent variable and the control variables, the estimation model for specific source 
contagion reads as follows (Neumayer and Plümper 2010): 
ij ik kj ij
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(15)
The dependent variable yij is the number of asylum seekers from source i in target j, ykj is the 
number of asylum seekers from other source countries k to the same target j and wik represents 
the weighting matrix which models the connectivity between source country i and other 
sources k. The spatial lag parameter ρ is to be estimated and indicates, if statistically 
significant, that the number of asylum seekers of the dyad ij depends on the number of asylum 
seekers from other sources to the same destination. 
 
The main theoretical argument for specific target contagion is that asylum seekers are deterred 
by a restrictive asylum policy in the destination country. If potential migrants are not 
completely discouraged by a tighter policy stance in their preferred target country but directed 
to other destination countries which are substitutes from the migrant’s point of view, the 
number of asylum seekers in one destination country should spatially depend on the number of 
applications in other targets. Since asylum policy is the main theoretical driver of such a 
diversion, the policy index provided by Leblang (2010), which is also included as a control 
variable, is used as a measure for the restrictiveness of a target’s asylum policy. If the 
theoretical argument is correct, asylum seekers should be directed to countries with a more 
lenient asylum policy and attracted from countries with a more restrictive policy, while 
                                                 
146 This measure might not fully reflect network effects from source countries in which a large number of 
languages is spoken. Since asylum seekers are not distinguished by their mother tongue, a more detailed analysis 
is not feasible. The results are not changed if the weighting matrix is based on official languages.  
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countries with the same policy should not influence the number of applications in the target 
country under observation. In principal, these differences in asylum policy could be expressed 
by the difference in the asylum policy measure between target j and target m; however, 
negative values are not feasible in a row-standardised weighting matrix as positive and 
negative values would offset each other. Therefore, two different weighting matrices are 
created: the first one measures the difference in asylum policy to more lenient countries, the 
second one the difference in asylum policy to more restrictive countries. Negative values are 
set to zero and both spatial lags are estimated simultaneously in one model. Using these 
weighting matrices allocates a higher weight to countries in which the asylum policy differs 
greatly from the target in question and no weight to countries with the same policy 
restrictiveness. Specifically, the following set of weighting matrices is used:147 
 Difference in asylum policy (more restrictive targets): As outlined, this weighting 
matrix allocates a higher weight to targets with a more restrictive asylum policy than 
target j and no weight to countries with a more lenient or the same policy. A negative 
sign is expected as lower numbers of applications in target m should lead to a higher 
number of applications in target j if asylum seekers are attracted by the relatively more 
liberal policy in target j. 
 Difference in asylum policy (less restrictive targets): In contract, this weighting matrix 
allocates a higher weight to targets with a less restrictive asylum policy than target j 
and no weight to countries with a more restrictive or the same policy. Again, a negative 
sign is expected as higher numbers of applications in target m should lead to a lower 
number of applications in target j if asylum seekers are directed to target m by the 
relatively more liberal policy in target m. 
 Difference in asylum policy (more restrictive targets) x Common language: Here, the 
weighting matrix is multiplied with a dummy taking the value of one if the same 
language is spoken in target j and target m. As a consequence, no weight is given to 
countries with the same asylum policy and to countries with a different national 
language, while countries with the same language receive weight according to their 
                                                 
147 Contrary to specific source contagion, the spatial lags with the contiguity and common region are not tested. 
The reason is that the main target region, the European Union, is very heterogeneous. Contiguity is dropped since 
geographical proximity and not the existence of a common border should influence the degree of substitutability.  
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relative policy restrictiveness.148 This weighting matrix is used to test whether 
countries with the same language are closer substitutes than countries with a different 
language. The rationale behind this is that if a migrant has some knowledge of a 
foreign language, assimilation in a country in which this language is spoken is easier 
than in a country with a different national language. If the preferred host country’s 
asylum policy is too restrictive, the asylum seeker might regard other destinations with 
the same language as alternatives. As before, a negative sign is expected, but the size of 
the coefficient of the spatial lag should be larger if the hypothesis, that same language 
countries are closer substitutes, is true.  
 Difference in asylum policy (less restrictive targets) x Common language: This 
weighting matrix is simply the counterpart of the previous matrix. Again and for the 
same reason, a negative effect is anticipated.  
 Difference in asylum policy (more restrictive targets) x Inverse distance: Here, the 
weighting matrix is multiplied with the inverse distance (1/distance2) between target j 
and target m. Here, no weight is allocated to countries with the same asylum policy, but 
the influence of targets with a more restrictive policy increases with their relative 
restrictiveness and decreases with distance. This matrix is used to test the hypothesis 
that geographically closer countries are closer substitutes than more remote targets.149 
A negative sign which is larger than the sign of the spatial lag with the non-interacted 
weighting matrix is anticipated. 
 Difference in asylum policy (less restrictive targets) x Inverse distance: Again the 
counterpart of the previous weighting matrix to model a decreasing influence over 
space of countries with a more liberal policy. The expected sign is negative. 
 
Formally, specific target contagion can be expressed as follows (Neumayer and Plümper 
2010): 
                                                 
148 It is noteworthy that this is not an interaction term in the sense of Neumayer and Plümper (2012) to measure 
whether the spatial effect differs systematically across countries. They suggest an interaction of the spatial lag 
with a dummy accounting for the differences between targets. Here, the not the effect of the spatial lag varies 
across countries, but the influence of other targets. 
149 Here, not the distance between source country i and target j is meant, but the distance between target j and 
other targets m. 
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The number of asylum seekers in country j originating from country i (yij) is explained by the 
weighted number of asylum applications from the same source country j in other destinations 
m. Here, the weighting matrix wjm models the connectivity between the targets j and m.   
 
The weighting matrices for all spatial lags are row-standardised. As a consequence, the spatial 
lags represent the weighted average number of asylum seekers in other sources (specific source 
contagion) and in other targets (specific target contagion), respectively, rather than the 
weighted total number of asylum seekers in other countries of origin and destinations.150 While 
this row-standardisation is common practice in the applied empirical literature on spatial 
dependence, it needs to be theoretically justified as it changes the relative importance of 
impacting countries and hence the estimation results (Plümper and Neumayer 2010). Using 
relative rather than absolute weights removes all level effects in the weighting matrix; for 
instance, taking the simple binary contiguity weighting matrix discussed above, the total effect 
of spatial dependence is assumed to be the same for Portugal which just has Spain as a 
neighbouring country as for Germany with its nine neighbouring target nations in the sample 
(Neumayer and Plümper 2012). Row-standardisation has the additional virtue that the 
coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities since the dependent variable and the spatial lag are 
both expressed in the same unit, namely log of the number of asylum seekers. 
 
Tables 30 and 31 provide summary statistics and data sources for all variables and the spatial 
lags.  
                                                 
150 To row-standardise a weighting matrix, each cell in a row of the matrix is divided by its row sum. As a 
consequence, the weights add up to one for each row.  
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Table 30: Summary statistics and data sources of the dependent and the control variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Source 
Dependent Variable 
Asylum seekers (log) 1.719 2.218 0 11.656 UNHCR (2011) 
      
Source county controls 
Total population (ln) 16.000 1.541 12.357 21.004 World Bank (2011) 
Share of people 15-64 58.652 6.725 46.196 82.719 World Bank (2011) 
Share of urban population 47.132 22.852 4.480 100 World Bank (2011) 
GDP per capita (n) 7.239 1.330 4.308 11.043 UNCTAD (2011) 
Natural disaster deaths (ln) 2.106 2.502 0 12.612 EM-DAT (2011) 
Battle deaths (log) 1.458 2.867 0 11.796 Lecina and Gleditsch (2005) 
Political terror scale 2.775 1.087 1 5 Wood and Gibney (2010) 
Democracy 0.552 6.810 -10 10 Marshall et al. (2006) 
      
Target country controls 
Unemployment rate 7.645 3.928 0.185 24.172 OECD (2011) 
Total population (ln) 16.738 1.087 15.082 19.534 World Bank (2011) 
GDP per capita (ln) 10.192 0.511 8.406 11.116 UNCTAD (2011) 
Asylum policy (t-1) -0.618 2.513 -9 7 Leblang (2010) 
      
Dyad-specific controls 
Recognition rate (t-1) 0.166 0.272 0 1 UNHCR (2011) 
ODA commitments (ln, t-1) 6.893 7.563 0 22.732 Nielson et al. (2010) 
Note: With the exception of the recognition rate (26,061), the summary statistics are given for the most 
comprehensive estimation model with 62,752 observations. 
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Table 31:  Summary statistics of the spatial lags 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Specific source contagion 
W: Contiguity 1.675 1.790 0 9.811 
W: Common region 1.469 1.326 0 7.565 
W: Inverse distance 1.409 1.330 0 8.929 
W: Common language 1.239 1.393 0 10.955 
     
Specific target contagion 
W: Asylum policy difference  (more restrictive targets) 2.064 1.987 0 10.463 
W: Asylum policy difference  (less restrictive targets) 1.321 1.433 0 9.177 
W: Asylum policy difference 
 (more restrictive targets) x Common language 
1.052 1.928 0 11.208 
W: Asylum policy difference 
 (less restrictive targets) x Common language 
0.0889 1.686 0 10.205 
W: Asylum policy difference 
 (more restrictive targets) x Inverse distance 
2.130 2.123 0 10.463 
W: Asylum policy difference 
 (less restrictive targets) x Inverse distance 
1.434 1.696 0 9.378 
Notes: W: denotes the weighting matrix used; All spatial lags are derived from own calculations; The summary 
statistics are given for the most comprehensive estimation model with 62,752 observations for specific source 
contagion and 62,736 observations for specific target contagion. 
 
Model and methodology 
In the most general form, the full estimation model reads as follows: 
( 1) ' ' ' 'ijt ij ij t ijt ijt i t j t ijty y X W I T J T              
(17) 
Here, yijt is the number of asylum seekers from source country i in target country j in year t, 
while yij(t-1) is the one-year lag of the dependent variable. The constant αij represents a dyad-
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specific fixed effect which captures all time-invariant characteristics which vary across dyads, 
but not within a country-pair. The matrix Xijt contains the spatial lags described above, whereas 
all source-specific, target-specific and dyad-specific control variables are represented by Wijt. 
Finally, Ii·Tt and Jj·Tt are time trends for the source country i and the target country j, 
respectively. 
 
The dependent variable, the number of asylum seekers, is a classical example of a count 
variable. Since the sample variance greatly exceeds the sample mean, a negative binominal 
model would be the most appropriate estimation technique. Here, equation (4) is nevertheless 
estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS), mainly because of two reasons: One the one hand, 
while spatial dependence is well understood in the workhorse OLS, it is not obvious whether 
the estimation of a spatial lag model is easily transferable to estimation techniques for count 
data. On the other hand, and more importantly, the negative binominal model fails to yield 
results either due to infeasible initial values or since a flat region in the estimation is 
discovered. Using OLS in count data has one minor drawback: the predictions made from an 
OLS model can be negative, which is not reasonable for asylum seekers. However, this 
problem is avoided by taking the log of the dependent variable and making predictions is not 
the main objective of this analysis in any case. Estimating a dynamic model such as the one in 
equation (4) with a fixed effects model also introduces a Nickell (1981) bias; yet this bias 
diminishes as the number of periods T gets large and the dataset covers the period from 1981 to 
2008. In such a dynamic model, the coefficients estimated only represent the short-term effect. 
To calculate the long-term effect, the coefficient of the temporal lag of the dependent variable 
has to be taken into account. 
 
The main challenge when estimating a spatial lag model is to establish a causal relationship 
between the spatially lagged dependent variable and the dependent variable. A statistically 
significant coefficient of the spatial lag does not necessarily indicate such causality, but could 
solely represent spatial clustering or unobserved spatial heterogeneity. Spatial clustering 
denotes a situation where close countries share certain observable characteristics, whereas 
unobserved spatial heterogeneity means that these factors either cannot be observed or 
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appropriate measures are not available.151 In the context of asylum migration, such spatial 
clustering could occur if geographically close countries share common characteristics or 
impacts, e.g. political unrest in the whole region, a drought affecting more than one country, 
which lead - together with similar bilateral characteristics with the destination country - to an 
simultaneous increase of asylum seekers of different source countries from a region to the 
same host. Unobserved spatial heterogeneity occurs for example if the measures used provide a 
poor approximation of the asylum emigration causing phenomenon and the real effect is partly 
subsumed in the error term. If this is true for two or more geographically close countries, there 
are spatial patterns in the error term. Other factors, such as a cultural rootedness and the 
willingness to abandon the home country are unobservable and might be similar across 
adjacent countries. Similarly, if geographically close target countries (e.g., Scandinavian 
countries) share certain unobserved characteristics which are attractive for asylum seekers such 
as the reputation of being a lenient destination country, a simultaneous, yet independent, rise in 
the number of asylum seekers in more than one host country could be the consequence. Spatial 
clustering in target countries occurs if a group of countries, e.g. Mediterranean EU members, 
have a tight asylum policy and low recognition rate. 
 
Following the suggestions of Plümper and Neumayer (2010), several steps in the model 
specification are taken to mitigate the problem of unobserved spatial heterogeneity, to account 
for spatial clustering and to make measuring spatial contagion more likely: First, the model 
specification is as broad as possible to control for a wide range of source-, target-, and dyad-
specific factors which could influence the number of asylum seekers in a dyad to account for 
spatial clustering. This reduces the risk of omitted variable bias in the spatial lags if these 
determinants are correlated with the spatial lags. Of particular importance are source country 
specific control variables which account for influences that could trigger a simultaneous 
increase in the number of asylum seekers in adjacent countries, such as those controlling for 
natural disasters or conflicts which might affect more than one source country.  Second, and 
most important, the estimation is based on dyad fixed-effects. While this approach has the 
                                                 
151 Close countries in this context are mostly, but not necessarily, geographically close countries. Also countries 
with a similar historical background such as Commonwealth Membership might share certain observable or 
unobservable features, even if they are thousands of miles apart. 
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drawback that no estimates for important time-invariant bilateral characteristics such as 
distance and common language can be obtained, all observable and unobservable time-
invariant factors are automatically controlled for as they are subsumed in the dyad-specific 
constant.152 The estimation is based on over time variation of the variables only, whereas all 
level effects are removed. For the spatial lag, this has the advantage that also all spatial 
clustering and unobserved spatial heterogeneity in levels is eliminated. As a consequence, not 
high numbers of asylum seekers from adjacent countries in the same destination country lead 
to a positive coefficient of the spatial lag, but simultaneous increases (or decreases) in the 
number of asylum seekers from close source countries in the same host country, which is a 
much stronger prerequisite. Third, the inclusion of the temporally lagged dependent variable 
also captures common trends and additionally accounts for temporal dynamics (Plümper and 
Neumayer 2010). Finally and in addition to the recommendations of Plümper and Neumayer 
(2010), a source and destination country time trend is added, which controls for any time trend 
in the number of asylum seekers that is specific to a country of origin and a target country.153 
These dyad-partner time effects account for fundamental differences in the variation of the 
number of asylum emigrants and immigrants across countries over time. If these differences 
are not fully captured by the control variables and are correlated with the spatial lags, these 
variables of interest could suffer from an omitted variable bias. They also effectively control 
for general trends in the size of asylum migration, for instance, if over time more people have 
learnt about the possibility to seek asylum abroad, transportation has become cheaper or simply 
if changes in reporting have occurred.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
152 The inclusion of dyad-fixed effects leads to a small sample-bias known as Nickell-Hurwicz-bias (Francese and 
Hays 2007). With more than 26,000 and 62,000 observations this should not impose a problem in the present 
estimation results. 
153 Note that this procedure differs from Chapter 2, in which only a global time trend is added, mainly for two 
reasons: First, bilateral aid was expressed in shares rather than in absolute figures, which removes very much of 
the time trend and mitigates the influence of unobserved country heterogeneity. Second, in contrast to migration 
decisions, the aid allocation decision is taken by government authorities rather than individuals, which limits 
heterogeneity and allows controlling more directly for influencing factors. 
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4.6. Main results and robustness checks 
The presentation of the results is organised as follows: First, the results for specific source and 
specific target contagion are shown individually. Since the effects are not mutually exclusive, 
they are subsequently estimated together.  
 
Table 32 displays the estimation results for specific source contagion. Since data on the 
recognition rate is limited for earlier years and completely unavailable for some dyads, the 
inclusion considerably restricts the sample size: while the number of dyads decreases from 
2,893 to 2,418, the number of observation drops from nearly 63,000 to slightly more than 
26,000. This sample reduction is likely to be non-random; therefore, the estimation results are 
presented for two specifications: In Model I to Model VI, the recognition rate is not controlled 
for, whereas this variable is added in Model VII to Model XII. When interpreting the results, 
one has to keep in mind that the estimation is based on dyad fixed effects, that is, all 
unobservable (and theoretically observable) country-pair specific time invariant influences are 
automatically accounted for. Such estimation is based on variation over time only. It is obvious 
that the inclusion of source and target specific time trends picks up a lot of the variation over 
time and that it might render control variables, which have an up- or downward trend or little 
variation over time, insignificant. As expected, many of the control variables are insignificant. 
The population of the target country and partly GDP per capita of the target country are 
dropped because of collinearity, which is not surprising since both variables have a fairly 
constant growth rate over time and are linearised by taking the log. For the few statistically 
significant control variables, the effect size and even the sign strongly depends on the model 
specification.  To check the plausibility of the controls, the estimations without the source and 
target specific time trend, but with a t-1 set of year dummies are presented in Table 37 in the 
Appendix. Such a global trend accounts for general trends in the number of asylum seekers, but 
it assumes that the trend is the same for each dyad. Formally, the estimated model can be 
written as follows: 
 
( 1) ' ' 'ijt ij ij t ijt ijt t ijty y X W T            (18)
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where Tt represents the set of year dummies to control for a  global trend.  
 
The control variables are now very much in line with expectations. First of all, the one-year lag 
of the dependent variable is positive and highly significant in all specifications, providing 
evidence for a high path-dependency in the number of asylum applications. A one percent 
increase in the past number of asylum seekers is associated with a more than 0.6 percent 
increase in the contemporary application level. As discussed above, while this clearly provides 
evidence for the migration network effects, it might also be due to persistence in the migration 
routes. More asylum seekers originate from larger source countries while the number decreases 
with rising GDP per capita, while higher levels of unemployment in the target country 
discourage migrants from lodging their application in this country. There is only limited 
evidence that a higher share of people aged 15 to 64 is associated with higher migration 
outflows, however, a higher degree of urbanisation in the source country leads to more asylum 
migrants. As argued by Neumayer (2005a), this could be due to a better diffusion of 
information in urban areas. An intense armed conflict, measured by the number of battle 
fatalities, triggers migration outflows, whereas no such an effect can be detected for natural 
disasters. The original intent of asylum is to provide protection to people who are prosecuted in 
their home country. In line with this definition and with expectations, higher values on the 
political terror scale lead to more refugees: a one point increase on a scale ranging from 0 to 5 
is associated with a 11 to 14 percent higher number of applications in the short-run, depending 
on model specification. Even after controlling for the threat of arbitrary imprisonment, torture 
and political murder, significantly fewer asylum applications come from democratic systems. 
A one point increase on the -10 to 10 democracy scale leads to a decrease in the number of 
refugees by 0.8 to 1.6 percent in the short-run. The asylum policy measure provided by 
Leblang (2010) has the expected sign, as a more restrictive asylum policy is associated with 
lower application numbers. A one-point increase in the index, which runs from -10 to 10, leads 
however to a mere 1.2 to 2.9 percent short-run decrease in the number of asylum seekers. 
Either, this little size of the effect could be due to a lack of knowledge of asylum seekers about 
the actual asylum policies in potential destination countries, or asylum policy is no determinant 
of the choice where to lodge the asylum application. This latter point might be because 
refugees are desperate about leaving their country and therefore are not deterred by tighter 
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asylum policy or because they are optimistic about being accepted despite a toughening of 
asylum policy. Furthermore, the time span from the application to the final decision and an 
eventual deportation is regularly several years. An applicant might hope for a more lenient 
asylum procedure in the future or that the situation in his or her home country has improved by 
the time his application is denied. Finally, the variable is only a very crude measure of asylum 
policy, as it gives equal weight to all policy changes, no matter how significant they are.  
 
The recognition rate, introduced in Model VII to XII, is positive and highly statistically 
significant in all specifications. The coefficient indicates that a 10 percentage point higher 
recognition rate in the previous period increases contemporary asylum applications in the 
short-run by around 1.3 percent. To calculate the long-run effect, the coefficient of the 
temporally lagged dependent variable has to be taken into account. Specifically, the coefficient 
of a given control variable is divided by one minus the coefficient of the one-year lag of the 
dependent variable (Egger and Merlo 2007). For Model VII, for instance, the long-run effect of 
a ten percentage point increase in the recognition rate is 3.7 percent. The negative impact of 
lower recognition rates could be explained one the one hand by deterrence, i.e. potential 
asylum seekers decide not to migrate or to lodge their application in another country. On the 
other hand, as noted by Hatton (2004), migrants may also decide not to apply for asylum and 
remain underground rather than risking rejection and removal.154 The latter point might be 
particular relevant for those with weak asylum claims and in destinations with a flourishing 
underground economy. Some of the variables react very strongly to the introduction of the 
recognition variable and to the considerably curtailed data set in Models VII to XII.155 The 
population of the target country is positive and highly significant in the more comprehensive 
data indicating that larger countries experience more applications. At the same time, the 
coefficient of the population in source countries more than triples with a much more precise 
estimate despite a lower number of observations. In contrast, the ODA commitment variable 
loses significance and the positive link between ODA and asylum seekers can only be 
                                                 
154 The same argument applies to a tighter asylum policy regime. 
155 Running the estimation models in the new data sample without the recognition rate variable reveals that all 
changes are in fact due to the smaller sample size rather than caused by the inclusion of the new variable (results 
not shown). 
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established in the larger sample. This points into the direction that the reputation effect of 
bilateral ODA outweighs the mitigation of the causes of asylum effect.  
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Table 32:  OLS estimation results for specific source contagion with source and target specific time trend 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
Asylum seekers (ln, t-1) 0.529*** 0.532*** 0.528*** 0.538*** 0.525*** 0.531*** 0.530*** 0.532*** 0.542*** 0.524*** 
(69.37) (69.10) (68.66) (72.44) (66.83) (45.41) (44.40) (44.88) (46.52) (43.81) 
W: Contiguity (t-1) 0.0766*** 0.0391*** 0.0963*** 0.0457* 
(9.18) (3.50) (6.64) (2.22) 
W: Common region (t-1) 0.120*** 0.0632*** 0.189*** 0.150*** 
(7.57) (3.52) (7.59) (5.24) 
W: Inverse distance (t-1) 0.102*** 0.0432** 0.116*** 0.0387 
(8.44) (2.64) (6.07) (1.54) 
W: Common language (t-1) 0.0489*** 0.00885 0.0326* -0.0271 
(4.03) (0.69) (2.00) (-1.52) 
Recognition rate (t-1) 0.0599 0.0628 0.0602 0.0609 0.0616 
(1.67) (1.73) (1.67) (1.69) (1.70) 
Unemployment rate target  0.0391*** 0.0199* -0.0621*** -0.0405*** -0.0795*** -0.122* -0.117* -0.121* -0.118* -0.120* 
(4.44) (2.54) (-5.91) (-4.99) (-6.88) (-2.44) (-2.38) (-2.41) (-2.36) (-2.43) 
Population target (ln) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
GDP per capita target (ln) 3.509*** 1.896*** -0.00788 1.116*** -1.275*** n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
(5.53) (9.20) (-0.03) (4.34) (-4.49) 
Asylum policy target (t-1) -0.000418 0.00287 0.0638*** 0.0523*** -0.0752*** 0.264* 0.263** 0.265** 0.265** 0.263** 
(-0.03) (0.24) (4.97) (4.31) (-5.39) (2.54) (2.63) (2.60) (2.59) (2.61) 
Population source (ln) -311.3 -268.9 -458.4 -554.7 -160.9 2165 2133 1695 1730 2250 
(-0.31) (-0.45) (-0.40) (-0.44) (-0.37) (0.40) (0.40) (0.32) (0.32) (0.42) 
GDP per capita source (ln) 22.06 -115.4 72.35 -323 -57.83 -663 -652.9 -519.7 -530 -688.8 
(0.31) (-0.45) (0.40) (-0.44) (-0.36) (-0.41) (-0.40) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.42) 
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Table 32:      OLS estimation results for specific source contagion with source and target specific time trend (continued) 
 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
Share urban population source -2.371 8.512 9.152 6.716 -4.445 -2.322 -2.293 -1.827 -1.861 -2.417 
(-0.31) (0.45) (0.41) (0.44) (-0.36) (-0.41) (-0.40) (-0.32) (-0.33) (-0.42) 
Share population 15-64 source -4.486 9.412 -6.538 12.78 -4.305 83.07 81.84 65.05 66.35 86.33 
(-0.31) (0.45) (-0.40) (0.44) (-0.36) (0.40) (0.40) (0.32) (0.32) (0.42) 
Disaster deaths source (ln) 1.958 -9.574 4.853 -9.108 4.516 1.323 1.307 1.009 1.032 1.384 
(0.32) (-0.44) (0.42) (-0.44) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.29) (0.29) (0.39) 
Battle fatalities source (ln) 1.815 27.88 -3.491 5.801 -0.712 22.34 22.01 17.54 17.89 23.21 
(0.32) (0.45) (-0.41) (0.44) (-0.35) (0.41) (0.40) (0.32) (0.32) (0.42) 
Political terror source -20.52 -34.54 6.365 -45.82 -53.56 -331 -326 -259.4 -264.6 -343.9 
(-0.31) (-0.44) (0.44) (-0.44) (-0.36) (-0.41) (-0.40) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.42) 
Democracy source -3.747 0.538 0.658 -11.79 0.236 -100.1 -98.65 -78.49 -80.06 -104 
(-0.31) (0.45) (0.44) (-0.45) (0.26) (-0.41) (-0.40) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.42) 
ODA commitment (t-1) 0.00247** 0.00243* 0.00259** 0.00264** 0.00239* 0.00135 0.00122 0.00142 0.00149 0.0012 
(2.62) (2.57) (2.75) (2.80) (2.53) (0.85) (0.76) (0.90) (0.94) (0.75) 
Constant 5023 4185 6653 10014 3436 -34654 -34179 -27162 -27694 -36018 
  (0.31) (0.45) (0.40) (0.44) (0.37) (-0.40) (-0.40) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.42) 
Observations 62,752 62,752 62,752 62,752 62,752 26,061 26,061 26,061 26,061 26,061 
Number of dyads 2,893 2,893 2,893 2,893 2,893 2,418 2,418 2,418 2,418 2,418 
R-squared 0.642 0.642 0.642 0.641 0.642 0.682 0.683 0.682 0.681 0.683 
Notes: W: denotes the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; Robust standard errors clustered on dyads used; t-values shown in parentheses; Includes dyad-
level fixed effects; Coefficients on source and target specific time trends not shown; * statistically significant at 0.05, ** 0.01, or *** 0.001 level. 
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Turning to the spatial lags in the original model specification (Table 32) it can be seen that they 
are positive as theoretically predicted and statistically significant at least at the five percent 
level as long as they are estimated individually. A ten percent increase in the average number 
of asylum seekers from neighbouring countries in a given destination country in the last year is 
associated with a 0.77 percent increase in applications from a given source in that destination 
country in the short-run (Model I). The corresponding long-term effect is 1.63 percent. For the 
average number of asylum seekers from the same source region, the effect is somewhat larger 
(Model II), as it is if other source countries are weighted according to their inverse distance to 
the source country in question (Model III).  The short-term effect of a ten percent increase is 
only 0.49 percent for asylum seekers from other source countries in which the same language 
is spoken (Model IV). Since these effects are not mutually exclusive and to assess their relative 
importance, all four spatial lags are estimated simultaneously in Model V. Since the spatial 
lags are positively correlated as they measure similar concepts, it is not surprising that the 
coefficients become smaller. The spatial lag with the common language weighting matrix 
becomes insignificant, while the other three remain positive and significant. This indicates that 
geographical proximity rather than a shared language matters for cross-border network effects. 
The result also is in line with the hypothesis that scale effects in migration routes facilitate 
asylum migration, as these are effects should decrease with distance. In the remaining models 
in which the recognition rate is additionally controlled for, with the exception of the spatial lag 
with the common language weighting matrix, the coefficients of the spatial lags are larger. If 
all spatial lags are again estimated together (Model X), only the spatial lags with the contiguity 
and the common region weighting matrix remain significant. This, however, is a consequence 
of the considerably reduced sample size rather than of adding the recognition rate as a control 
variable (results not shown) and indicates that missing data for the recognition rate is non-
random and introduces a sample selection bias. 
 
A brief look at the spatial lags in the model specification with the global time trend (Table 37) 
shows, that their inclusion hardly affects the coefficient size and the significance level of the 
remaining control variables. This provides confidence in the results of previous studies, which 
do not control for the potential spatial dependence, as there is no evidence that they suffer from 
an omitted variable bias. The results corroborate the previous findings, even though the 
coefficients of the spatial lags are generally somewhat smaller than in the main specification, 
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yet positive and statistically significant throughout. However, they lose their significance if 
they are estimated simultaneously in the smaller dataset which includes the control variable for 
the recognition rate (Mode XII), but this again is an artefact of the smaller sample size.  
 
For specific target contagion where the number of asylum seekers from source i in target j 
depends on the number of applicants from source i in other targets m, theory predicts a 
negative effect. As can be seen from the results in Table 33, this relationship is confirmed in 
the empirical analysis. To save space, only the coefficients of the temporal lag, the spatial lags 
and the recognition rate variable are shown. The estimation models include source and target 
specific time trends to account for unobserved spatial heterogeneity. As before, the temporal 
lag is positive and highly significant in all specifications. Model I presents the estimation 
results for the spatial lag where weights are allocated according to the difference in asylum 
policy, but these weights do not depend on other factors. Both spatial lags, for more restrictive 
and more liberal targets, are negative and significant at the 0.1 percent level. The coefficients 
indicate that in the short-run, a ten percent decrease in the number of applications from a 
source country in other more restrictive targets are associated with a 1.1 percent increase in the 
target under observation. Similarly, a ten percent increase in the number of applicants from a 
country of origin in more liberal destination countries leads to a decrease of 1.9 percent in a 
given target country. The corresponding long-term effects are 2.5 percent and 4.0 percent, 
respectively. This provides evidence that asylum seekers are deterred by restrictive asylum 
policy and attracted by a more lenient policy and that domestic asylum policy creates spill-over 
effects onto all other destination countries. 
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Table 33:  OLS estimation results for specific target contagion with source and target specific time trend 
Model I II III IV V VI 
Asylum seekers (ln, t-1) 0.527*** 0.541*** 0.539*** 0.533*** 0.542*** 0.543*** 
(71.31) (73.80) (73.39) (45.98) (47.36) (47.03) 
W: Asylum policy difference (more restrictive targets) -0.111*** -0.113*** 
(-13.91) (-9.77) 
W: Asylum policy difference (less restrictive targets) -0.187*** -0.162*** 
(-18.31) (-8.90) 
W: Asylum policy difference (more restrictive targets) x Common language 0.00315 -0.0412*** 
(0.49) (-4.51) 
W: Asylum policy difference (less restrictive targets) x Common language -0.0172** -0.0627*** 
(-2.74) (-7.22) 
W: Asylum policy difference (more restrictive targets) x Inverse distance -0.0518*** -0.0607*** 
(-7.51) (-6.36) 
W: Asylum policy difference (less restrictive targets) x Inverse distance -0.0609*** -0.0489*** 
(-8.35) (-4.24) 
Recognition rate (t-1) 0.0635 0.0675 0.057 
         (1.78) (1.88) (1.59) 
Observations 62,763 62,763 62,763 26,061 26,061 26,061 
Number of dyads 2,893 2,893 2,893 2,418 2,418 2,418 
R-squared 0.648 0.641 0.643 0.685 0.682 0.682 
Notes: Set of control variables as in Table 32; W: denotes the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; Robust standard errors clustered on dyads used; t-values 
shown in parentheses; Includes dyad-level fixed effects; Coefficients on source and target specific time trends not shown; * statistically significant at 0.05, ** 0.01, or *** 
0.001 level. 
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If the influence of more liberal and more restrictive destinations is limited to those with a 
common language (Model II), the spatial lag for more restrictive targets becomes positive, 
but far from significant. However, the spatial lag for more liberal targets is still negative 
and significant, albeit with a short-run elasticity of 0.017 it is considerably smaller than the 
effect in the first specification. While this result is still in line with the previous finding, no 
evidence is found for the hypothesis that targets with the same language are closer 
substitutes. Finally, if the influence of other targets is modelled not only to depend on the 
difference in asylum policy, but also to decrease with distance between the targets, the 
spatial lags are negative and highly significant (Model III). Yet, the coefficient size again is 
smaller rather than larger than in the first specification, indicating that geographically closer 
countries are not necessarily closer substitutes. This result is somewhat at odds with the 
anecdotal evidence presented by other authors (see Section 3). A possible explanation is 
that closer countries have a more similar asylum policy and therefore do exert less influence 
on each other. On the one hand, the difference in asylum policy might increase with 
distance between targets. On the other hand, the weighting matrix in Model III allocates less 
influence to more distant countries. If the former effect outweighs the latter, the total 
distance effect is positive. Model IV to VI presents the estimation results in the smaller 
sample, after controlling for the recognition rate. This variable has the right sign, but is 
marginally insignificant as a consequence of the target specific time trend. The spatial lags 
are comparable to the first sample, but both spatial lags, where the effect is restricted to 
targets with a common language, are negative and significant (Model V). The relative effect 
sizes of the spatial lags, however, are as before. 
 
So far, specific source and specific target contagion are estimated separately; however, 
there is no reason to assume that the two effects are independent or mutually exclusive. 
Therefore, Table 34 depicts the results of estimation models which include both types of 
spatial dependence. Due to space restrictions, only the non-interacted weighting matrix for 
difference in asylum policies is taken as a measure for specific target contagion and added 
to the previous set of estimation models. Again, all estimations encompass a source and 
target specific time trend to account for unobserved spatial heterogeneity. As before, all 
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spatial lags are in line with expectations: the coefficients for the spatial lags controlling for 
specific source contagion are positive and highly significant, whereas the spatial lags for 
specific target contagion are negative and significant at the 0.1 percent level throughout. 
Yet, the coefficients are affected by estimating the spatial effects simultaneously. Most 
importantly, the elasticity of the temporal lag increases from slightly more than 0.5 to 
around 0.75, indicating a much higher time dependency than before. As a consequence, the 
difference between the short-term and the long-term effect becomes larger. Second, the 
coefficients of the spatial lags that measure specific source contagion are also inflated, with 
an increase between 29 percent for spatial lag with the common region weighting matrix 
(Model II) and 84 percent for the spatial lag with the common language weighting matrix 
(Model IV). This pattern persists if all spatial lags are estimated together (Model V) and 
with the exception of the spatial lag using the common region weighting matrix also in the 
smaller dataset, but after controlling for the recognition rate (Model VI to X). There are also 
some changes in the significance levels in the most comprehensive Models V and X, since 
the spatial lag using the common language weighting matrix remains significant in Model 
V, as does the spatial lag with the inverse distance weighting matrix in Model X. Third, the 
spatial lag for the difference in asylum policy for more liberal targets becomes considerably 
smaller, while the spatial lag for targets with a more restrictive asylum policy is hardly 
affected.  
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Table 34:  OLS estimation results for specific source and specific target contagion with source and target specific time trend 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
Asylum seekers (ln, t-1) 0.743*** 0.750*** 0.737*** 0.763*** 0.730*** 0.799*** 0.805*** 0.797*** 0.819*** 0.789*** 
 (119.4) (126.7) (118.4) (137.5) (114.3) (110.8) (111.2) (108.9) (123.6) (104.0) 
Specific source contagion  
W: Contiguity (t-1) 0.110*** 0.0466*** 0.108*** 0.0505*** 
 (16.88) (5.74) (13.27) (4.52) 
W: Common region (t-1) 0.155*** 0.0638*** 0.144*** 0.0669*** 
 (16.73) (5.91) (11.64) (4.65) 
W: Inverse distance (t-1) 0.160*** 0.0780*** 0.140*** 0.0599*** 
 (17.65) (6.74) (13.10) (4.16) 
W: Common language (t-1) 0.0898*** 0.0287*** 0.0679*** 0.0131 
 (11.49) (3.46) (7.66) (1.38) 
Specific target contagion 
 
W: Asylum policy difference   
(more restrictive targets) -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.106*** -0.097*** -0.094*** -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.094*** 
 (-17.19) (-16.72) (-17.39) (-17.66) (-16.78) (-10.79) (-10.30) (-10.93) (-11.11) (-10.31) 
W: Asylum policy difference  
(less restrictive targets) -0.139*** -0.142*** -0.138*** -0.139*** -0.143*** -0.111*** -0.116*** -0.110*** -0.113*** -0.115*** 
 (-16.15) (-16.28) (-16.12) (-16.09) (-16.38) (-8.50) (-8.92) (-8.46) (-8.73) (-8.76) 
Recognition rate (t-1)  0.0138 0.0158 0.0212 0.00821 0.0255 
   (0.47) (0.53) (0.72) (0.28) (0.86) 
Observations 62,752 62,752 62,752 62,752 62,752 26,061 26,061 26,061 26,061 26,061 
Number of dyads 2,893 2,893 2,893 2,893 2,893 2,418 2,418 2,418 2,418 2,418 
R-squared 0.876 0.876 0.877 0.875 0.877 0.883 0.883 0.883 0.882 0.884 
Notes: Set of control variables as in Table 32; W: denotes the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; Robust standard errors clustered on dyads used; t-values 
shown in parentheses; Includes dyad-level fixed effects; Coefficients on source and target specific time trends not shown; * statistically significant at 0.05, ** 0.01, or *** 
0.001 level. 
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4.7. Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to analyse whether the number of asylum seekers from one source 
country in a host nation depends on the number of asylum migrants from other source countries 
in the same destination and on the number of applications in other target countries. There are 
two main arguments for the existence of the first phenomenon, called specific source 
contagion: First, personal migrant networks might not be constrained to migrants from the 
same source country, but they also work across borders, just as ethnicities are not geared to 
national boundaries. These personal networks facilitate transition and reduce assimilation and 
risk cost in the host country by supplying information about agents and assistance in the search 
for accommodation and employment. Thereby, existing migrants provide a positive externality 
which makes asylum migration from geographically close source countries more likely. 
Second, most asylum seekers rely on the services of people smugglers who invest time and 
money to gather information about the asylum regime in host countries and the most promising 
routes as well as to make contacts with carriers. Migration along well established routes 
reduces both costs and risk for the migrant or makes migration possible in the first place. This 
is not only true for refugees on the main routes, but also for those stemming from countries 
through which these main routes run and those using smaller feeder routes to access the major 
routes. The second form of spatial dependence, namely specific target contagion, arises if 
asylum seekers are deflected by a more restrictive asylum policy in one target country and 
incentivised to lodge their application in another destination country. Many policy measures, 
for example visa restrictions or lower recognition rates, are targeted against asylum seekers 
from a specific source country. As a consequence, the number of asylum seekers from a source 
country in a given target country should depend on the number of applications from that 
country of origin in other target countries.  
 
The results confirm the existence of both specific source and specific target contagion. As 
expected, the number of asylum seekers from a source country increases the size of the 
migration flow from geographically close other source countries. Only limited evidence, 
however, is found that these network effects extend to migrants from other remote source 
countries in which the same language is spoken as in the source country in question. The 
estimation results also confirm the existence of specific target contagion, since an increase in 
the number of asylum seekers in all other destination countries is associated with a decrease in 
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the number of applications in a given target country. This lends support to the deflection 
hypothesis. 
 
Both findings have important policy implications: Hatton (2004) argues that the time-
dependency limits the effectiveness of asylum policies to reduce the number of asylum seekers. 
This is because the stock of migrants who are already in the host country decreases the costs 
for subsequent migrants, but those already residing in the target country are not affected by the 
policy measures. The same argument applies for policy actions that are targeted against 
refugees from a given source country. Targeted asylum policy falls short since it does not 
affect the number of applications from other source countries, but these migrants provide a 
benefit to migrants from the country against which the policy measures are directed and 
thereby undermine their effectiveness. Despite some efforts to harmonise asylum policy to 
share the burden of asylum, particularly in the European Union, most asylum measures remain 
unilateral. Policy restrictions provide a negative externality to other target countries since the 
flow of asylum seekers is deflected and these other countries experience higher application 
numbers. As a consequence of such a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, governments have an 
incentive to engage in a race-to-the-bottom and lower the standards until they run into severe 
conflicts with a nation’s obligation under human rights treaties such as the Geneva Convention 
(Neumayer 2004). This negative externality provides a further reason for policy harmonisation 
and common standards in asylum policy, so that not only a minimum treatment to refugees is 
guaranteed, but also that the negative impact of a government’s actions on other countries is 
limited. 
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Appendix 
Table 35:  List of target countries and first year of detailed data availability 
Australia (1996), Austria (1980), Belgium (1980), Canada (1989), Czech Republic (1990), 
Denmark (1984), Finland (1981), France (1981), Germany (1980), Greece (1980), Hungary 
(1995), Iceland (1997), Ireland (1991), Italy (1980), Japan (1996), Luxembourg (1995), 
Netherlands (1980), New Zealand (2001), Norway (1985), Poland (1991), Portugal (1982), 
Spain (1982), Sweden (1981), Switzerland (1980), United Kingdom (1980), United States 
(1987) 
Notes: List of target countries used to calculate the spatial lags; due to data availability of the control variables, 
countries in italics are excluded from the estimation.  
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Table 36:  List of source countries 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Arab Republic of Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, 
Former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo), Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Democratic Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macao, 
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, 
Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, 
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, West Bank and 
Gaza, Republic of Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Notes: List of sources countries used to calculate the spatial lags; due to data availability of the control variables, 
countries in italics are excluded from the estimation.  
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Table 37:  OLS estimation results for specific source contagion with general time trend 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
Asylum seekers (ln, t-1) 0.628*** 0.609*** 0.618*** 0.609*** 0.623*** 0.608*** 0.659*** 0.647*** 0.649*** 0.647*** 0.653*** 0.644*** 
(92.30) (78.90) (78.81) (78.68) (86.70) (75.60) (63.95) (58.99) (57.82) (58.62) (62.26) (57.27) 
W: Contiguity (t-1) 0.0682*** 0.0530*** 0.0536*** 0.0197 
(9.00) (5.04) (4.32) (0.99) 
W: Common region (t-1) 0.0511*** -0.0165 0.0691*** 0.028 
(4.42) (-1.00) (3.87) (1.14) 
W: Inverse distance (t-1) 0.0792*** 0.0393* 0.0650*** 0.026 
(8.03) (2.48) (4.47) (1.08) 
W: Common language (t-1) 0.0356*** -0.00393 0.0463*** 0.0107 
(3.38) (-0.30) (3.42) (0.65) 
Recognition rate (t-1) 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 
(3.63) (3.63) (3.69) (3.66) (3.70) (3.68) 
Unemployment rate target  -0.008*** -0.0075** -0.0076** -0.0073** -0.0076** -0.0074** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
(-3.34) (-3.24) (-3.27) (-3.14) (-3.27) (-3.19) (-3.62) (-3.80) (-3.82) (-3.71) (-3.74) (-3.83) 
Population target (ln) 0.977*** 0.740** 0.783** 0.704** 0.866*** 0.732** 0.641 0.525 0.461 0.5 0.559 0.45 
(4.14) (3.13) (3.28) (2.97) (3.63) (3.07) (1.27) (1.04) (0.91) (0.99) (1.11) (0.89) 
GDP per capita target (ln) 0.332*** 0.283*** 0.299*** 0.292*** 0.312*** 0.287*** 0.193 0.152 0.144 0.162 0.164 0.139 
(4.49) (3.79) (4.00) (3.90) (4.21) (3.83) (0.82) (0.64) (0.61) (0.69) (0.70) (0.59) 
Asylum policy target (t-1) -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
(-3.61) (-3.99) (-3.89) (-4.09) (-3.77) (-4.05) (-4.47) (-4.52) (-4.52) (-4.53) (-4.56) (-4.56) 
Population source (ln) 0.228** 0.201** 0.222** 0.192** 0.213** 0.193** 0.687*** 0.657*** 0.730*** 0.665*** 0.697*** 0.687*** 
(3.19) (2.76) (3.05) (2.64) (2.93) (2.65) (4.84) (4.59) (5.13) (4.66) (4.91) (4.82) 
GDP per capita source (ln) -0.214*** -0.223*** -0.219*** -0.217*** -0.215*** -0.221*** -0.341*** -0.349*** -0.341*** -0.340*** -0.339*** -0.343*** 
(-8.18) (-8.60) (-8.25) (-8.27) (-8.13) (-8.50) (-6.29) (-6.42) (-6.22) (-6.21) (-6.20) (-6.28) 
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Table 37:      OLS estimation results for specific source contagion with general time trend (continued) 
 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
Share urban population source 0.0099*** 0.0103*** 0.0103*** 0.0107*** 0.0100*** 0.0104*** 0.0179*** 0.0179*** 0.0176*** 0.0180*** 0.0177*** 0.0177*** 
(5.05) (5.28) (5.26) (5.52) (5.11) (5.42) (3.71) (3.69) (3.59) (3.73) (3.65) (3.64) 
Share population 15-64 source 0.00405 0.00547 0.00553 0.00700* 0.00365 0.00618* 0.00732 0.00744 0.00947 0.00924 0.00637 0.00879 
(1.40) (1.90) (1.90) (2.42) (1.26) (2.10) (1.32) (1.34) (1.70) (1.65) (1.15) (1.55) 
Disaster deaths source (ln) 0.00142 0.00147 0.0014 0.00111 0.00146 0.00131 -0.00515 -0.00512 -0.00535 -0.00536 -0.00529 -0.00533 
(0.68) (0.71) (0.67) (0.53) (0.70) (0.63) (-1.60) (-1.59) (-1.66) (-1.66) (-1.65) (-1.66) 
Battle fatalities source (ln) 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
(7.30) (7.12) (7.21) (7.03) (7.18) (7.06) (6.02) (5.84) (5.92) (5.87) (5.96) (5.84) 
Political terror source 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.137*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.139*** 0.138*** 0.140*** 
(15.35) (15.43) (15.47) (15.31) (15.40) (15.33) (10.82) (11.02) (10.97) (10.98) (10.86) (11.00) 
Democracy source -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.01*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
(-5.21) (-5.66) (-5.60) (-5.80) (-5.46) (-5.71) (-4.54) (-4.77) (-4.80) (-4.78) (-4.78) (-4.87) 
ODA commitment (t-1) 0.00231* 0.00216* 0.00233* 0.00227* 0.00238* 0.00216* 0.000237 0.000267 0.000246 0.000283 0.000155 0.000251 
(2.35) (2.21) (2.37) (2.33) (2.43) (2.22) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.10) (0.16) 
Constant -22.26*** -17.45*** -18.69*** -16.95*** -19.97*** -17.30*** -22.45* -19.59* -19.77* -19.56* -20.91* -18.80* 
  (-5.16) (-4.01) (-4.23) (-3.88) (-4.55) (-3.91) (-2.35) (-2.05) (-2.07) (-2.04) (-2.20) (-1.96) 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 62,752 62,752 62,752 62,752 62,752 62,752 26,061 26,061 26,061 26,061 26,061 26,061 
Number of dyads 2,893 2,893 2,893 2,893 2,893 2,893 2,418 2,418 2,418 2,418 2,418 2,418 
R-squared 0.51 0.512 0.511 0.511 0.51 0.512 0.482 0.483 0.482 0.483 0.482 0.483 
Notes: W: denotes the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; Robust standard errors clustered on dyads used; t-values shown in parentheses; Includes dyad-level fixed 
effects; Coefficients on (t-1) year dummies not displayed; * statistically significant at 0.05, ** 0.01, or *** 0.001 level. 
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5. Conclusion 
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Contrary to the work on spatial dependence in monadic data, empirical studies on spatial 
dependence in dyadic datasets are still scarce. So far, only a very limited number of studies 
have been published, but all of them show that spatial dependence is a wide-spread 
phenomenon also in dyadic data.  This thesis contributed to filling this gap in the literature 
by analysing spatial dependence in the diffusion of double taxation treaties (DTT), official 
development assistance (ODA) and asylum migration. In all three applications, 
comprehensive evidence for spatial dependence is found. In the first case, it is shown that 
the propensity that a given country-pair signs a tax treaty is positively influenced by treaty-
signing behaviour of other countries. Particularly, a treaty conclusion will be more likely if 
competitors for foreign direct investment entered such a DTT. This result confirms the 
theoretical argument by Baistrocchi (2008) that net-capital-importers find themselves in a 
situation which can be described as a prisoners’ dilemma: while net-capital-importers 
individually should not sign tax treaties with major capital exporters, collectively they have 
an incentive to do so. This is because on the one hand a tax treaty with a major capital 
exporter could lead to a considerable loss in tax revenues for net-capital-importers. On the 
other hand, such a treaty can provide a competitive advantage in the rivalry for foreign 
capital. If one country enters a DTT with an important source country of foreign 
investment, it gains an advantage over other countries without such a treaty. Therefore, 
other focal countries have an incentive to follow suit and to negotiate such a treaty 
themselves. However, in such a situation, no country has a competitive advantage, but all 
net-capital-importers face decreasing tax revenues. In the second case, it is demonstrated 
that aid from a donor to a recipient is not independent from aid from other donors to the 
same beneficiary. Yet, there is little evidence for strategic interaction among donors, in the 
course of which aid is used as a mean to pursue their national economic and military 
interests. Rather, the results suggest that smaller donors tend to follow the aid allocation 
decisions of the important players. The third application analysed spatial dependence in 
bilateral asylum flows, both on the source and the target side. It was argued that personal 
migrant networks which work across borders reduce the risk of transition and therefore 
foster asylum migration. Furthermore, the design and increasing efficiency of international 
human trafficking routes lower the cost of transportation from countries which are adjacent 
to major source countries. Finally, it has been demonstrated that asylum seekers are 
deflected by a tighter asylum policy in one country and encouraged to lodge their 
application in a target country with a more liberal stance towards asylum seekers.  
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All three examples show that spatial dependence in dyadic data is a widespread 
phenomenon. Practically all empirical studies which are based on a dyadic framework, for 
instance those employing the standard gravity-model, can be augmented to test for spatial 
contagion. This is appropriate if theory suggests the existence of such spatial dependence 
among dyads, dyad-members, sources or targets. In fact, as the example of official 
development assistance showed, some studies control for spatial dependence, but the lack 
of theory and justification for the choice of the weighting matrix indicate that authors are 
not consciously analysing spatial contagion.  
 
Compared to monadic data, modelling spatial dependence in dyadic data is somewhat more 
complex. This is not only because there are five different forms of spatial contagion in 
directed dyads, but also because the weighting matrix allows for a large variety of choices. 
Both the concrete form of spatial dependence as well as the weighting matrix used need to 
be theoretically justified, as the results might strongly depend on how spatial dependence 
modelled. By describing and naming the different forms of spatial dependence both in 
undirected and directed dyads, Neumayer and Plümper (2010a) have raised the issue in the 
empirical literature and paved the way for more applications. Even though the calculation 
of the spatial lags remains computationally intensive, particularly for specific source and 
specific target contagion, the ado-files for STATA by Neumayer and Plümper (2010b) 
allow an easy access and provide a convenient way to compute spatial lags for the applied 
researcher.  
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